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Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-Making

 


3. Access

I want you to consider this [the United Nations] your home.

Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
speaking to NGOs at the 1994 DPI Annual Conference


 

A Fast Track or a Slow Roll?

In an increasingly interconnected world with accelerating communication technologies, some global decisions are made very quickly. The movement of news and financial transactions is nearly instantaneous. Consensual decision-making, in contrast, is rarely fast or easy. Intergovernmental decision-making rolls along like an old-fashioned freight train. It is laborious to operate and slow, and the quality of access along the line may be quite variable. Global decisions that derive from this are generally the outcome of a long cycle that begins with the identification of the problem, followed by a period of analysis and fixing on solutions and commitments, and only then does the period of action or implementation begin. In many cases, CSOs point out that governmental implementation of intergovernmental agreements is incomplete or inadequate

This cycle, of course, begins at home. Some national groups can, in the traditional sense, lobby their own governments and foreign offices on the policy issues. This conventional means of access is frequently brushed aside in the current discussion of evolving global civil society. It should not be. CSOs can act in their own national political arena in addition to asserting a new role in global civil governance.

Access to the numerous international organizations and decision-making processes that have an influence on global governance has certainly improved in recent years but, as the following discussion illustrates, it is still highly uneven.
 

NGO Access to UN Decision-Making and Global Conferences

Several leading United Nations organizations have hailed the ascendancy of civil society as a guarantor of international and national democracy, and it is common to hear that the door is now open to NGO participation. Is this rhetoric or reality? It is difficult for the UN to accomplish these ambitions in institutional terms, although it does have a pragmatic self-interest to do so. A strong civil society provides a strong voice at the national and international level for sustaining the UN and its programmes. Messages about NGO access to the UN, however, remain mixed.

NGOs have clearly played an important role in setting the agenda. Issue identification often is initiated within civil society. Some of the issues selected for discussion at recent international conferences — the conferences on women, on environment, on social development, on population, on cities, on food security — became a legitimate focus for international attention in large part because of efforts by civil society to frame the issues in a way that required government action.

Once on the international agenda, decision-making processes begin that are, in one form or another, followed by a range of regional and international organizations. Briefing papers are produced by a secretariat and/or other intergovernmental bodies. These are circulated to national governments for comments. Countries may choose to respond on paper before the conference, so that their comments may be absorbed in advance; or they may choose to take their issues directly to the conference table instead. The issue often evolves as it is being reviewed at the national level, so this is the opportune time for CSOs to make their views known to their national representatives. Of course, in nations with poor relations between civil society and national governments, this opportunity may not exist.

After the period of national review, conference papers are redrafted by the secretariat and typically presented at a series of preparatory committees or "prepcoms". The prepcoms are designed to allow consensus to be reached by all governments through open debate. At the UN, these debates at prepcoms and at international conferences have, with increasing frequency, included opportunities for NGOs to present their views. This process results in conference resolutions, a set of recommendations to national governments. Their fate then lies with national governments, as they are the primary agents of implementation for inter-governmental agreements. Once again, here is a role for NGOs in monitoring and follow-up.

Some groups have been able to operate with remarkable success; the UN discussions relating to women provide an excellent example. With conscientious attention, the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) has followed the rules of procedures for NGO access. WEDO's strategy has been extraordinarily successful, providing a strong and practical route for NGOs to lobby within the UN system, empowering women and integrating a gender perspective into global issues from economics to reproductive health.

On substance, the Women's Linkage meticulously produced, as an advocacy aid, a list of previous commitments made by the UN in a range of themes relevant to women's issues: economics, reproductive and sexual health and rights, race and ethnicity, human rights, equity and environment.71 On process, the WEDO Women's Caucus at the NGO Forum in Beijing became the de facto communications point between governments and NGOs, allowing NGOs unprecedented access to relevant delegations and leading to success at influencing the texts.72

While the door at the UN may now be open wider than before, there are more NGOs clamoring to get in and with higher expectations of access. The doorway is too narrow to allow everyone in. The UN still allows onl>


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st groups, and on strict terms of entry. NGOs that take up new initiatives may therefore have their activities and influence constrained in various ways. NGOs might be designated as official, accredited NGOs; or invited to participate in expert meetings; or funded to support UN activities; or used to deliver UN system technical assistance services. While these initiatives are no doubt integrating NGOs into the UN process, they may also create power struggles within the NGO community between those with access and those without.

Ironically, the integration of NGOs into the UN helps define elements of the structure within the global NGO "community". Some NGOs are already able to attend international meetings. When the UN integrates NGOs into its delivery of services, particularly in conjunction with its technical assistance programmes in developing countries, these NGOs may also be able to work on broader tasks. The formal ECOSOC definition of "accredited NGO" itself generates a hierarchy within the NGO community. In short, there still are divisions: NGOs associated with UN activities that have access to power, influence and funding; and those that do not. These power structures are likely to carry over into activities not associated with the UN, influencing relations among NGOs and the status of NGOs with funders and with national governments.

NGO access to the UN has always been uneven. This originally reflected those who were able to conform with the existing rules of access and those who were not. Northern NGOs also may have been favored because they were located closer to the seats of power and could attend international meetings. Today, the number of Southern and grassroots organizations that want to participate in international governance has grown, and more groups worldwide are optimistic about the role of the UN in human security and development. The significance of exclusivity in access was different in 1950 than it is now.

Some obstructions to the UN system can be removed quickly and effectively by the home country government. Government policy in the host country, however, also plays a role. This was quite visible at the Beijing Women's conference when the Chinese government sought to deny visas to some participants for domestic political reasons. But even when a meeting is at the UN Headquarters in New York, this can occur. In a statement circulated at the Commission on Sustainable Development session in New York in May 1996, NGO participants deplored the fact that the US government had denied entry visas to representatives of some NGOs that wanted to attend the session.73

Access to UN conferences remains a chimera for those potential participants who are poorer, further away and less experienced in the procedures of international bureaucracy. For many of them, just getting to the conference is a major achievement. They may have to work with unsympathetic national governments who can and do refuse entry or exit visas, tie up conference applications in miles of red tape, and sometimes put them in prison. Even if political circumstances do not constrain their departure from their home country, finances often do, particularly for NGO representatives from developing countries.74

The reality is that in many respects, the rules for each international conference are designed afresh and the decision to build on or reverse decisions made in previous conferences lies with the prepcom leadership and with individual governments. These often are the very people whom CSOs view as restrictive.75 Some 45 per cent of respondents to the Benchmark Survey felt that access to their "own government delegation" was restricted. UN agencies were considered restrictive by 42 per cent of respondents; and aid-providing governments and governments funding NGOs were both perceived as restrictive by 40 per cent of respondents (see figure 3).

At the conference itself, quite apart from the formal meeting rules and procedures that are for the most part understood, NGOs feel "restricted" from access by a range of actors and institutions. Almost half (47 per cent) of the respondents to the Benchmark Survey identified "patriarchal attitudes" as restrictive. There was no significant difference in this perception between men and women. As one Kenyan man commented, "The whole UN process is rigid, formal, hierarchical and paper-driven — everything is patriarchal!"76
 

New Experiments with Access to International Political Governance

Several models of access to international organizations have developed in recent years. Much of the action has been in the environment and development arenas. UNEP and UNDP have strong commitments to the integration of CSOs in their policy and programme activities.77 The UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), as noted earlier, has provided access to CSOs that belong to any of nine major groups, not just ECOSOC accredited NGOs.78 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has increased participation from environmental NGOs and invited suggestions on how to formalize the means of access. The World Bank has recently made radical changes in its NGO policy.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

The OECD, in its own literature, recognizes that it is referred to as "a think tank, a monitoring agency, a rich man's club, an unacademic university, and a talking shop".79 OECD members are the G-7 economic superpowers and some 20 other industrialized or more developed countries in Europe, North America, Latin America and Asia. Historically, the OECD has been advised by permanent advisory committees from the trade union and business sectors. In 1995, for the first time, environmental groups were invited to present a joint environmental statement to Heads of Environmental Agencies and Ministers of the Environment, who meet every five years. Co-ordinated by the European Environment Bureau, environmental groups developed several recommendations on substance, for example a critique of the WTO and the trade-driven terms of environmental discussions. The statement also commented on the unfinished agenda (implementation of existing agreements), new areas on the global environmental agenda, linking social justice and the environment, and improving the public process for a sustainable world, including greater access by environmental NGOs to decision-making bodies.80

The Ministers have now recommended to the OECD Council that a permanent Environmental Non-governmental Advisory Committee be established.81 While strengthening the role of CSOs within the OECD, this body would also increase the status of environmental issues in an organization more dedicated to trade, finance and economic development. This would be a significant victory. The challenge now is for environmental groups to come up with recommendations about how this committee should be created and function.

A door ajar at the World Bank?

Both civil society and elected political leaders have limited direct influence on the decision-making of the global financial system. But certain institutions, notably the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are cultivating improved relations with the CSO community.

NGO access to information on the World Bank has been improved through a public information centre and the availability of some documents on the Internet. The appointment of two leaders, James Wolfenson to the Presidency of the World Bank, and Maurice Strong82 as his senior advisor, has already heralded significant changes in relationships between the Bank and NGOs around the world. The Bank is involving operational NGOs more fully in Bank projects and project evaluations, and it has opened a number of policy dialogues with NGOs.

This new era of World Bank work with civil society stems largely from the need to deliver projects more efficiently, but it also goes beyond that. John Clark, working on NGO issues for the World Bank, has distinguished between conventional uses of NGOs as suppliers of services or development projects and a newer — and in his view — more desirable support of NGOs with a "demand" emphasis. According to this perspective, the role of NGOs is to be active participants in the development process, and it is the role of the World Bank to facilitate this in its broadest sense.83 In its Participation Sourcebook, the World Bank envisions a continuum of empowering the poor: "On one end of this continuum, the poor are viewed as "beneficiaries" who are the recipients of services, resources and development intervention.... As the capacity of poor people is strengthened and their voices begin to be heard, they become "clients" who are capable of demanding and paying for goods and services from government and private sector agencies.... We reach the far end of the continuum when these clients ultimately become the owners and managers of their assets and activities".84

As a consequence of the gradually increasing integration of NGOs into World Bank projects, almost half of all Bank projects in 1994 involved NGOs.85 The Bank now recognizes NGOs not only as service providers where the state has been seriously weakened or has little authority, but as integral to the effective achievement of development aims. In the Sabah Land Settlement and Environmental Project in Malaysia, for example, World Wide Fund for Nature (Malaysia) and other local NGOs worked together with the Federal Land Development Authority to lay the groundwork for future natural resource planning and conservation efforts. In the Philippines, a national NGO, PANLIPI, was contracted to identify the tribal groups likely to be affected by a project to help preserve forest lands.

The implications of these changes at the World Bank are not clear, but they are receiving attention from CSOs — as illustrated by "Women's Eyes on the Bank", a WEDO project. WEDO intends to keep pressure on the Bank to democratize development assistance and prevent the creation of an élite group of CSOs that receive these funds, as well as to reform World Bank development practices.86

Changing perspectives at the World Bank have also trickled down to subsidiary bodies. Created to provide funding for initiatives that address global environmental issues, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is governed by three international organizations: the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP: all entities that are increasingly aware of their NGO partners. Because of this background, the GEF has involved NGOs in many projects. In addition, to assist NGOs in their operative, on-the-ground activities, a small grants programme channels money directly to responsible NGOs in developing countries for projects such as global climate change and ozone, international waters and loss of biodiversity.
 

Closed Doors in Other International Fora

Many other international economic actors are less open to NGO involvement in the decision-making process or in the operative aspects of their organizations — NGO access is still highly restricted or the door is firmly shut. These include intergovernmental entities such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), international bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), transnational corporations and industry associations. So far, such institutions have been less open to participation by civil society. International industry associations, for example, use decision-making models designed to produce consensus among members, but not necessarily with the objectives of transparency or the integration of other stakeholder interests who will be influenced by the outcomes.

The World Trade Organization

All WTO members are national governments, and each member has one vote. With one member-one vote, all government members theoretically have equal influence on decisions, but countries with very large market shares are often able to sway rules and decisions. Membership dues for WTO operations and administration are assessed at a rate based on their relative level of trade activity, so the outcome may be similar to the UN where major financial contributors in the UN system have influenced international policy by withholding and releasing funds or threatening to do so. This could reduce the influence of other national governments and the constituents they represent. In addition, all WTO members are obliged to "ensure conformity" in their national and sub-national jurisdictions, so these smaller and, generally, more democratic and participatory forms of government also must become accountable to WTO decisions.

This development has substantial implications for global decision-making. In national and international arenas, citizens, governments and scientific bodies have typically identified the problems that require public attention. These problems and concerns have gone through various decision-making fora — parliaments, UN agencies, international agreements — where measures have been agreed and implemented that have set national regulations and international conventions and agreements and standards. Under its operating rules, the WTO will be able to intervene at the crucial point between the recognition of a need and the process for implementing a solution, circumventing public input into the global economic policy process.

The processes of participation and review that operate in a national democratic environment are absent in the WTO. Outlines for new trade agendas typically are discussed at informal and exclusive meetings between small groups of Northern ministers, academics and consultants.87 The setting of trade standards is discussed in "green room consultations", a deliberation process to which participants must be formally invited. The invitee must be of ambassadorial level — and since developed countries have a greater number of officials at this level, the North is allowed greater representation.88 Standards are set based on trade impact and scientific evidence alone. Participants in these consultations are not required to consider social values, larger economic and community development objectives, women or Third World concerns, or public policy, even though these issues have historically been the driving force behind the development of international standards.89 These issues are exactly the areas where many CSOs have their greatest interest.

This has presented new challenges for NGOs. For example, current discussions in the WTO of a new Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) would significantly increase the rights and privileges of economic entities. The WTO would extend its province from being a trade organization to being an organization that regulates investment as well. The agreement may free corporations from many national regulatory constraints, thereby reducing the ability of governments and civil society to legitimately represent their own interests. In response, various models being proposed by NGOs in Australia, Costa Rica, England, France, India, Kenya, and the US attempt to integrate sustainable development principles into the language of international trade.

Some NGOs are actively questioning the level of democracy within the WTO system, in particular with respect to the negotiating process for terms of trade.90 The organization exists as the permanent body to host negotiations on diverse aspects of international trade and "communicates" with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations "as appropriate". The trade agreements direct the institution to co-operate with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to ensure coherence in global economic policy-making. The agreements also recognize international standard setting bodies, like the ISO, for the development of appropriate technical regulations. NGOs are not recognized as observers or consultant organizations to the WTO General Council or to its subsidiary bodies.

In July 1996, the WTO presented its Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with NGOs, stating that while NGOs were a "valuable resource" in regard to trade negotiations, "it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings".91 This was presumably due to the politically sensitive nature of multilateral trade negotiations.92 While proposing more exchange of information and informal dialogue between NGOs and the WTO secretariat, the WTO Guidelines conclude that "...primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making [lies at the national level]".93

Many NGOs working on trade and development issues will undoubtedly refuse to confine their activities to the national level. Just two months after the WTO decision, a group of NGOs established the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. Based in Geneva, this organization will monitor the work of the WTO, UNCTAD and certain other international organizations, and aims to enhance the transparency of international trade negotiations by informing NGOs and other groups about the negotiations.

The International Organization for Standardization

When the decisions of international organizations have global implications for governance, there should be opportunities for participation and full representation. If individual CSOs are unable to represent their constituents, governments or other umbrella organizations should be representing those interests. Such representation is not always present, as evidenced in the case of the international standards process used by the ISO.

The ISO is an international federation of national standards bodies which was set up in 1947 to promote worldwide standardization of products, processes and services in order to facilitate international exchange. In the new trade régime established under the WTO such initiatives will have standing in international trade law, and this has significant public policy consequences.94 These standards may even have greater standing than international agreements achieved through the UN process with strong public sector input.

The ISO process restricts NGO participation because of both economics and negotiating procedures — through the cost of travel to the numerous negotiating meetings, and because the voting members are accountable primarily to business interests and not to governments that have public constituents. This was evident in the case of the ISO 14000 series related to global environmental management standards, where the decision-making process was fairly closed. Furthermore, the process did not integrate international environmental standards created in the intergovernmental process, such as the Montreal Protocol, the Basle Convention or Agenda 21, each of which involved substantive NGO participation.

The ISO process restricts not only NGO access but also that of many developing countries. Early discussions related to the ISO 14000 series did not encourage input from developing countries, although this changed with time. Most of the developing countries that participated only did so after the drafting was essentially complete. Even at that point, 80 per cent of the delegates to the meeting to ratify the key ISO 14001 Draft International Standard on environmental management systems (EMS) were from developed countries. Only 6 per cent of African countries, 13 per cent of Latin American or Caribbean, and 20 per cent of Asian countries were represented. Developing countries and NGOs had minimal impact on the drafting of the final text. None of the Steering Committee and Working Group Chairs for the ISO 14000 series negotiations came from developing countries.95

Transnational corporations

There is new optimism about civil society as an agent of democratic global change. Forward-thinking positions being taken by some leaders in the UN, the World Bank and the corporate world need to be understood in the broader context: most global business and financial institutions are not adequately accountable to democratic processes, and in many cases they are impervious to pressures from civil society.

TNCs are in frequent conflict with CSOs. Because of their size and their practices, some become obvious targets for CSO action. Citizens can make, for example, an easy link between a corporate action in a developing country and the responsibilities of the parent in their home country. There are many calls for global standards of practice and demands that TNCs should follow the same standards abroad as at home.

Many international NGO conferences adopt positions that oppose a group of TNCs or the practices of a certain sector of international business. The Copenhagen Alternative Declaration attacked the "concentration of economic, political, technological and institutional power and control over food and other critical resources in the hands of a relatively few transnational corporations and financial institutions".96 The NGO statement to the OECD had a section on corporate behaviour, calling for sectoral approaches to corporate regulation and for an International Code of Corporate Environmental Conduct and Civil Liability.97 NGOs bitterly criticized the closing of the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations in 1993 and have frequently called for the rejuvenation of a Code of Conduct on TNCs and serious scrutiny of their global dominance.

In the environmental arena alone, civil society is fighting the international business community on a myriad of activities, such as practices that influence climate change, deplete the ozone layer, and reduce the quality and quantity of tropical timber forests. A report published by the Australian Conservation Foundation on the deplorable environmental record of Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. at the Ok Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea lists numerous international agreements, international industry association charters, corporate and intergovernmental codes of conduct and international treaties and conventions that are routinely flouted by the company without penalty.98 Parallel conflicts are being fought by consumers, workers and local communities.
 

Conclusion

Given their powerful sense of moral authority, CSOs confronted with a closed door to the new and crucial institutions of global governance are likely to knock harder, not to walk away. If the door is open, they want to make certain that the gatekeeper does not restrict entry on unilateral terms.

The lack of formal access to key global decision-making bodies does create impediments for CSOs. In response, the conventional tools of education and persuasion are still dominant. Print and electronic media, conferences and networking are now actively being used to further their agenda. If these are not effective in changing the minds of the decision-makers, more creative and/ or confrontational campaigning may ensue. One British observer of the global NGO scene predicts an increase in "uncivil" behaviour from workers and communities directed at TNCs. In this light, it is interesting that an Economist review of an NGO conference on Globalization that drew over 1,000 people in New York in November 1995 referred to participants as "neo-Luddites".99

CSO responses to problems of access and related concerns are in their infancy. They draw on the lessons learned in gaining access to the UN and on the possibilities of new technologies as communication and organizing tools. The phenomenon of CSOs seeking access to global governance is showing that they have found responsibility without power; moral but not fiduciary authority. It is ironic that this unprecedented growth and influence of global civil society is occurring at exactly the point when the UN's power and role are declining. There is a basis for this development, including the fact that the UN and its agencies are struggling to survive. Civil society and CSOs give it moral authority for action. But it must be frustrating for NGOs, having spent so long working to get onto the playing field of global governance, to find that the goal-posts have moved to a new economic arena.

71 Women's Linkage Caucus, Take the Brackets Off Women's Lives! Women's Linkage Caucus Advocacy Chart, WEDO, New York, 1 July 1995. This document complemented previous work and documents by the Women's Caucus and the Women's Linkage Caucus at the 1994 and 1995 Commissions on the Status of Women (CSW), comprised of some 1,320 NGO representatives from 73 countries covering all regions of the world and focusing on advancing gains made by women at prior UN conferences.

72 Martha Alter Chen, "Engendering world conferences: The international women's movement and the United Nations", in Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker (eds.), Non-governmental Organizations, the United Nations and Global Governance, op. cit., pp. 477-493.

73 Appeal to the United States to Grant Visas to NGOs Seeking to Attend the CSD, pamphlet, CSD, New York, May 1996.

74 Benchmark Survey of NGOs, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

75 Benchmark Survey of NGOs, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

76 Strike Mkandla, observation at ELCI meeting to discuss the relationships between ELCI and UNEP, UNEP, Nairobi, 9 March 1995.

77 ELCI/UNEP, UNEP's Policy Statement on Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Major Groups, draft, 25 February 1996; UNDP, UNDP and Organizations of Civil Society, San Francisco, June 1995.

78 The nine major groups are: women, youth, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological community, and farmers.

79 OECD, The OECD, OECD Press Division, Paris, 1996, p. 3.

80 International Environmental NGO Statement to the February 1996 Environmental Policy Committee at Ministerial Level, OECD Document ENV/EPOC/MIN(96)13, Paris, 1996.

81 Meeting of OECD Environment Policy Committee at Ministerial Level, Paris, 19-20 February 1996, OECD Document SG/COM/NEWS(96)15, Paris, 1996.

82 Previously Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), he oversaw the increased integration of "major groups" of NGOs into the UNCED process. Later, Strong was CEO of Ontario Hydro, one of the largest utility companies in the world, and President of the Earth Council in Costa Rica, whose mandate is to monitor the implementation of Agenda 21.

83 John Clark, "The state, popular participation and the voluntary sector", World Development, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1995, pp. 593-601.

84 World Bank, World Bank Participation Sourcebook, Washington, D.C., June 1995, p. 7.

85 World Bank, Operations Policy Department, Co-operation Between the World Bank and NGOs: 1994 Progress Report, Washington, D.C., February 1995. Note that in many cases, NGOs were involved in the design, appraisal or implementation of projects, particularly in Africa (62 per cent) and South Asia (78 per cent).

86 Bella Abzug, President and Co-Chair of WEDO, Rural Well Being: From Vision to Action, presentation to the World Bank Conference on Environmentally Sustainable Development, 26 September 1996.

87 Martin Kohr, Countering the North's New Trade Agenda, Third World Network Report 78, November 1995. Also see his briefings for the CSD session, No. 2, TWN, Penang, March 1996.

88 WEDO, Transnational Corporations in the United Nations: Using or Abusing their Access?, Primer No. 2, New York, 1995.

89 WEDO, Who Makes the Rules? Decision-Making & Structure of the New World Trade Organization, Primer No. 3, New York, 1995.

90 The exception is the Committee on Trade and Environment of the WTO.

91 WTO, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, Geneva, July 1996, WT/L/162.

92 NGLS, Go-Between, No. 60, Geneva, October-November 1996, p. 5.

93 WTO, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, op. cit.

94 Benchmark Environmental Consulting, ISO 14001: An Uncommon Perspective. Five Public Policy Questions for Proponents of the ISO 14001 Series, European Environmental Bureau, Brussels, November 1995 and April 1996.

95 The numbers omit a small percentage from Central and Eastern Europe. Details from UNCTAD, ISO 14000: International Environmental Management Systems. Five Key Questions for Developing Country Officials, draft for comments, UNCTAD, Geneva, 1996.

96 The Copenhagen Alternative Declaration, Copenhagen, 8 March 1995.

97 International Environmental NGO Statement to the February 1996 Environmental Policy Committee at Ministerial Level, OECD Document ENV/EPOC/MIN(96)13, op. cit., paragraphs 20 and 21.

98 Helen Rosenbaum and Michael Krockenberger, Report on the Impacts of the OK Tedi Mine in Papua New Guinea, Australian Conservation Foundation, November 1993. Also see Helen Rosenbaum, Principles for the Environmental Management of Australian Mining Companies operating in Papua New Guinea, Australian Conservation Foundation, 1995.

99 "Cranks and proud of it", The Economist, 20 January 1996, pp. 86-87.


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