DECENTRALIZATION IN ZIMBABWE
                                     by
                               Frances Stewart,
                               Jeni Klugman
                                    and
                                A. H. Helmsing

(Human Development Report Office Occasional Papers) (summary)

Contents
  1. General Introduction
  2. Structure of Government and Decentralization Measures
  3. How much Decentralization in Practice?
  4. The Impact of Devolution of Powers to Different Levels
  5. General Conclusions
  6. Bibliography

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1. General Introduction

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in southern Africa in which African
majority rule was achieved only in 1980. Dual structures in the social,
economic and political spheres are legacies of the racist settler regime.
In this context the national government has had the difficult task of
attempting to redress past inequities without alienating the white
population.

1.1 Human Development

Zimbabwe has achieved impressive strides in human development since
independence, as reflected by improvements in such indicators as literacy,
child mortality and life expectancy which stand well above regional
averages (see table 1). Access to services important for human development
also compares favourably with countries of the region. For example,
combined primary and secondary enrolment ratios stood at 95% by 1986-88.
These achievements reflect a substantial restructuring of public
expenditures since independence towards priority social services and away
from defence.

Nonetheless, the country remains amongst the "low human development"
group as classified by the 1992 Human Development Report. Improved
performance is especially urgent in certain areas, including economic
growth, daily calorie supply as percentage of requirements and maternal
mortality rates. Serious disparities in human development indicators and
access to services persist, reflecting the continuing impact of past
discrimination.

Rural-urban gaps reveal the disadvantages faced by the majority black
population, who are largely rural based. Whereas all urban dwellers are
estimated to have access to health services, only about six in ten living
in the countryside do. One study found that, in 1979, the income of urban
non-black residents stood at Z$8500, compared to the average Z$220 earned
by rural peasant farmers, a disparity of 39:1. Within the urban areas
inequality was estimated at 27:1 (Riddell 1982). In 1980, whites had
exclusive ownership of almost half the land (two-thirds of the best land;
see table 2) and (together with foreign interests) owned virtually all of
the capital in industry and mining.

1.2 The Economy

Structure

With an abundance of natural resources, relatively good physical
infrastructure and a diversified industrial sector, the Zimbabwean
economy has been described as the "most highly developed in black
Sub-Saharan Africa" (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989). In 1988 services
accounted for 38% of GDP, followed by the industrial sector, including
mining (7% of GDP and 40% of export revenue) and a diversified
manufacturing base (26% of GDP and 16% of formal sector employment).
The period of UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) left a closed
economy, with enforced protection stimulated by state intervention
favouring settler interests. Agriculture represents 15% of national
income, employing approximately 70% of the total labour force and 25%
of formal sector employees. The inherited dual structure of agriculture
has been modified to some extent since independence, but the distinction
between the commercial (largely white, large scale farming) and Communal
Lands, farmed by blacks, remains important.

Recent Trends

Between 1974-79 national income fell, with an increasing share of public
expenditure (up to 30-40%) directed towards the military. Since
independence, economic performance has fluctuated, largely due to
extraneous factors, including drought, world recession, falling demand for
Zimbabwe's exports and foreign exchange shortages. Overall, real economic
growth averaged 3% in the 1980s - growth in per capita terms was almost
negligible.

The African government maintained a policy of economic nationalism in the
context of strong state control. But there was external pressure to shift
this focus. In 1982 an IMF agreement was signed, which broke down in 1984.
In 1990 an Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) was launched,
with the support of the IMF and World Bank, featuring trade
liberalisation, market-based interest rates, reductions in the budget
deficit and domestic deregulation.

In the rural areas, extensive commercial farming areas remain dominated
by a relatively small number of white farmers, who still receive 70% of
agricultural credit, extension and other services (Stoneman and Cliffe
1989). Yet since independence the Communal Lands have increased their
share of national supplies of crops and livestock, as many of the
disadvantages facing them were reversed.

1.3 Politics

Political developments in independent Zimbabwe were constrained by the
Lancaster House agreement. The Constitution (for a time)1 entrenched the
interests of the whites, reserving a certain number of parliamentary
seats for whites-only, and prohibiting compulsory acquisition of most
land. These legal constraints, combined with the practical desire to
secure an 'orderly transition' which would avoid the sudden exodus of
capital and white settlers experienced by Mozambique, led to what was
termed a policy of 'reconciliation'.

By the time of independence, the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU)
had a well established organisation throughout much of the country. The
party secured 63% of the black vote, and 57 of the 80 black seats in the
first national elections in 1980 when Robert Mugabe formed a government.
Nkomo's Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) won twenty seats, mainly
in Matabeleland. The first Cabinet included both ZAPU and segregationist
politicians, but ZAPU was excluded from the government in 1983. After
several years of tension and violence, ZANU and ZAPU signed a unity
accord in 1987. At the national elections in March 1990, ZANU-PF won all
but three of the 120 seats contested, and Mugabe received 78% of total
votes cast for the presidency. However there was a significant abstention
rate; only 54% of eligible voters went to the polls, compared to turnout
rates of over 90% in the 1980 and 1985 elections.

Although the black population has experienced substantial advances in
access to health and education services and economic opportunities since
independence, they still face serious problems of poverty and
unemployment. It is reported that the gap between the 'benz' lifestyle
enjoyed by the 'chefs' (party and government leaders) and that of most
Zimbabweans, is bitterly resented. While ESAP was portrayed as a means
of "working together for all of us"2, it is uncertain whether the reform
measures will promote the intended goals without adversely affecting
vulnerable groups in Zimbabwean society.

2. Structure of Government and Decentralization Measures

At the national level there have been significant changes in the
structure of government since independence, the net result being a single
chamber of parliament and an executive presidency directly elected by the
people, with a move towards a one-party state, particularly since 1988.
From Independence, the government declared its intention to promote
decentralization, and supported this by a series of institutional
innovations.

2.1 Steps toward decentralization

a. The colonial system and the position at independence.

In the colonial era, the policy of racial segregation dominated economic
and social policies enforced by such legislation as the Land
Apportionment Act 1930 (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1985). Local government was
divided on the basis of race - Urban Councils and Rural Councils (formed
in the 1960s out of the 'road committees') were elected by the whites for
white settler areas and enjoyed a fair degree of autonomy. In contrast,
Native Councils (later termed African Councils), which covered the
communal African farming areas, were subject to central control. A key
official was the Native (later District) Commissioner, appointed by the
central government, who was ex-officio President of the Council.
Community development boards were created in the 1960s -under the
authority of the District commissioner - to define the development needs
of the community. The number of African Councils grew over time to 242
by 1980.

During the period of UDI the administration of black rural areas became
increasingly centralised and authoritarian, dominated by
centrally-appointed commissioners with "dictatorial powers"
(Mutizwa-Mangizwa 1985,p.60). Extensive centrally-determined rules
governed such activities as land use. The motive was that of central
control rather than local development (Stonemen and Cliffe 1989).
According to Mutizwa-Mangiza, shortage of arable land in Tribal Trust
Lands was a fundamental problem (see table 2) which resulted in
impoverished African Councils for blacks, with affluent Rural and Urban
Councils for whites. The African Councils were very fragmented
geographically. Key administrative personnel occupied an ambiguous
position - chiefs were the paid and appointed officials of the
government, and were also supposed to represent African opinion. From
the early 1970s, in an increasing number of areas the rebels gradually
managed to gain control and settler authority broke down.

At independence there was a declared commitment to decentralization and
participation, and therefore a clear need to restructure government at
the local level. In practice this has taken three forms. First the
creation of new Ministries and deconcentration of others: the Ministry
of Local Government and Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), and the
Ministry of Community Development and Co-operatives (MC&CD) were
established, while most Ministries have been dispersed spatially, and
are formally represented down to the district level. The extension
workers of the MC&CD operate at the village level. In other words there
has been a significant deconcentration of central government activities.
Secondly, a series of legislative enactments and directives have sought
to democratise and strengthen local government, although the system of
local government is characterised by uneven development across the
country, in terms of functions, capacity and resource base. Thirdly, a
participatory organisational structure was established to permit local
participation in development planning.

b. District Councils Act 1980.

The District Councils Act 1980 (amended in 1981 and 1982) applied to the
Communal Lands, where it revived local government after the period of
guerrilla insurgency, consolidated the previously fragmented authorities
from over 220 to 55, and democratised the system of local government.
District Councils consist predominantly of elected members, plus those
nominated under the Act (e.g. chiefs and headmen are ex officio members).
They are chaired by an elected member. The councils are the principal
planning and development agencies within their jurisdictional zones. They
have limited powers of taxation, implement a variety of central
legislative enactments, and provide various services. The District
Administrator, who is chief executive of the council, is a national civil
servant, responsible for overall planning, development and co-ordination.
Although the traditional leaders who had dominated local government
during the colonial era were not removed (as in Tanzania, for example),
no new ones were appointed and their powers of adjudication and land
allocation were transferred to the District Councils. The average
population per DC is 78000, although it varies from 15,000 (Mzarabani)
to 227,000 (Gokwe -data for 1982).

c. The Prime Minister's Directive 1984

Organisational structures for popular participation in development
planning were outlined in the Prime Minister's Directive on
Decentralization (1984 & 1985), which provided the basis for a
hierarchy of representative bodies at the village, ward, district and
provincial levels.

Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) are elected bodies with
responsibility for defining local needs. VIDCOs present village needs to
Ward Development Committees (WADCOs), which cover about six villages and
consist of VIDCO representatives. They oversee and prioritise local needs
and forward these to the District Council. Each ward is represented by a
district councillor.

District Development Committees (DDC) are planning and co-ordination
committees, composed of two local councillors, together with 18-28
central government officials from the sectoral ministries, and the
police, army, and Central Intelligence Organisation. Membership is
dominated by representatives of the central government. They are chaired
by the District Administrator, currently a CG employee. The main planning
functions of the DDC are to formulate District Development plans (short
and long term), based in part on the plans forwarded from the VIDCOs and
WADCOs. These are forwarded to the Provincial Development Committee (see
below). The DDC also submit annual estimates to the Public Sector
Investment Program (PSIP) via the Provincial Development Committees. The
DDCs permit horizontal co-ordination of the activities of sectoral
ministries and local authorities.

d. Provincial Councils and Administration Act 1985

This legislation gave increased focus to the province, for planning.
Table 3 presents the populations and area of each of the eight provinces.
The Provincial Council consists of the chairmen and one councillor
selected by each of the Councils in the province (District, Rural and
Urban), one member nominated by the ruling party, and a representative
from the Provincial Assembly of Chiefs. It is chaired by the Provincial
Governor, who is appointed by the President and enjoys Cabinet rank, and
sits in the national parliament. Governors are responsible for
co-ordination of the activities of sectoral ministries and the District
Councils. It is their task to liaise with the Development Committees and
oversee District Councils; however the office of Governor lacks mandatory
powers in respect of both local authorities and sectoral ministries.
The Provincial Development Committee (PDC) is composed of heads of
ministries at provincial level, members nominated by the police, army
and Central Intelligence Organisation, the Provincial Planning Officer
of the Department of Physical Planning, and leaders of commerce and
industry operating within the province who may be co-opted. The committee
is chaired by the Provincial Administrator, a central government employee,
and is responsible for formulating plans for co-ordinated development in
the province. To this end it produces short and long term plans which are
supposed to reflect a combination of District Development Plans,
provincial plans of Ministries, the PDC's own ideas, government national
policies and, where possible, major development plans of private
organisations (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). It is important to note that the
province itself does not have any functional responsibilities, nor does
it have any source of finance. At present, the primary role of the
province in the development planning process is to ensure that district
project proposals are co-ordinated, and presented to sectoral ministries
-i.e. a project sorting function (PDSP 1991).

e. Amalgamation 1988+

The most recent legislative reform, the Rural District Councils Act 1988,
purported to end the dual system of local government in rural Zimbabwe,
through amalgamation of the Rural Councils and the District Councils into
55 Rural District Councils.3 The aim is to overcome the colonial legacy
of separate development based on race, and to permit a more equitable
distribution of public services. However the amalgamation has been
fraught with difficulties and reflects a range of compromises which
seriously detract from its ostensible objectives. Full democratic
participation has not been extended to the former Rural Council areas,
where only local taxpayers and their spouses are able to vote, thereby
excluding the black landless farmworkers (i.e. the majority of the
population in these areas). Nor does the RDC Act unify the tax base, but
continues to rely on the basic tenurial divisions between the different
wards: commercial, communal and resettlement, and urban. The proceeds of
the land development levy (collected from the commercial wards) are to
be spent on road maintenance. Thus as Helmsing (1991) points out, whilst
the Act formally does away with a relic of separate development, "basic
socio-economic and tenurial divisions have remained and the Act accepts
these and the RDC is organised around these divisions" (p.134). In any
case in early 1992 it had still not come into effect. Attempts at
implementation began in 1990, through the resolution of boundary disputes.

2.2 Overview of current responsibilities and system of finance

The responsibilities and powers of District Councils fall into two broad
spheres - the delivery of basic social and economic services at the local
level, and participation in development planning. In theory, the District
Council also has significant responsibilities in planning development
activities within the area, although local efforts in this sphere are
often perceived to be rather ineffective (see below).

The scope of the powers and responsibilities of the DCs is much more
limited than the Rural and Urban Councils (see table 4). The District
Councils are responsible (often concurrently with sectoral ministries)
for a range of services, including basic education and health,
sanitation, housing and social welfare, as well as some business
ventures intended to generate income to help finance their expenditures
(e.g. retailing liquor). However, most DC expenditure goes to education
(around 90% - Table 5).

The allocation of functions between different levels of government is not
well defined, so that it is not always apparent where central government
activities should stop and where local authority activities should start
(Mutizwa-Mangiza 1990). In some areas this has been a source of
controversy. Regarding primary education, for example, the Ministry has
sought to recentralise vital elements of the service. Teachers, who were
formerly selected, recruited and paid through the District Council were,
in 1987, placed under a National Unified Teaching Service administered
by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Health proposed a similar
recentralisation of health personnel, although this has not yet been
carried through.

In Zimbabwe the most striking feature of current financial arrangements
is the overwhelming dependence of District Councils upon central grants
which are tied to specific purposes. On average, District Councils raise
only 15% of total local revenue through taxes, rates, charges, etc; the
remainder comes in the form of transfers from the centre all of which
are tied to particular activities, approved centrally. What constitutes
an "approved expenditure" is determined by central ministerial
regulations and circulars. The grants system works with advances and
reimbursements based upon approvals. There are effectively no block
grants to the district level other than a lump sum for administration,
which is based on central calculations of local requirements. In
education, for example, there is a tuition grant, to be used for the
purpose of "tuition" only (narrowly defined), and not for any other
expenses. The lack of discretion in local expenditures is exemplified by
the extremely fragmented system of accounts kept by District Councils,
which involve up to fifteen separate accounts for different revenues and
activities. with no flexibility of movement of funds within or between
accounts. Thus the colonial practice wherein the vast majority of
financial allocations were made on a sectoral basis has been maintained,
which effectively means a very centralised and compartmentalised system
of finance.

The DCs have very limited powers of taxation: they collect a small amount
of revenue from the development levy (a poll tax), a little more from
fees, licenses, and income generating projects, but mainly rely on
central government grants. In contrast, the urban and rural councils
receive a significant proportion of revenue from rates on property and a
levy on beer.

To summarise, since independence there have been important changes in the
structure of government, broadly favouring decentralization. First, there
has been significant deconcentration of sectoral ministries to the local
level. Second, democratic structures have been established at the district
level, which will be further improved when (as envisaged) the DA becomes
responsible to the DC, and not a centrally appointed official, and
amalgamation is completed. Third, participatory structures were
established to allow local participation in national planning from the
village level upwards.

But the real extent of decentralization has been limited by a number of
factors: first, as noted above, by lack of financial autonomy of the DCs;
second, by moves by important sectoral ministries to recentralise
activities; third, limited influence of the local authorities over the
National Plan in practice (to be discussed below); fourth, by excessive
focus on the Provincial level, which has no directly elected
representatives, and no powers of taxation; and finally, political
factors, including the absence of a secret ballot, and the dominance of
a centralised single party structure.

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1 In fact the whites-only electoral roll was abolished in 1987, and
property rights could be altered from 1990.

2 This is the theme of the strident public media campaign in 1991 launched
in three languages, in newspapers, radio and television across the country.

3 The local government units are still small, relative to the rest of
Africa.
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RRojas Research Unit/1996