Make your work easier and more efficient installing the rrojasdatabank  toolbar ( you can customize it ) in your browser. 
Counter visits from more than 160  countries and 1400 universities (details)

The political economy of development
This academic site promotes excellence in teaching and researching economics and development, and the advancing of describing, understanding, explaining and theorizing.
About us- Castellano- Français - Dedication
Home- Themes- Reports- Statistics/Search- Lecture notes/News- People's Century- Puro Chile- Mapuche


Data 1Data 2 International Reports
World indicators on the environmentWorld Energy Statistics - Time SeriesEconomic inequality


 Introduction

Income Poverty:

The latest global numbers

Recent regional trends

Prospects for poverty reduction

Trends in inequality

 Social Indicators

  What the Poor Say


Voices of the Poor: Income Poverty

Prospects for poverty reduction

What are the prospects for reducing income poverty in the medium term? The share of people who will be living on less than $1 or $2 per day depends on how much per capita consumption levels will change and whether changes will affect people with different levels of consumption equally or will affect some groups more than others. For example, if average per capita consumption levels increase equally for all—the poor as well as the rich—then the share of those consuming less than the threshold will decline. However, if consumption levels increase for the rich only, then the share of the poor will remain unchanged. The processes that affect how changes in aggregate consumption levels are distributed across the population are not well understood, so forming a judgment on how many people will be living in poverty in the future is difficult.

The World Development Report 1990 on poverty (WDR 1990) (World Bank 1990) projected the proportions of the population that would be living on less than $1 per day in the year 2000 under the assumption that "the strategy recommended in the report gained wider acceptance" (World Bank 1990, p. 138). Under this assumption, the report forecast that the global poverty rate would fall from 32.7 percent in 1985 to 18.0 percent in 2000, representing a compound rate of decline of 3.9 percent per year. The Bank’s latest estimates indicate a fall in the poverty rate from 28.3 percent in 1987 to 24.0 percent in 1998, implying a compound rate of reduction in poverty of only 1.5 percent per year. So the WDR 1990 projections overestimated the subsequent rate of poverty reduction, although the report did state that "it would be possible to do somewhat better—or much worse" (p. 138).

Why did the WDR 1990 projections turn out to be too optimistic? In terms of the aggregate numbers, China and India have the greatest weight, and both experienced a slower pace of poverty reduction than anticipated, even though growth was actually higher than predicted. The main reasons were rising inequality in China and slow growth of consumption as measured by household surveys in India. In the rest of the world Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union experienced negative growth and rising inequality, while Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced unexpectedly low growth and consequently less poverty reduction than expected.

The case of India is worth highlighting. During the 1990s, the growth rate of consumption expenditure per person measured by the Indian National Sample Survey have been appreciably lower than that of the private consumption component of the national accounts. Possibly this captures actual developments, reflecting the underlying differences in the consumption concepts used by surveys versus national accounts. However, it is more likely that this discrepancy stems from data problems in one or both sources. For example, if surveys fail to capture growth in expenditures at the high end of the distribution, they underestimate growth in both average expenditure and inequality. The Indian data are being further analyzed to better understand the sources of this discrepancy.

This report follows a methodology similar to that employed in the WDR 1990, but the underlying assumptions incorporate the lessons learned from that experience, in addition to being based on survey information for many more countries. Nevertheless, the projections should not be treated as forecasts, but rather as representing a plausible range of possible outcomes for poverty based on alternative assumptions about growth and inequality. Our understanding of the quantitative dynamics of inequality remains incomplete, and there are many uncertainties inherent in projecting output growth. Moreover, there are large uncertainties about the relationship between growth and inequality. While most countries have experienced little change in aggregate inequality over time, this is generally the result of powerful countervailing forces. For example, most growing countries experience both a rise in the relative demand for skills and a rise in the relative supply of skills as education expands that can lead to small or negligible changes in inequality as these effects balance out. Moreover, the relationship between inequalities in the return to skills and inequalities in overall income or consumption is also highly complex, and depends on patterns of labor force participation, household composition, and transfers, among other factors.

 Next: Income Poverty: Two scenarios for the next decade