NOTES ON IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT
by Róbinson Rojas Sandford (1993)
By and large, national strategies for development in less developed
societies have been shaped by the international context, and the
international context have been shaped by a few powerful economies
during the XX century: Britain, Japan, United States, and Germany, and
to a lesser extent Italy, France, and the Netherlands.
Writing in 1985, M. Bienfeld stated that "there is a greater need than
ever for national policies to be formulated in the context of an
informed judgement about the nature of international development,
because these are currently deeply contradictory and increasingly
uncertain." (M. Bienefeld and M. Godfrey (eds.), "The Struggle for
Development. National Strategies in an international context", John
Wiley & Sons Limited, 1985).
"Import-substitution industrialization (ISI) was adopted as a growth
and development strategy by most of the larger Latin American countries
between the late 1940s (Chile and Brazil in the late 1930s. R.R.) and
the early 1960s. It was thought that in a world of stagnant demand for
the type of primary products which the region had traditionally exported,
ISI would provide a new dynamism and a greater amount of independence
from the economic fluctuations which originated in the traditional
industrial centres of the world".
"ISI had some positive effects on the larger economies of Latin America.
It was responsible for periods of high growth rates during which the
economies underwent some profound structural changes. After a while,
however, it also caused some severe imbalances, threatening the
continued growth and socio-economic stability of a number of countries".
(W. Baer & L. Samuelson, "Editor's Introduction", WORLD DEVELOPMENT,
Vol. 5, Nos. 1/2, 1977)(see BOX 1)
International environment in the 1930s and 1940s, after the Great
Depression and the Second World War:
1) stagnant demand for raw materials and cash crops
2) stagnant supply of manufactured goods
General effects of ISI:
1) periods of high growth rates
2) profound structural changes:
a) composition of employment:
the creation of a manufacturing
working class and capitalist class
the creation of a financial sector
the creation of a large amount of
civil servants and a powerful
bureaucratic class
b) new patterns of urbanization:
housing quarters for blue collar
workers
dramatic increasing of urban poverty
and slums
c) foreign domination of a domestic manufacturing
sector supplying protected internal markets
d) development of coincidence of interests between
the high rank state bureaucracy, industrial-
financial-agribusiness domestic oligarchy and
foreign capital
3) Severe imbalances, threatening the continued growth and socio-
economic stability:
a) deficits on current account caused by imports
of capital goods and intermediate goods, and
payments to factors (factor services)
b) internal distribution of income became even more
polarized due to internal monopolic ownership of
means of production
c) the gap between urban and rural incomes became
wider due to economic policies protecting the
"infant" manufacturing sector.
In a word, ISI did not diminish domestic economy's external dependence,
but merely changed its nature. Before was about a mismatch between
prices of goods being exported and prices of good being imported. Now
was about technological and financial domination by foreign capital
of the manufacturing and financial sector, adding to the classical
domination of the mining and agribusiness sectors.
The structural changes which this type of industrialization brought
about were CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF DEMAND FOR IMPORTS:
a) capital goods
b) industrial raw materials-
intermediate goods
For the native capitalist class it gradually became clear that unless
there were adequate export earnings, an import constraint might cause
industrial, and thus general economic stagnation.
EXTERNAL FACTORS
The post-war period was characterised by:
--asymmetrical expansion of the main industrial economies (mainly
Japan, United States, and Germany-France-UK-Italy competing to
dominate international trade maximizing profits in Asia, Africa and
Latin America)
--the upsurge in the internationalization of capital (industrial and
financial capital) under the control of transnational corporations.
--a remarkable change in the patterns of trade, both in its
composition and main flows (manufactured goods began to dominate the
trade and flows became more and more a matter of industrial countries
internal markets)
--a syncronized boom in the industrial economies in 1972-1973 helped
to feed the worst inflation the integrated capitalist world has ever
experienced (which was pushed even higher by the increase in oil
prices in 1974)
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS' ACTIVITIES EFFECTS:
1) foreign dominance of the modern sector (adding to socio-economic
polarization)
2) drain on the balance of payments as more and more profits were
remitted abroad parallel to higher imports (capital goods and
intermediate goods)(see BOX 2)
3) few efforts were made by the host countries governments and
transnational corporations to adapt the technology to local factor
endowments, creating unemployment and the development of a natural-
resources-capital-intensive type of industrialization
4) the economic power of transnational corporations inhibited the
development of non-dependent local capitalist class
5) transnational corporations tended to 'distort' the consumption
patterns of the host countries population through aggressive
marketing policies and massive advertising.
INTERNAL FEATURES
ISI's main feature is that the State must assume a leading role as
allocator of economic resources, and, most importantly, had to lead
investment in the heavy industry until that sector became profitable
and "mature" to be transferred to private capital ownership.
Therefore, the State was trapped within the contradictions between
OBJECTIVES and class composition of the administrative apparatus.
The objectives of
a) economic efficiency,
b) administrative consistency, and
c) social equity
were at odds with the triple alliance between the high rank civil
servants, domestic monopolic capital and transnational corporations.
The urban-manufacturing emphasis of ISI developed into a dramatic
neglect of agriculture, and therefore a low rate of growth of
agricultural products became the norm.
Additional reasons were:
1) backward agricultural techniques
2) a large illiterate peasantry (being utilized by large landowners to
sustain their political power)
3) primitive agricultural services
4) lack of an infrastructure to serve agriculture
5) concentration of landownership in the hands of a social group whose
members were at the same time large industrialists and bankers.
The effects of this urban bias were shortages of food which added to
polarization of income made of social unrest a characteristic of
Latin American political life in the 1950s to 1970s.
Furthermore, the new industries were utilizing capital intensive
technologies which created:
a) low rate of growth of industrial employment, far below the
rate of rural-urban migration, and urban population growth
b) the above polarized even more distribution of income, and
urban poverty was reaching the depths of rural poverty
c) capital intensive industrialization reinforced regional
inequalities, because only big urban settlements had the
basic infrastructure to support capital-intensive production
Also, the high protective walls behind which industries operated allowed
for the perpetuation of considerable economic efficiencies which
translated in even higher social inefficiencies.
In a number of Latin American countries the pressures of rapid
industrialization and urbanization brought along high rates of
inflation adding to the 'imported inflation' from industrialized
countries. Rapid growth of government infrastructure expenditures
necessary to complement the industrial-urban growth, alongside
regressive taxation, led to large inflationary budget deficits.
Growing presence of blue collar workers, general regressive distribution
of income, notorious presence of foreign capital in the modern sector
and continuous presence of the political and economic domination of
United States capital led to political instability in the 1960s. The
the ruling classes' answer was allow to transform the Armed Forces in
a political organization. Peasants uprisings in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chile, plus the triumph
of the Cuban revolution led to military coups searching for an
alternative development strategy.
Two sets of contradictions were apparent, centering around the role of
the State and the political context:
1) the contradiction between the imposing roles assigned to
the State as
defender of national sovereignty,
definer of the national purpose,
arbiter between interest-groups, and
dispenser of services,
and the frequently
deficient policy-making, planning, administrative
and financial capacities of the State.
2) the contradiction between
political forms emphasizing equal rights and
democratic procedures, and
the very uneven distribution of opportunities for
political participation.
POLITICAL CRISIS
ECLA's "Economic Survey of Latin America 1973", United Nations, 1973,
captured the political unrest in the continent as an outcome of the
failure of ISI, writing:
"Systematic rejection of the prevailing style of economic growth with
structural heterogeinity has been most pronounced in intellectual and
academic circles and in part of the educated youth. Groups of
intellectuals and academic researchers, particularly sociologists, have
been prone to assess the prevailing style as neither acceptable nor
viable. An extensive literature has accumulated, mainly within the past
decade, analysing the inter-relations of EXTERNAL DEPENDENCY AND
INTERNAL POWER STRUCTURES IN GENERATING THE PREVAILING STYLE, and
examining the potentialities of different social classes, interest-
groups, and institutions as destroyers of this style and architects
of a different future. The theoretical and value-based premises for
rejection of the prevailing style have, of course been extremely
varied, and the proposals for action have included predominantly
technocratic and nationalistic approaches as well as revolutionary
ones".
And elaborating on "the revolutionary ones", ECLA's scholars wrote:
"...the strongly critical tone predominating in some academic research
and teaching circles in regard to the prevailing style and its
supporters, combined with student militancy, has placed many social
research institutions in a precarious or even worse position".
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
BOX 1
Import-substitution strategies have been defined by the capitalist
literature as a three-state strategy.
FIRST STAGE: societies in the process of modernization should
substitute domestic production of previously imported
simple consumer goods
SECOND STAGE: substitute through domestic production for a wide range
of more sophisticated manufactured goods.
The two stages so far protecting "infant industry" behind
high tariffs and imposing quotas and non-tariff barriers
to other products
THIRD STAGE: reach the long-run objective of ISI, which is dual:
a) achieving greater domestic industrial diversification,
b) export previously protected manufactured goods as
economies of scale and low labour costs make domestic
costs more competitive in the world market.
As opposed to ISI, the literature presents EXPORT-PROMOTION
INDUSTRIALIZATION (EPI), which is basically an ideological position
based on total faith in the free-market.
-EPI assumes efficiency and growth benefits from the free market
-EPI gives priority to substituting large world markets for narrow
domestic markets
-EPI assumes that the above avoid the distorting price and cost effects
of protectionism
In practice, the distinction between ISI and EPI is much less pronounced
than many advocates would imply. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, ISI
strategies were pursued by countries such as Chile, Peru, Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.
CONCEPTUAL WORKING TOOLS
Four broad categories:
1.- Primary inward-looking policies ( mainly agricultural self-
sufficiency)
2.- Secondary inward-looking policies ( manufactured commodity self-
sufficiency through import-
substitution)
3.- Primary outward-looking policies ( encouragement of agricultural
and raw material exports)
4.- Secondary outward-looking policies ( promotion of manufactured
exports )
Today, in 1997, 0ver 70% of export earnings by less developed societies
are in category 3, primary outward-looking policies
________________end of BOX 1____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
BOX 2
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1950-1961
(US$ million)
Net new U.S. investment 2,965
Profit and interest remittance on above -6,875
---------------------------------------------------
Net movement of U.S. private capital -3,910
Total U.S. aid 3,384
Official U.S. debt repayments -1,151
Interest on debt to U.S. govt. - 404
---------------------------------------------------
Net movement of public capital 1,829
---------------------------------------------------
NET MOVEMENT OF ALL CAPITAL -2,081
____________________________________________________
source: R. Rojas, "Latin America: Blockages to Development",
London, 1984, p. 243
-------------------------------------------------------------
From ECLAC, "Economic Bulletin for Latin America", Vol. XVII,
No. 1, First Half of 1972
Financial Resources for Development
"...the cumulative total of direct foreign investment in Latin America
(except Cuba) rose from 7,400 to 17,900 million dollars...between 1950
and 1969...there was a parallel increase in investment in manufacturing...
"...foreign investment also poses a number of new problems for economic
development, especially in conexion with the
(1) balance of payments,
(2) the nature of the technological development it
promotes, and
(3) the autonomy of the national economies
"...the net balance on movements of capital, profits and other private
remunerations between the developed countries and Latin America as a
whole has been markedly negative...
"...the magnitude of the deficit is made evident by a comparison of
direct investment from the United States with the corresponding
remittances of profits: during the period 1960-1968, the total
remittances of profits exceeded total capital inflows by 6,700 million
dollars, WHICH IS MORE THAN THE SURPLUS OF 5,600 MILLION DOLLARS
RECORDED FOR TOTAL LATIN AMERICAN TRADE DURING THE SAME PERIOD...
"...the net balance of direct foreign investment has in practice
consistently been a negative quantity...
"...during the period 1950-1969, for every dollar that entered, two left
in the form of depreciation and profits...
"...the net result of this 20-year period was that the overall net
contribution of foreign capital to external financing was an outflow
of approximately 500 million dollars..."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NET AVAILABLE FINANCING IN LATIN AMERICA
(billion US dollars)
Net inflow Net payments for Net available
of capital profits and interests financing
1979 29.0 -14.2 14.8
1980 29.9 -19.0 10.9
1981 38.0 -29.1 8.9
1982 16.6 -36.8 -20.2
1983 4.5 -34.0 -29.5
________________________________________________________________________
source: ECLAC, "Preliminary Overview of the Latin American Economy
During 1983", E/CEPAL/G1279, 29 Dec. 1983
________________________________________________________________________
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT IN THE TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT (percentages)
1950 1960 1967
Total 18.7 21.7 23.1
Argentina 29.4 32.2 34.1
Chile 21.2 23.7 25.8
Mexico 19.9 23.3 25.6
Brazil 15.1 21.4 21.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
source: "Industrial Development in Latin America", Economic Bulletin
for Latin America, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1969
________________________________________________________________________
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH RATES OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND
THE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT, 1940-1968 (annual rates)
Growth rate Growth rate
of GDP of industry
1940-1950 5.0 6.8
1950-1960 4.7 6.3
1960-1968 4.5 5.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
source: "Industrial Development in Latin America", Economic Bulletin
for Latin America, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1969
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION. Average annual growth
1960-70 1970-76 1980-89
Low income countries 6.7 4.5 8.6
(without China and India) 6.7 4.5 3.1
Middle income countries 7.6 7.2 3.0
Industrial countries 5.7 3.2 2.2
-----------------------------------------------------------
source: World Development Report 1978 and 1991, World Bank
____________________________________________________________
EXTERNAL DEBT:
Total debt as Interest Payments
% of GDP as % of Exports
1970-75 76-82 83-89 1970-75 76-82 83-89
Low income 20.5 28.5 60.7 2.9 5.3 11.8
Middle income 18.6 34.6 54.9 5.1 11.0 15.4
------------------------------------------------------------
source: World Development Report 1991
____________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Box 3
Inward-oriented industrialization
(notes by Robinson Rojas)
Up to 1929-33 Latin American economy had been characterized by free
trade...exporting raw materials and cash crops, that is.
The world trade crisis (1929>) prompted Latin American governments to
radically rethink their philosophies of political economy, i.e. Latin
American exports declined from an average of about US$ 5,000 million in
1928-29 to US$ 1,500 million in 1933...There were serious problems with
current account in the balance of payments and foreign exchange
shortages...
Latin American societies found themselves able to finance decreasing
amounts of imported manufactured goods from the industrial countries;
...various measures were taken to conserve and ration decreased foreign
exchange resources:
1.- tariffs were raised,
2.- import quotas were enforced,
3.- restrictions on the use of foreign exchange.
Latin America changed from a group of free-trade economies to one of
highly protected economies.
Latin American capitalists, making the most of the scarcity of goods
and the level of protection, began to produce or increase the domestic
production of goods previously imported.
Their new political economy was based on the following:
A.- all major industrial countries (especially U.S.A and Japan) had
industrialized behind high protective tariffs;
B.- a country needed to develop a mature industrial structure before
it could become involved in the free trading of manufactured goods;
C.- protective policies should promote a wide rather than a specialized
range of industries;
D.- protective policies create more opportunities of employment at a
time of rapid growth in both national populations and labour
markets;
By the 1950s the above became formalized in the policy known as
IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION
as theorized by the influential "Comision Economica para America Latina
de las Naciones Unidas" (CEPAL) (United Nations Economic Comission for
Latin America, ECLA, today known as Economic Comission for Latin
America and the Caribbean, ECLAC).
CEPAL envisaged four stages of industrial development:
First Stage:
concentrated on the production of basic non-durable
consumer goods such as textiles, foodstuffs and
pharmaceuticals;
Second Stage:
specialization on more complex products, known as
consumer durables, such as gas/electrical cookers,
radios and television sets, and motor vehicles
(both the technologies and parts of these products had to
be imported at the outset, until domestic generation of
both was created)
Third Stage:
promotion of intermediate industries: plants
manufacturing steel, petrochemicals, aluminium, etc.
promotion of production of a wide range of parts and
components plants, supplying the consumer goods industries
Fourth Stage:
development of domestic technology through a growing
capital goods industry (manufacturing machinery and
plants)
The process of ISI in Latin America has been engineered through a
distinctive institutional structure: the "triple alliance", or an
alliance between
state owned firms,
national private enterprises, and
transnational corporations;
the balance between these categories varies from country to country.
By and large, national private enterprises were seen to be losing ground
in the 1960s to both public enterprises and transnational corporations.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE ENTERPRISE:
to invest in those intermediate and capital goods sectors
that continued industrial expansion seemed to require,
specially because of inadequate domestic capital market...
to invest in the extractive industries and in the further
processing and refining of the minerals concerned.
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE:
great diversity in terms of size, technological level and
forms of organization, but promoting large conglomerates
with a wide variety of manufacturing interests, and often
important tertiary functions in banking, insurance, finance,
tourism, commerce, and the media.
At the other end of the size range, large number of small
enterprises, they were labour-intensive (methods) and low
capital (inputs).
Actually, a "fractured" system of production was reinforced
upon the system of production inherited from colonial times,
with MODERN, INTERMEDIATE AND PRIMITIVE sectors ( see
R. Rojas, "Latin America: Blockages to Development", 1984,
Table 1, page 195)
THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
to produce high technology, capital-intensive products for
the domestic market under the same array of protective
legislation utilised for national enterprises. Foreign
direct investment was more important at the beginning on
mining and agribusiness, and then, the flows deviated to
manufacturing.
By the 1960s a clear brand of "dependent" industrialisation was in
place in Latin America, as an outcome of this triple alliance, and
intellectuals from Chile, Argentina, Brasil and Peru, based at the
Universidad de Chile in Santiago, Chile, were producing an array of
criticism and elaborating alternative strategies for development:
"A real process of dependent development does exist in some Latin
American countries. By development, in this context, we mean
"capitalist development". This form of development, in the periphery
as well as in the center, produces as it evolves, in a cyclical way,
wealth and poverty, accumulation and shortage of capital, employment
for some and unemployment for others. So, we do not mean by the notion
of "development" the achievement of a more egalitarian or more just
society. These are not consequences expected from capitalist
development, especially in peripheral economies..."
"...in the end, what has to be discussed as an alternative is not the
consolidation of the state and the fulfillment of "autonomous
capitalism", but how to superced them. The important question, then,
is how to construct paths toward socialism"...( F. H. Cardoso and E.
Faletto, in working paper discussed in the late 1960s in CESO -Centro
de Estudios Economico Sociales-, Universidad de Chile, and later
included in the introduction to "Dependency and Development in Latin
America", University of California Press, 1979, a translation of
"Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina", Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1969)
----------------------------------------------------------
LATIN AMERICA.- GDP PER CAPITA AS % OF U.S. GDP PER CAPITA
(percentage)
1952 1992
Argentina 33.9 26.0
Bolivia 6.0 2.9
Brazil 13.7 11.9
Chile 17.1 11.8
Colombia 15.1 5.7
Costa Rica 9.1 8.4
Cuba 19.1 7.1
Dominican Republic 10.5 4.5
Ecuador 5.5 4.6
El Salvador 11.3 5.0
Guatemala 10.4 4.2
Haiti 4.1 1.7
Honduras 8.0 2.5
Mexico 12.5 14.9
Nicaragua 8.8 1.5
Panama 18.6 10.4
Paraguay 4.6 5.9
Peru 6.3 4.1
Uruguay 19.1 14.4
Venezuela 26.7 12.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Department of Commerce, and World Development Report
1993
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________end of Box 3__________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 1 AVERAGE RATE OF GROWTH (% PER YEAR)
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
LATIN AMERICA
1965-1973 1973-1980 1980-1991
Argentina 4.4 2.1 -0.3
Barbados 6.7 3.5 2.2
Belize 5.8 5.4 5.3
Bolivia 4.2 3.8 0.3
Brazil 9.8 6.4 2.4
Chile 3.5 3.7 3.6
Colombia 6.3 5.0 3.7
Costa Rica 7.1 5.3 3.1
Dominican Republic 9.7 4.8 1.7
Ecuador 7.6 6.6 2.0
El Salvador 4.4 3.2 1.1
Guatemala 6.0 5.5 1.1
Guyana 3.1 1.0 -2.8
Haiti 1.7 4.3 -0.7
Honduras 4.6 6.6 2.5
Jamaica 5.3 -2.9 1.8
Mexico 6.8 6.2 1.2
Nicaragua 3.5 -1.9 -2.3
Panama 7.4 4.6 0.2
Paraguay 5.1 9.6 2.7
Peru 3.9 2.8 -0.4
Trinidad and Tobago 3.2 7.0 -4.6
Uruguay 1.2 4.3 0.5
Venezuela 3.7 3.3 1.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGGREGATE RATE OF GROWTH FOR NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES:*
1965-1973 6.6
1973-1980 4.8
1980-1991 1.5
________________________________________________________________________
*Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru
and Venezuela
________________________________________________________________________
source: Trends in Development Economies 1992, The World Bank, 1992
________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2 NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES*
AGGREGATE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH -GDP
1900-1913 2.1
1913-1929 2.8
1929-1954 3.5
1950-1960 5.4
1960-1970 5.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Industrial countries Developing countries*
1938-1950 4.5 3.8
1950-1960 5.0 6.9
1960-1970 5.6 6.3
ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
(per capita)
Industrial countries Developing countries*
1938-1950 3.8 2.1
1950-1960 3.8 4.5
1960-1970 4.4 3.6
INDEX OF OUPUT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Developing countries*
Light industry Heavy industry
1938 100 100
1953 162 217
1958 222 372
1963 270 556
1970 389 994
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INDEX OF OUTPUT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Industrial countries Developing countries*
1938 100 100
1953 196 191
1958 251 267
1963 325 366
1970 468 563
1980 661 1,108
1991 914 1,454
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
ANNUAL GROWTH OF OUTPUT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
Industrial countries Developing countries
1938-1953 4.6 4.4
1953-1958 5.1 6.9
1958-1963 5.3 6.5
1963-1970 5.6 6.3
1970-1980 3.5 7.0
1980-1991 3.0 2.5
________________________________________________________________________
* Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico,
Peru and Venezuela.
________________________________________________________________________
source: Statistical Yearbook 1970 and Statistical Yearbook 1971,
United Nations, 1971
Trends in Developing Economies 1992, The World Bank, 1992
________________________________________________________________________
Table 3.- EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF LATIN AMERICA'S FOREIGN TRADE
(US$ millions)
Year Imports Exports Total
1910 1,098.1 1,308.6 2.406.7
1920 2,884.6 3,490.7 6,375.3
1922 1,616.4 2,108.1 3,724.5
1928 2,393.6 3,029.7 5,423.3
1932 610.4 1,030.4 1,640.8
1939 1,346.5 1,858.5 3,205.0
1946 3,532.1 5,993.9 9,526.0
1951 7,287.4 7,311.3 14,598.7
________________________________________________________________________
source: compiled from the Pan American Union's FOREIGN TRADE SERIES and
from FOREIGN COMMERCE YEARBOOK, published by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, and from G. Wythe, "An Outline of Latin
American Economic Development", New York, 1949
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