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A necessary explanation
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
The murder of Allende
And the end of the Chilean way to socialism

Róbinson Rojas
Harper and Row, New York, 1975,1976-Fitzhenry&Whiteside Ltd., Toronto, Canada, 1975
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 2


In April 1970, the presidential campaigns were providing a few
surprises to the "experts" who had decided that Salvador Allende
was "politically dead". The Socialist Senator who was the Unidad
Popular's candidate had already been defeated in three presidential
elections, in 1952, 1958, and 1964. However, public opinion polls
showed that in the north and south of the country, in the
industrial concentration at Concepcion and in Santiago, the
capital, sympathy for Allende, especially among the labourers,
peasants, and office workers, assured him of more than 35 percent
of the vote. Since there were three candidates (the other two were
former President Jorge Alessandri and a Christian Democratic
Senator, Radomiro Tomic), there were "great possibilities" that
Allende would win by a narrow margin.

In the last week of April an important meeting was held at the
house of Patricio Rojas, President Frei's Minister of the Interior.
It was attended by Andres Zaldivar, the Treasury Minister; Patricio
Aylwin, a Christian Democratic Senator; Pedro Ibanez, a National
Party (conservative) Senator; and the director of the Paper and Box
Manufacturers, Arturo Matte Larrain. The topic of conversation was
how to prevent Salvador Allende from becoming President should he
win the election.

The Chilean Constitution decreed that if the winning presidential
candidate did "not obtain the half plus one of the vote", then,
fifty days later, the Parliament "could proclaim President
whichever of the candidates had obtained the first two
pluralities". That is, Parliament could elect the "runner-up". The
meeting's participants decided to launch a public opinion campaign
to get "Allende's runner up" elected. To provide a veneer of
"national legitimacy" to this manoeuvre, the participants agreed to
ask the Army's commander in chief, General Rene Schneider Chereau,
to declare publicly that the armed forces would "guarantee" the
election of the runner-up, if necessary.

Patricio Rojas talked to Schneider, and through Andres Zaldivar
they got to Agustin Edwards to tell the director of his newspaper,
EL MERCURIO, to interview the commander in chief. The interview
appeared on page one of the May 8 issue and established the
following points:

1. The Army will guarantee the constitutional verdict.

2. The Army is the guarantor of a normal election, in which the
candidate elected by the people or by the Chilean Congress in
plenary session will assume the presidency. (This was a key point:
Schneider was saying that the military would guarantee the
presidency to whoever won 51 percent of the vote in September -
impossible for Allende- or to the runner-up if the first [Allende]
got less than 51 percent.) In saying this, Schneider complied with
the Christian Democrat/Conservative collusion's request. But he
went beyond them, and spoke of "guaranteeing" only a "normal
election". This opened the possibility that the military would find
an election in which Allende won more than 51 percent of the votes
"abnormal", would annul it, and would call new elections.

"Political intervention is outside all our doctrines. We are the
guarantors of a legal process on which the entire constitutional
life of our country is based.

"If abnormal events occur [internal disruption], our obligation is
to prevent them from obstructing what is intended by the
Constitution." (In these two points, Schneider makes it clear that
the military will not take the side of any political party, but
that they will act should the system of North American imperialist
and Chilean big business control be threatened.)

"Whoever is very restless about certain ideas, certain tendencies,
or certain political activities and wants to participate in them
had better take off his uniform and embrace them as a civilian."
(Schneider was here warning a small percentage of middle-level
officers who showed some sympathy for Allende's candidacy. He was
also calling attention to the threatening recurrence of progressive
ideas among the officers, after the great internal cleanup of 1961-
1962 when those suspected of sympathizing with "socialist ideas"
were forced into retirement.)

But when September 4, 1970, arrived, the political situation was
very different from what had been envisioned. The election results
were predictable enough (Allende with 1,075,000 votes -36.3
percent; Alessandri with 1,036,000 votes -34.9 percent; and Tomic
with 824,000 votes -27.8 percent). But Allende's relatively skimpy
victory was greeted with a great explosion of enthusiasm by his
million sympathizers. That night there were parties in the streets
and demonstrations in Santiago, Valparaiso, Concepcion, and the
other important cities. And, totally unexpected, large sectors of
Christian Democratic youths and workers came out to join the Unidad
Popular demonstrations, making a kind of spontaneous "anti-
imperialist front". All this would have clearly made it a rash and
brutal move to elect, fifty days after the fact, the runner-up as
President of Chile.

In addition, Radomiro Tomic (who did not know about the intended
ploy of his party leaders) visited Allende at his home at noon on
September 5 to "salute him as the winner and future President".
Allende, before hundreds of newspapermen, embraced Tomic and
answered, "Your moral gesture consolidates our friendship of more
than thirty years."

Obviously a new way would have to be found to dissolve Allende's
victory. All day Sunday, September 6, secret meetings went on
between Senators Pedro Ibanez and Francisco Bulnes (on behalf of
Alessandri) and the Ministers of the Treasury, Andres Zaldivar;
Defense, Sergio Ossa Pretot; Economy, Carlos Figueroa; and the
Interior, Patricio Rojas (on behalf of the Frei government). The
commanders in chief of the Air Force, General Carlos Guerraty;
Navy, Admiral Jorge Porta Angulo; and military police, General
Vicente Huerta; and the head of the Santiago garrison, Army General
Camilo Valenzuela, were having a separate meeting of their own.

Immediately afterward, two members of the military made a proposal
to General Schneider. It was a very simple one: to convince Eduardo
Frei that it was necessary to prevent, at any cost, the
ratification of Allende's victory in Parliament. This was to be
accomplished by means of a military insurrection which would result
in Frei's resignation, the appointment of a governing military
junta, and the calling of new presidential elections between only
two candidates after a six-month period. To warrant this military
insurrection, a plan of social chaos was proposed, involving
"financial panic" and a "wave of terrorist acts".

General Schneider was agreeable but made two stipulations: one, that
he would not become a member of that military junta and would
retire from active duty at the moment of the planned insurrection;
and two, that the U.S. military mission had to be informed of these
plans, to obtain "their support" or "the benefit of their

That Sunday afternoon, the conspirators put their plan into action,
beginning with a gigantic network of telephone calls warning people
that "the Marxists will wind up with all the money" and that they
should "withdraw all savings and deposits in bank accounts". On
Monday morning, September 7, the branches of the commercial and
federal banks, and the savings and loan associations, opened to
long lines of depositors who wanted to withdraw their money. Two
weeks after the elections, 611 million escudos (some $50 million)
had been withdrawn from current accounts in the private sector of
the commercial banks and the State Bank; 54 million escudos (about
$4.5 million) had been withdrawn from savings in the State Bank;
the withdrawal against adjustment bonds was 11 million escudos
($900,000); and the savings and loan associations suffered
withdrawals of 322 million escudos (over $26 million).

The large oligopolies began to demand full payment for sales of
raw materials previously made on instalment to medium-sized and
small businesses. At the same time, the large oligopolies stopped
buying from the medium-sized and small businesses. This situation
was intended to set the interests of these two categories against
those of the labourers, peasants, and office workers who
sympathized with Allende.

The "financial panic" was completed with the flight of foreign
currency, dollar speculation on the black market, and the artificial
increase of trips abroad, all in illegal manoeuvres protected by
Frei's Ministers of the Treasury and the Economy.

The sale of dollars for trips abroad, which from January to August
1970 had averaged $5.3 million per month, rose to $17.5 million in
September and $13.6 million in October. The official price of the
dollar was 12.2 escudos, but on the black market it reached a high
of 70 escudos.

On October 13 the directors of the Confederation of Small Businesses
and Manufacturers reported on "the percentage of decrease in
business activity: Santiago, 53 percent; Arica, 28 percent;
Antofagasta, 20 percent; Coquimbo, 83 percent; Valparaiso, 30
percent; Colchagua, 50 percent; Concepcion, 33 percent; Los Angeles,
53 percent." In alarm they pointed out that "in the whole country,
sales have gone down 38.4 percent" and "we have work only for the
next fifteen days and resources for wage payment for twenty more

On September 23, performing his role in the plot, Frei's Treasury
Minister, Andres Zaldivar, gave a speech over national radio and
television citing terrifying statistics about the financial calamity
and reporting that "the economic situation of the post-election
period stemmed from psychological factors" and that "the more than
probable results of this situation would be a complete and
generalized economic disaster."

The "financial panic" part of the plot had been achieved to
perfection. What then kept the conspirators from succeeding in
their aim to prevent Allende from assuming power?

Through Arturo Matte Larrain, one of the owners belonging to the
gigantic Paper and Box Manufacturers, the conspirators had
established a bridge between President Eduardo Frei and ITT. Along
with the CIA, ITT was giving its support to a coup that would prevent
Allende's ratification by the Chilean Parliament. Matte Larrain's
contacts were the Americans Robert Berrellez and Hal Hendrix, both
ITT public relations officers.

On September 8, Matte Larrain informed Frei that ITT was lobbying in
Washington to get the U.S. government to support a "military junta"
that would prevent Allende's ratification, and that a general plan
of "pressure" had already been agreed on by the various U.S. private
industries in Chile. According to the plan, banks would not give
new credits or extend those already approved; the companies would
delay in delivering products, cash remittances, replacement parts,
and the like, would withdraw all technical assistance, and "would
pressure savings and loan associations to declare bankruptcy."
According to a memo dated September 17, 1970, sent by ITT 
representatives in Chile, Hal Hendrix and Robert Berrellez, to
E. J. Gerrity, senior vice-president in charge of public relations
for ITT, in New York, the State Department had given its green light
to Ambassador Edward Korry to do all possible to prevent Allende from
taking power. Berrellez and Hendrix had asked Matte to assure Frei
that ITT was ready to contribute money or whatever else was necessary.

According to the same ITT memo, Frei's response was along the
following lines: he felt he could not shatter his image as a democrat,
so if the situation continued to develop, he hoped that he would be
thrown out and sent into exile for a while. He would not do anything
to prevent the financial and economic collapse from cultivating
public receptivity to a military coup that would reorganize things.
However, he refused absolutely to do anything to attract public
suspicion to himself. He felt he had to guard his public image.12

Matte Larrain, through ITT's Hendrix, was asked to persuade Frei
to take a more active role. Frei never decided to take that step.

At the same time, Brigadier General Valenzuela, commander of the
Santiago garrison, had contacted retired General Viaux to form a
"crash team" to instigate acts of terrorism throughout the country.
Viaux's group was aided by Enrique Schilling, private secretary to
Radical Senator Julio Duran, as well as by a growing group of
university students led by the lawyer Pablo Rodriguez Grez.

The terrorists began work in mid-September, depending for protection
on director general of military police Vicente Huerta, and for
technical advice on two members of Army intelligence (SIM).

The scheme was successful except that Frei was not actively
collaborating, and the victorious candidate, Allende, was rapidly
establishing contacts with the Chilean armed forces to "clarify his
program". Edward Korry, the U.S. ambassador, began to get nervous and
sent highly insolent messages to Frei, one of them saying, "Tell him
it is time to put his pants on".

For his part, Allende let the generals know (through Manuel Torres
de la Cruz, Herman Brady, and Rene Schneider) that those who opposed
his ratification were making a mistake, for the following reasons:
never in Chilean history had the runner-up been elected in a plenary
session. The million Chileans who elected him would not accept such
a decision. "My program" is one of "developing state capitalism" and
is not socialist. "The reforms" of "my program" are "the only
peaceful way left for this system."13

Allende's declarations, on another front, had been repeated to the
Christian Democratic leaders who were not implicated in the military
coup: Renan Fuentealba and Bernardo Leighton, both of whom carried
great weight with their party's leadership. From there arose the idea
of making Allende sign a "Statute of Democratic Guarantees", to be
incorporated into the Chilean Constitution and to serve as Allende's
certificate of "non-Marxist" conduct. On October 8 this statute had
already been drawn up and approved by both the Christian Democrats
and the Unidad Popular. The statute ensured that at least that a
majority of Christian Democratic legislators would vote for Allende on
October 24, giving him enough ballots to be elected.

As Allende's conversations during the first week of October were
bearing fruit with the Christian Democrats, his messages and
conversations with the military leaders were also showing their
effect. Schneider had kept the U.S. military mission in Santiago
abreast of everything that happened; this information was relayed
to the Pentagon. The Pentagon evaluated the situation, and in early
October the U.S. military mission informed Schneider that "the
whole plan is cancelled." On October 15, Schneider gave a talk on the
subject at the Army's Polytechnic Academy, repeating the instructions
the U.S. generals had relayed from Washington:14

1. We should not act stupidly in such a delicate moment in the
constitutional life of Chile. The armed forces cannot at this time
"detain evolution and change". Our duty is "to accept them", to
take care that they develop in an orderly fashion and without disturbing
the peace.

2. "Pessimism and loss of faith" can lead us into believing that
"the Marxist enemy is at the door" and into mistakenly "going to
extremes" to fight him.

3. A very significant group of Chileans "is not at this time
disposed to allow to be snatched away from them an election victory that
they believe will change the course of their lives." Our duty is to let
these people make their experiment, but without harming others,
without harming our Fatherland or our institutional life.

4. "Senator Salvador Allende has given us assurances" that he will
remain within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws, that his
"program of change" will not pose a threat to our Western,
Christian way of life. The Senator has said something to me personally
with which I concur: at this point in time, a government like Senator
Allende's is the only type of government that can prevent a violent
and tragic people's insurrection from exploding.

5. We, the armed forces, who are the guarantors that this society
will continue being "Western and Christian", will have to "wait and
see what happens." The future will tell us whether we must intervene
to put things back in their proper places, or whether Senator
Salvador Allende will keep his promise to "guide" the people's
restlessness and "prevent the insurrection of the have-nots".

The Chilean Army's commander in chief had passed the word on to the
Army high command. It was also passed on to the director general of
the military police and the commanders in chief of the Air Force and
Navy. When Jorge Porta Angulo relayed it to his corps of admirals,
four of them met with Allende to ask him if what was being said in
the armed forces about him was true. Allende confirmed all the ideas
Schneider had divulged. Admiral Porta Angulo resigned his post and
was replaced by the commander of the First Naval District
(Valparaiso), Vice-Admiral Hugo Barrios Tirado.15

What had happened in the first week of October 1970 was that the
Pentagon had said NO to a military coup in Chile. The Chilean generals
were left with the awkward task of dismantling the already functioning
coup machinery. The Pentagon's decision made a tremendous impact in
the CIA, which had hoped to go ahead anyway. The lack of coordination
among the Pentagon, President Nixon, and the CIA was to create a
fragmentation in the team of conspirators, by now reduced to retired
General Roberto Viaux's "crash team".

Robert Berrellez's and Hal Hendrix's memoranda to the vice-president
of ITT in New York, beginning in September 1970, have made this lack
of coordination with the Pentagon famous. In a memo dated Santiago de
Chile, September 17, and sent to Edward Gerrity in New York, Hendrix
and Berrellez reported: "Late Tuesday night (September 15), Ambassador
Edward Korry finally received a message from the State Department
giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon.
The message gave him maximum authority to do all possible -short of a
Dominican Republic-type action- to keep Allende from taking power".
The same report added that we should "bring what pressure we can on
USIS in Washington to instruct the Santiago USIS to start moving the
MERCURIO editorials around Latin America and into Europe".

The report added that Arturo Matte Larrain believed that Eduardo Frei
had not yet made up his mind, that "a subtle but firm enough pressure
must be brought to bear on Frei," and that "the MERCURIO chain is
hitting at Allende and the Communist party with effect."16

That is, on September 15, President Nixon appeared to be giving the
"green light" to the conspiracy while the Pentagon was still analyzing
the situation.

On September 30, Gerrity sent word to Messrs. Merriam, Neal, and Ryan
of ITT that in Chile, Jack Guilfoyle, a New York ITT vice-president,
"was advised of the following by Enno Hobbing of the CIA: Hobbing was
visited yesterday by Gregorio Amunategui, who is an Alessandri
representative. Gregorio had come from Santiago and his message to
Hobbing from Alessandri was -keep cool, don't rock the boat, we are
making progress-. This is in direct contrast to what Broe

On October 9, the ITT vice-president in Washington, William Merriam,
sent a report to John McCone, a former CIA director, in which he
wrote sarcastically that he was "rather surprised" to learn that
"the Nixon Administration will take a very, very hard line when and
if Allende is elected," and disappointedly remarked that "this is the
first heartening thing I have heard."18  Obviously, there had been
quite a shift in policy from that cited in the September 17, 1970,
memo from  Hendrix and Berrellez to ITT's E. J. Gerrity, stating that
Ambassador Edward Korry had been advised to move in the name of
President Nixon to prevent Allende from taking power.

By that time, it would appear that the Pentagon had given Nixon its
opinion and had ordered its man in Santiago, Schneider, to defuse the
coup. But ITT persisted. On October 16, Edward Gerrity in New York
heard from Hal Hendrix that "the chance of a military coup is slim
but it continues to exist.
"A key figure in this possibility is former Brigadier General Roberto
Viaux." But he warned: "It is a fact that word passed to Viaux from
Washington to hold back last week. It was felt that he was not 
adequately prepared... Emissaries pointed out to him that if he moved
prematurely and lost, hist defeat would be tantamount to a 'Bay of
Pigs in Chile'." 19

Hendrix was not telling Gerrity everything. On October 3, Hendrix's
associate, Robert Berrellez, had met with Roberto Viaux and his
brother-in-law Raul Igualt at the Santiago Country Club to discuss
the news that Washington wanted Viaux to cancel the coup. Viaux told
Berrellez that he had heard from General Schneider that the project
was cancelled. Berrellez was of the opinion that there was a traitor
somewhere, and persuaded Viaux to go ahead. The general said that a
phoney kidnapping of the commander in chief, Rene Schneider, was being
contemplated to create two or three days of tension. This would be
followed by the overthrow of Frei and the appointment of a military
junta headed by Camilo Valenzuela. Berrellez said the kidnapping
should be a real one. He also reported to Hendrix that Viaux seemed
furious at Schneider and agreed that if there was a traitor, it had
to be the commander in chief of the Army.

On October 21, after General Schneider had already dismantled the
coup, Hal Hendrix had told his superiors in New York: "Now there is
general resignation that Allende will win easily in the Congress...
In spite of the forementioned, there remains in Chile a faint whisper
of hope -or wishful thinking- that a military coup will be staged to
prevent Allende from assuming the presidency...some civilian and
military personnel continue to look toward former Brigadier General
Roberto Viaux to lead a military action." 20

That same day, the group directed by ex-General Viaux was preparing
the last details of the plan to use the "traitor Schneider" to create
the social chaos which would lead to a military coup.

On the morning of October 22, Viaux dispatched a team to "liquidate
the traitor". General Schneider was shot inside his Mercedes-Benz.
He died three days later, after the Plenary Congress had elected
Salvador Allende President.

On October 25, Hendrix reported to New York: "Contrary to the
general expectation, the military did not move against Allende over
the weekend. It was believed that the killing of Schneider was the
prelude to the coup." 21

Since the Pentagon had told the Chilean generals NOT TO MOVE, they
did not move, even after the assassination of their commander in chief.

Allende agreed with Schneider's successor, General Carlos Prats
Gonzalez, to "investigate the Schneider case in such a way as not to
provoke a rift in the armed forces" -in other words, not to
investigate the real causes, the true extent of the Chilean generals'
complicity in the coup and with the Pentagon, as well as the
participation of Frei's Cabinet ministers. Prats would vouch for the
Army's "loyalty" to Allende, if Allende would not force him to
investigate. This was the first of several dangerous agreements
Allende made with the Chilean generals that moved him into their
line of fire. 22

The armed forces agreed to sacrifice Vicente Huerta, the director
general of the military police; Admiral Hugo Barrios Tirado, commander
in chief of the Navy; and Carlos Guerraty, commander in chief of the
Air Force. They were replaced by Jose Maria Sepulveda Galindez,
military police; Cesar Ruiz Danyau, Air Force; and Raul Montero, Navy.
These three, together with Carlos Prats, urged Allende not to replace
the rest of the generals (as was the custom every time the President
of the Republic changed), in order to "protect institutional stability
and cohesion". Once again, Allende acceded.

However, Allende took advantage of the military's reluctance to allow
the truth to be revealed by exploiting General Schneider's
assassination as the supposed proof that "over and above all things,
the Chilean armed forces are professional and respectful of the
Constitution and the laws". Allende thus converted Schneider into a
symbol of "loyalty to the Fatherland". He did this so successfully
that, judging from later events, he even convinced himself of it.
He had lost sight of the truth: Schneider had been obeying Pentagon
orders until his death, and the Pentagon machinery inside the Chilean
armed forces remained intact. Allende was agreeing to leave it intact.
This was to prove a fatal mistake.

[11] For a detailed examination of the conspirational meetings of
civilian politicians and the military in October 1970, see 'El caso
Schneider. Operacion Alfa', Section of Special Documents, Editora
Nacional Quimantu, Santiago, 1972; Eduardo Labarca, 'Chile al
Rojo', Ediciones de la Universidad Tecnica del Estado, April, 1971;
Sergio Ramos, 'Chile: Una economia en transicion?', Casa de Las
Americas, La Habana, 1972, pp. 260-286; PURO CHILE issues
throughout November 1970; and the transcript of the trial
attorney's report, published in EL SIGLO, June 5, 1971. General
Schneider's role in the plot was indirectly denounced, because the
political conditions at the time did not permit the destruction of
his "constitutional image", in CAUSA ML, No. 20, Jan-Feb 1971, and
in issues of EL PUEBLO, Feb., March, and April 1971 (in these
articles, the Pentagon's involvement in the affair was also
denounced). Additional documentation of ITT's and the CIA's
machinations will be found in 'Documentos Secretos de la ITT',
Ediciones Quimantu, 1972.

[12] The most spectacular proof of Frei's participation in the plot
was given by retired General Roberto Viaux Marambio. In CONERSACIONES
CON VIAUX (Santiago, 1972), Florencia Varas, a journalist, published
Viaux's confidences made to her while he was in prison. These and the
investigations conducted after the scandal provoked by this
confession (one of the main charges in the Parliament accusation of
Frei in 1973, when he was president of the Senate; see note 5)
revealed that Arturo Matte Larrain (of the Matte-Alessandri economic
clan) and Guillermo Carey Tagle (a lawyer  for Kennecott Copper) were
the contacts between Frei and the rest of the conspirators, including
by Robinson Rojas, a series of articles published in PURO CHILE,
March 7-April 15, 1973.) Viaux explained in detail to Varas how Frei
had participated in the conspiracy but asked not to be associated
with it publicly. Viaux insisted that Frei's hesitation made the
Americans suddenly withdraw their backing from the coup.

[13] In hindsight, it is tragic to recall how Allende persisted in 
his thesis that his government was not socialist but that it was
paving the way toward socialism without any prior violence and
destruction. On the basis of this thesis, during the three years of
his administration he attempted to convince his political enemies that
if the Unidad Popular's reforms were not made, social violence would
erupt, motivated by the most underprivileged sectors of society. But
the curtain of propaganda from the right and the United States painted
Allende's government as "socialist" and even "Marxist". Allende's
speeches and press conferences are  filled with references to his
nonsocialist program and his thesis that his reforms were the only
way to halt the decay of Chile's social system. One quotation will

"In the first place, [we need] clarity, clear understanding, to know
where we are going, what goal we should achieve at this stage. I have
said very honestly: The government of which I am the head is not a
socialist government. The Unidad Popular program is not a socialist
program. But our government and our program are the beginning of the
building of socialism." (Speech of May 1, 1972, made before thousands
of labourers; quoted in Salvador Allende's collected speeches, LA
REVOLUCION CHILENA, Ediciones Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1973.)

The reader will find more such quotes from Allende's speeches in
Chapter 5. Regarding the state's "capitalist" nature in its economic
reforms, see Sergio Ramos, CHILE, UNA ECONOMIA EN TRANSICION?, cited
above; Pedro Vuscovic (Allende's Minister of the Economy), DOS ANOS
DE POLITICA ECONOMICA, published in UTE (Universidad Tecnica del
Estado) magazine, Vols. 11 and 12, Jan-feb. 1973. A version of
Allende's conversation with the generals was given by Luis Hernandez
Parker on the radio program "Tribuna Politica", broadcast by
Santiago's Radio Portales, Oct. 20, 1970.

With regard to the terrorist activities, Valenzuela, Schilling,
Rodriguez, Huerta, and Viaux confessed organizing them. This was
etc. in November and December 1970, and afterward. An official
summary of these confessions appeared in THE SCHNEIDER CASE: OPERACION
ALFA, Editorial Nacional Quimantu, Santiago de Chile, 1972, Series
of Special Documents.

[14] A version of the talk General Schneider gave in the Academy was
known on the night of October 15 in the core of Senator Allende's
campaign committee, and it provoked a series of articles on the
subject of "The Armed Forces' Constitutionality" in ULTIMA HORA,
EL SIGLO and PURO CHILE, Oct. 17-19, 1970. These articles cited
concepts put forth by Schneider to demonstrate that Allende would be
elected in the Plenary Congress, because the armed forces were not
afraid of the Unidad Popular program. For their part, Kennecott lawyer
Guillermo Carey Tagle and Air Force General Joaquin Garcia, both
involved in the plot (see Eduardo Labarca, CHILE AL ROJO, cited 
above), commented on Schneider's talk at a meeting of friends (at the
home of Senator Raul Morales Adriazola, another conspirator, see
note 4) on the night of October 18. Colonel Thomas H. Jones, chief
of the Army section of the U.S. military mission, was rumoured to have
influenced the Schneider talk that smashed their plot's hopes of
victory. Jones had come to Chile around mid-1968 and was Schneider's
constant companion in programming the Bernardo O'Higgins Military
School curriculum. PEC, a magazine of the extreme right, denounced
in an issue in the last week of October 1970 the "American military"
as the cause of Allende's elevation to the presidency. Later reports
showed that Colonel Jones and Colonel Paul M. Wimert, military attache
to the U.S. Embassy, were closely attached to Schneider in those weeks
and held many meetings with other officers of the Army and Air Force,
chiefly to explain the lack of opportunity to prevent Allende from
becoming President. In July 1971, in separate actions only three days
apart, Colonels Jones and Wimert were removed from the U.S. Embassy.
This followed an unprecedented series of visits between January 14
and May 25, 1971, from an admiral and a rear admiral of the U.S. Navy
and a U.S. Air Force general to the Chilean high command, each one
spending an average of four days there. Meanwhile, between December
1970 and May 1971, Allende held fourteen meetings with the Chilean
high command, which he told radio and newspaper reporters were
"concerned with the future of those national institutions." (For
details of these events, see CAUSA ML, No. 21, August 1971, my
article QUE PIENSAN LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS?, the first part of which
is translated in Dale Johnson's book THE CHILEAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM,
New York, Doubleday Anchor, 1973; in Alain Labrousse's REFORMISME
OU REVOLUTION, Paris, 1972; and in Labrousse's EL EXPERIMENTO
CHILENO, Grijalbo, 1973.

[15] Admiral Porta Angulo resigned his post because the four admirals
who had spoken to Allende did so without his authorization as
commander in chief of the Navy. That is, they failed to respect the
"military hierarchy," which in Chile, particularly in the Navy, has
almost the character of a religious myth. Porta Angulo felt that his
"hierarchy" had been abrogated, and so he quit.

[16] Quoted from the documents provided by columnist Jack Anderson to
the Senate Commission investigating ITT in 1972. From NACLA's (North
American Congress on Latin America) LATIN AMERICA & EMPIRE REPORT,
Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1972, pp. 8-10.

[17] Ibid., p. 13.

[18] Ibid., p. 14.

[19] Ibid., p. 15. This report was dictated by phone from San Juan.

[20] Ibid., p. 17.

[21] Ibid., p. 19.

[22] In November 1970, in his first instructions to the directors of
Unidad Popular newspapers and news media, President Allende said that
"General Schneider's tragic murder is of such political sensitiveness
that our responsibility as revolutionaries is to refer to it in the
way most convenient to the interests of the political process that
we are directing." He went on to declare that the duty of responsible
journalists was to confine themselves to the official reports
released by the military attorney in charge of the case in referring
to anything that had to do with the military personnel allegedly
involved. Later, more detailed instructions issued by the President's
spokesman added that the event should be treated as a "personal and
isolated adventure" on the part of some generals. Allende had
insisted to responsible Unidad Popular journalists that they had to
take care to keep  the armed forces from collapsing in order to
maintain his government's security on that "flank", as he put it. In
point of fact, it was an extremely perilous moment, since the
Santiago and Concepcion garrisons were involved, along with the
commanders in chief of the Navy, Air Force, and military police. A
notable presence was that of Colonel Washington Carrasco, serving as
General Eduardo Arriagada Lasa's chief of staff in the Army Third
Division. Carrasco was promoted to Arriagada's position when the
latter was fired during the Allende administration; he was to become
one of the principal members of the conspiring generals' group,
leading the military insurrection of September 11, 1973.

Later, in December 1971, the Santiago daily LA TRIBUNA mentioned
the Prats-Allende agreement in unsigned articles on pages 2 and 3.
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