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The political economy of development
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Human Development Report Office (HDRO)

In preparation for the Human Development Report every year, the HDRO commissions a number of experts to write papers on issues related to the theme of the Report. The following is a compilation of selected Occasional Papers written since 1992. Individually, each paper brings to light a key facet of human development in different parts of the world. Together, they help establish a framework of tools, concept and action to address the issue of human development worldwide.

Occasional Paper 17 -


V. Prospects for Progress in Human Development

Concluding Remarks

Annex 1


The Economic Outlook

To a large extent, the prospects for progress in human development will be determined by the opportunities for reversing Africa's economic decline and launching the countries of the region on the path of economic recovery and development. While it is possible to have economic growth without human development, it is inconceivable to bring about the latter in the absence of the former. Economic growth is therefore imperative.

What are the economic prospects facing African countries in the immediate future as well as over the long haul? The short run prospects will be highly dependent on such factors as the weather, the prices of commodities on the international market, the degree of success in resolving the debt crisis, the magnitude of resource flows from abroad and political conditions at home. By their very nature, such factors are difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy. With respect to prospects in the long run, much will depend on the extent to which Africa addresses its underlying structural problems. If there is any lesson to be drawn from past experience, it is that one cannot continue with "business as usual". A new start would involve a serious reconsideration of traditional policies and strategies, most significantly creating an enabling environment for ensuring people's participation not only in the economic arena but also in the social and political spheres. This will require more visionary and bold leadership and a more understanding international economic environment than Africa has known in the past. Progress is possible, but it will be neither automatic nor easy.126

Regional Co-operation and Security

Progress will also depend on the extent to which African countries are prepared to act in concert. Africa, with some notable exceptions, is a continent of mini-states. Nine countries have populations of less than a million and only nine countries have a population in excess of twenty million. Therefore, most countries do not form viable economic entities. Moreover, many of them confront almost identical problems. And, given the artificial nature of most African boundaries and the similarity of peoples living on opposite sides of national borders, it is common for one country's problems to flow over into its neighbours.

To be sure, there has not been a shortage of efforts at setting up regional co-operation arrangements. Beginning with the ill-fated East African Common Market, one could cite several examples, some of the more notable attempts being the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic Community (CEAO), the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), and the Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). The performance of these groupings has been uneven and non has been wholly satisfactory. Numerous problems have been encountered, including political differences between governments, lack of commitment, inadequate co-ordination of policies, unsatisfactory modalities for compensating losers from regional arrangements, and physical barriers. Therefore, much more needs to be done in this very vital area. How much progress will be made in this direction will to a very large extent be determined by the degree of commitment demonstrated by African leaders. To date, unfortunately, they have been long on rhetoric and short on delivery. In 1994, the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community came into force. It will remain to be seen whether the fate of this initiative will be different from ill-fated to previous attempts in this direction.

A related problem is the role of regional co-operation in resolving some of the political crises and armed conflicts that have been bedevilling the continent. Little has been done by regional institutions, especially the Organisation of African Unity, to help solve the many cases of civil conflict in the region. The failure to intervene positively in the conflicts in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Liberia and more recently the impotence displayed in the face of the carnage in Somalia and Rwanda come readily to mind. This reflects poorly on the collective African capacity to resolve conflicts and maintain peace and stability within the region. The establishment of the OAU's "Mechanism for Conflict to Prevention, Management and Resolution" and a "Peace Fund" to finance the operations of the mechanism in 1993127 are important African regional initiatives in spite of the hitherto relative non-effectiveness of the mechanism. One reason for this is the lack of sufficient funds. Unless the international community is willing to provide the substantial resources and logistical backstopping which conflict prevention and management operations require, the OAU mechanism will remain a handicapped initiative. The current economic crisis and the poverty of African nations will make it almost next to impossible for them to finance this initiative in the desired magnitude.

Bringing Governance Closer to the People

As pointed out above, Africa has not remained unaffected by the global wave of democratisation. There have been encouraging developments in this regard, but they need to be viewed in perspective. There are, after all, numerous examples of resistance to the forces of democratisation and setbacks to the process. Progress has therefore been halting and uneven.

However, the pressures for bringing government closer to the people are real and will not be easily led to rest. In the face of unfulfilled promises for economic, social and political justice, such pressures are unlikely to relent, even in the face of intransigence by entrenched governments. But instituting truly democratic governance will not be easy; nor will it be accomplished in a short period of time. What complicates the process is that many African countries will have to consummate both economic and political reform simultaneously. And attempting this feat in the context of abject poverty is a Herculean task. It is therefore quite conceivable that there will be setbacks and reversals in the immediate future. But the long-term prospects hold much better promise.128

Moving Towards People-Friendly Markets

As noted earlier, markets raise issues of both efficiency and equity. Even if they operate efficiently, they cannot be considered people-friendly if they confer benefits on limited segments of society while marginalizing larger constituencies. The challenge is therefore one of striking a balance between efficiency and equity considerations.

This is a task that is exacting in the extreme, but especially so for African countries. Markets are poorly developed and they are highly fragmented. The private sector is small in size and operates within serious constraints. In such circumstances, even with the best of will and commitment, progress towards people-friendly markets is bound to be slow. Also, what happens in the political arena will have a great deal of influence on the pace of economic reform. Unbounded optimism is therefore difficult to justify.

Enhancing the Role of Civil Society

The role of civil society is intimately linked to the question of governance raised above. Much of the political instability and lack of representative governance that have been plaguing Africa are due to the absence of a robust civil society in most African countries. In such a situation, governments do not feel accountable to the people; the squandering of public funds, to which there is no stigma attached in most cases, passes without penalty; nepotism becomes rampant; and so on. The lack of a free press, strong professional organisations, and effective citizens' groups creates an atmosphere of political irresponsibility. There may be no laws to protect the citizenry, and even if there, they may be flouted at will by the powers that be.

The accent put on people's participation by HDR93 is highly appropriate. It is a message that needs not only to be heeded but also to be urgently acted upon. It is gratifying to note that Africa has done some advance thinking in this regard, as reflected in the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development. This document represents an eloquent plea for a human-centred development strategy. It declares:

we affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity and popular enthusiasm of the vast majority of the people.129

It then proceeds to define the roles of people, governments, non-governmental and voluntary development organisations, and the international community in making popular participation a reality. As such, it is an important declaration of intent.

But it would be unfortunate if, as happens too often in such cases, this document remains a mere declaration. To make participation meaningful would require substantially reducing the stranglehold of the state on the people and their independent organisations. Unfortunately, African governments have generally been reluctant to loosen their grip; on the contrary, the more successful popular organisations are, the greater the penchant of the state for bringing them under its control. The ultimate test of the success of people's participation will therefore be the willingness and commitment of African governments to nurture popular initiatives. Since they are unlikely to do this of their own free will, it is the magnitude of popular pressure that will be the decisive factor. It is difficult to predict what course future developments will take place. One thing that is clear, however, is that neither Afro-pessimism nor excessive optimism are warranted.

The creation of a strong civil society will entail the emergence of the kind of groups mentioned above. This is a time-consuming process and one that becomes especially difficult in societies in which even basic literacy is limited. To ensure proper behaviour from political leaders requires responsible conduct from citizens. And such conduct must be based on a proper appreciation of rights and obligations. Since this is a tall order for most African countries to meet, and while progress in this regard is bound to be slow, the demands for legitimacy, accountability and transparency of governance, popular participation and respect for human rights are not likely to be discouraged easily. An historic responsibility call on all concerned, including the international community to invest in and support efforts to enhance the role of civil society and strengthen its institutions and organisations.

Increasing and Restructuring Resource Allocation

Human development is as much a question of mobilising more resources as of proper resource allocation. A revealing picture is provided by resources allocated to defence on the one hand, and human development (especially education and health) aspects on the other. The end of the cold war has given rise to expectations of a peace dividend, and promising developments have taken place in this regard.

But Africa has not been a beneficiary of this trend. For example, the share of GDP devoted to military expenditure in the developing countries declined from 4.2 per cent to 3.5 per cent between 1960 and 1991. In Africa, by contrast, it increased more than four-fold, rising from 0.7 per cent to 3 per cent. Spending on the military as a proportion of combined education and health expenditure increased from 27 per cent in 1960 to 43 per cent in 1991.130 These are unfavourable trends, especially in view of Africa's enormous unmet human development needs. It should also be noted that in many African countries the military is used not so much for legitimate needs of national defence but for keeping the citizenry cowed, frustrating demands for economic and social advancement and using military might to silence genuine and perceived injustices. High military spending also means drainage of foreign exchange, given the fact that Africa is largely an importer of armaments.

The need for restructuring the pattern of resource allocation is therefore quite evident. There is an urgent need to shift resources away from military expenditure for investment in human development and to double the share of overall expenditure in human development as a percentage of public expenditure from current levels. Practical means and attainable targets are within reach.131 Investment in people, has been found to generate impressive returns.132 The longer such investment is delayed, the smaller the chances of progress towards human development in particular and sustained growth and economic transformation in general.133 But the African situation does not promise much improvement in this regard, at least in the near future.
 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The serious deterioration in human conditions in Africa makes it imperative that no task is more central or urgent than mounting an all-out and persistent attack on the root causes of human deprivation. Equally true is the fact that reversing the deterioration of the African economies requires that the underlying causes behind this retrogression must be dealt with in earnest.

Human development must thus form the core of imaginative and comprehensive development strategies and not merely short-term and crisis management-focused adjustment and economic reform measures which African countries need to implement with dedication and unwavering political commitment in the years to come. Alleviating poverty and improving human conditions; empowering the broad masses economically and enabling them to participate economically to enhance their opportunities for productive employment and income generation; establishing genuine partnership between the people and their governments in the cause of development; unleashing the creativity and enthusiasm of the people; building human capacities; promoting effective popular participation in development; achieving food security; establishing peace, national reconciliation and stability; and establishing democratic, accountable and responsive systems of governance are part of the main ingredients of human development.

Africa is grossly deficient in all these respects. Yet without progress on this front, the term development would be devoid of any meaning and sustained growth and development would hardly be feasible. To the extent that African countries can make progress in this direction in the years to come, will then prospects for sustained human-centred development in Africa have been brighter.

What makes this challenge particularly daunting is that Africa's current population of 622 million is growing at the fast rate of 3.1 per cent. Without a reduction of this rate of increase and the implementation of comprehensive human-centred development strategies and policies, the sheer explosion in numbers will translate itself into unmanageable pressure on social services and a further deepening of the economic, human and environmental crises.   Annex 1 Human Development Index Ranking for African Countries  

 

Country HDI Rank HDI Value
Mauritius 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Tunisia 
Seychelles 
Botswana 
South Africa 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Gabon 
Swaziland 
Lesotho 
Zimbabwe 
Cape Verde 
Congo 
Cameroon 
Kenya 
Namibia 
Sao Tomé & Principé 
Madagascar 
Ghana 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Zambia 
Nigeria 
Zaire 
Comoros 
Senegal 
Liberia 
Togo 
U. Republic of Tanzania 
Equatorial Guinea 
Sudan 
Burundi 
Rwanda 
Uganda 
Angola 
Benin 
Malawi 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Central African Republic 
Ethiopia 
Djibouti 
Guinea-Bissau 
Somalia 
Gambia 
Mali 
Chad 
Niger 
Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso 
Guinea 
60 
79 
81 
83 
87 
93 
109 
110 
111 
114 
117 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
127 
128 
131 
134 
136 
138 
139 
140 
141 
143 
144 
145 
148 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
172 
173 
0.778 
0.703 
0.690 
0.685 
0.670 
0.650 
0.553 
0.551 
0.549 
0.525 
0.513 
0.476 
0.474 
0.474 
0.461 
0.447 
0.434 
0.425 
0.409 
0.396 
0.382 
0.370 
0.352 
0.348 
0.341 
0.331 
0.322 
0.317 
0.311 
0.306 
0.276 
0.276 
0.276 
0.274 
0.272 
0.271 
0.261 
0.260 
0.254 
0.252 
0.249 
0.249 
0.226 
0.224 
0.217 
0.215 
0.214 
0.212 
0.209 
0.209 
0.203 
0.191 

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press, Table 1, pp. 129-131.
 
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126. See Sadig Rasheed, Development's Last Frontier: What Prospects? Four Essays on African Development, op. cit.

127. See OAU, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, 29th Ordinary Session, Cairo, June 1993.

128. See Sadig Rasheed, "The Democratization Process and Popular Participation in Africa: Emerging Realities and the Challenges Ahead", op. cit.

129. ECA, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, op. cit., p. 17.

130. See UNDP, Human Development Report 1994, op. cit., table 21, p. 171.

131. See Inge Karl, Resources for Social Development, A Policy Paper Commissioned by UNDP for the World Summit for Social Development, New York, UNDP, 1994.

132. See, for example, T.P. Schultz, Human Capital Investment in Women and Men Micro and Macro Evidence of Economic Returns, International Center for Economic Growth, San Francisco, 1994; G.M. Becker, Human Capital, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964; T.W. Schultz, "The Rate of Return in Allocating Investment to Education", Journal of Human Resources, 1967, volume 2 No. 3, 1967. For policy-oriented proposals in this regard, see UNDP, Human Development Report, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, op. cit., World Bank, World Development Report 1990, Washington D.C. Oxford University Press; Mahbul UL Haq, New Imperatives of Human Security, A Policy Paper Commissioned by UNDP for the World Summit for Social Development, New York, UNDP, 1994; Jan Pronk and Mahbul UL Haq, Sustainable Development: From Concept to Action, New York, UNDP, 1992; ECA, The Khartoum Declaration, op. cit.; ECA, African Common Position on Human and Social Development in Africa, Addis Ababa, 1994; ECA, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, op. cit. 133. See Sadig Rasheed, Rethinking Development Strategy in Africa: The Imperative and Prospects of Human-Centred Development, paper presented to UNDP's Stockholm Roundtable on Change: Social Conflict or Harmony, Stockholm, July 1994. , "Africa at the Doorstep of the Twenty-First Century: Can Crisis Turn to Opportunity?" in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.) Africa Within the World, London, Zed Books, 1993, pp. 41-58.

 


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