The tensions of authoritarian rule and democratization enter the arena of civil society in a complex, rather than in a deterministic manner. The dominance of the ruling class in production and state activities does not easily translate itself into hegemony in the sphere of civil society. I use the term hegemony to mean the capacity of rulers to secure compliance from the populace through methods that are not explicitly coercive. Disadvantaged groups can, and do, contest attempts to establish ruling class hegemony at the civil terrain. Their capacity to press for democratization does not lie at the productive base, but in the wider civil arena where national strategies can be formulated and broad coalitions built. Workers' agitations for industrial democracy become effective only when they are linked to broader concerns for national democracy. For instance, workers' strikes in factories become a central force in democratization only when such strikes have meaning for broad sections of society. Specific agitations against retrenchment and declines in real wages may be linked with popular dissatisfaction with deteriorating living conditions on a national scale to generate broad public support. Problems of factory victimization may in turn be linked to wider issues of organizational autonomy and the rule of law.

Similarly, the complaints of teachers, students and doctors for better salaries, higher grants, improved working conditions and professional autonomy enter the democratic arena only when such issues are linked to national concerns for falling educational standards and health facilities, and the general problems of state repression. Such linkages bring unionist and professional agitations into the wider civil sphere, and may give rise to issue-oriented pressure groups and national alliances for democratization. Such alliances may encompass a variety of social groups such as fractions of the dominant power blocs, and ethnic, gender, environmental and religious social movements that feel aggrieved by the existing distribution of power and resources. Issue-oriented pressure groups may, in fact, play key roles in initiating and sustaining the demands for democracy.

The capacity of state authorities and ruling classes to establish hegemony in civil society depends on their record of political legitimation and their ability to improve the quality of life of major sections of the population. Failures exacerbate the crisis of legitimation, erode social hegemony and strengthen the forces pressing for democratization. Once democratization is widely perceived as a viable mode for regulating social and political conflicts, it ceases to be an exclusive project of any one class or social group. Ruling classes can incorporate, for instance, the demands of subordinate groups and influence the democratization process. This may be a strategy to resolve differences among the dominant power blocs and to blunt the militant demands of the popular groups.

Conversely, leaders of dominated groups may employ authoritarian practices in conducting the affairs of their organizations and in resisting the policies of business managers and the power élite. Such strategies may weaken the democratic project even though they may also force policy makers and managers to opt for democratic concessions. We end up with an articulation of a multiplicity of values and strategies, traversing the authoritarian-democratic divide, but with the dominant political values determined by the balance of social and political forces.

There is nothing in the modes of accumulation of African societies that prevents social groups from struggling for democracy. What we have instead are obstacles to the realization of stable democratic rule. But these obstacles themselves are not fixed and incontestable since they engender antithetical forms of political behaviour in the contestants for public resources and state power.
 

1.6 Structural pre-conditions for stable and sustainable democracy

I make a distinction between conditions for sustainable democracy and the struggles for democracy. The latter, as we have seen, can be located at the level of the contradictions of authoritarianism, rooted in the dynamics of accumulation and civil society. Democratic struggles do not necessarily lead to stable democratic rule. The triumph of democracy, and its consolidation, not its fleeting appearances, may require some changes in the organization of the patterns of accumulation themselves.

I focus the discussion on the structural conditions, leaving out standard explanations based on individualism, market industrialization, political culture and multi-ethnic pluralism that litter the literature on pre-conditions for democracy in developing countries. These provide at best partial explanations to the problem. The bulk of liberal democratic theory surely establishes a close relationship between the economy – referred to as levels of development – and stable democratic rule (Lipset, 1983; Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1984; Vanhanen, 1989). Levels of development are, however, located outside the context of forms of appropriation and methods of production, restricted primarily to questions of incomes, resource distribution and welfare. When such scholars attempt to integrate forms of accumulation and social classes into their analysis, as Diamond does in his study of the collapse of Nigeria's First Republic, ruling classes are reduced to élites and politicians, and the process of surplus appropriation is restricted to the rent-seeking state capitalist type (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1988). There is an additional normative dimension to liberal theory which renders it less useful to the analysis of Third World experiences. Theorists tend to work their way backwards by identifying the end values of democracy in Western societies – tolerance, moderation, loyal opposition, etc. (Powell, 1982; Pye and Verba, 1965). How such values can be developed in societies marked by intolerance, violence and polarization is left largely unexplained.

I am primarily concerned with the material, structural conditions that are favourable for stable democratic rule. I break down the framework of modes of accumulation into six models, reflecting the way changes in the forms and modes of accumulation condition the development of democratic and authoritarian practices. By changes in forms of accumulation I mean either the intensification of a particular mode or its weakening. Thus we can have as an example an intensification of transnational capitalist production (TCP) and rent-seeking state capitalism (RSC), and a weakening of petty commodity production (PCP). Based on this example, we end up with six models of forms of accumulation: these are illustrated in Table 1.

Note: Two other permutations have been ruled out in this schema, viz. the simultaneous intensification or weakening of all three forms of accumulation. It is assumed that if TCP is being intensified it may lead either to the weakening of PCP and RSC, or to an intensification of PCP and a weakening of RSC, or to an intensification of RSC and a weakening of PCP. Similarly, it is assumed that if PCP is weakening, TCP and RSC may either be intensifying, or TCP alone is intensifying, or RSC is intensifying and TCP is weakening.

I group A, B and C as models of economic expansion; and D, E and F as models of economic crisis. Models of expansion do not rule out possibilities of crisis. In fact, crisis is embedded in all the models, given the problems usually associated with markets, state interventions and mixed systems of accumulation. I do not discuss specific cyclical crisis situations. A model of expansion in this context represents positive structural transformations, and a model of crisis is associated with negative structural changes. The two deal with development processes that lead to qualitative changes in forms of accumulation. In this context negative structural changes can experience periods of positive growth. These models are illustrated in the following scale:

• • +3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3
    A	B	C		D	E	F

The focus on forms of accumulation in constructing the models obviously downplays other crucial variables like resource endowment and class structure – some would say it leaves them out completely. The theoretical focus is, of course, to establish a linkage between forms of accumulation and political systems that can be classified as either democratic or authoritarian. In any case, some of the other variables, though not explicitly treated, could be deduced from the six models which, in a way, give us some idea of different patterns and levels of development. I relate changes in forms of accumulation to questions of rural-urban integration, the nature of system-maintenance social contracts, the provision of public welfare, and the dynamics of state-civil society relations. These represent the crucial factors in establishing whether African countries can experience authoritarian or democratic rule. I make no attempt, however, to develop quantifiable variables around these issues. I highlight the qualitative links between these issues and authoritarianism/democracy in Table 2.

The peasant question, which is at the heart of rural-urban integration, is central to any discussion of democracy in Africa since most people live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their main source of livelihood. Rural populations are the major source of national food supplies, export revenues and industrial development (Barraclough, 1990; Mamdani, 1986 and 1987). By rural-urban integration, I understand the process of sustaining the economic, social and political life of rural communities, leading to a transformation of the structures of dualism that have underpinned all facets of rural-urban relations. Low levels of national integration restrict democratization to an urban phenomenon, relegate peasants to the fringes of civil society, and undermines their ability to develop national strategies and enter into broad democratic coalitions.

The alienation of rural societies from the mainstream of national life exposes the peasantry to continued manipulation from state authorities and rural/urban patrons, anxious to maintain authoritarian forms of rule. Solving the rural-urban dilemma may, in fact, provide the basis for coming to terms with the problems of unbalanced ethnic and regional development. The resolution of this dilemma should obviously give prominence to the transformation of the regulatory mechanisms that have undermined the independence of petty producers, and provide support for the dynamics of petty accumulation. This boils down to a question of making economic development and democracy national projects, as opposed to the current practice where they are mainly an urban phenomenon dominated by the power élites. Table 2 shows how this issue is related to the six different models of accumulation.

A stable and sustainable democracy must also be able to create a social system that will accommodate the conflicting claims of diverse groups in society. The social groups remain committed to the fundamentals of the existing order while competing, sometimes militantly, for overall dominance. Classical liberalism relies on the depoliticizing functions of the market as the bedrock for the construction of such a stable social order. The hegemony of the capitalist class is presented as anonymous and the losses inflicted by the market on disadvantaged groups is interpreted as a natural fate which can befall all individuals (Lawrence, 1989). In this context, liberals see democracy as the natural political shell of capitalism.

There is, however, no natural correspondence between capitalism and democracy (Therbon, 1977). All capitalist economies, however advanced, must devise social systems that will sustain democratic rule. Such systems must provide welfare/economic support, however contestable, for the deprived majority to exercise their formal democratic rights, which in turn should allow them to sustain and develop their livelihood aspirations. Western democracies were consolidated in the post-1945 period with the construction of welfare states. Social democratic parties provided political leadership to restless workers and deprived groups to usher in the so-called "historic class compromise". Social democracy has strong built-in elements of corporatism as governments try to balance the conflicting demands of unions and the organized private sector. The leading actors and their organizations bargain with the state as independent entities but their co-optation into the policy apparatus entails major compromises, including the regulation of the behaviour of their members (Cawson, 1989; Carter, 1989).

The corporate type of social control is contrasted with social contracts in which the ruling authorities define the rules and regulate the participation of the other contestants. Invariably the contending social actors are denied autonomous political space to canvass for the views and interests of their members. The social contract is top-down and authoritarian. Despite its authoritarian character, its legitimacy may rest on relatively high levels of welfare. The level of this type of welfare may be lower than the corporate type because of the low level of development and the political constraints imposed on the bargaining positions of social actors. Another type of social control is patron-client arrangements which can operate in both formal democracies and authoritarian systems. Where patron-client relations sustain democratic rule, the contending groups and their organizations may enjoy formal autonomy, but the political authorities may co-opt the leadership or introduce policies that compromise the political effectiveness of the groups. Public welfare supports the patronage system even though such welfare does not need to be as high as in the other systems of social control. The relative freedom of the groups frees the ruling authorities from defending a costly social contract. The state then relies on the fragmented rural communities, through patron-client networks, to counter the political weight of the urban groups. Where patron-client relations are used to buttress authoritarianism, the social groups lose their formal independence, but they may be compensated with relatively higher expenditure on welfare to sustain compliance.  

Model A creates conditions for the emergence of sustainable liberal democracy. Rent-seeking activities become less central to the business practices of the private monopolies and the local entrepreneurs. The private capitalist sector expands and transforms the petty commodity enterprises. Some of the groups in this sector are transformed into wage workers, others join the ranks of the power élite or remain as peasants, but with sustainable agricultural systems. The disparities between town and country are reduced. Economic expansion encourages the establishment of integrated rural enterprises. Corruption is minimized, resources are "rationally" allocated, classes mature, and patron-clientelism is checked. The authoritarianism associated with monopolies is restrained by broadening the social base of the firms and by making extensive economic and political concessions to the dominated groups at the work place and civil society and in the administration of state power. This may necessitate the establishment of a corporate social contract. The nature of the concessions and the character of the democracy may vary according to the specific demands of the social forces.

In model B the excesses of rent-seeking activities have either been checked or minimized. The state tends to act more rationally, in a developmental way, but largely in defence of private capital. Industrial monopolies and capitalist agriculture are, however, not strong enough to transform the petty commodity sector. Although the state is still open to manipulation from privileged groups, the political élites insist on some rational legal order in regulating conflicts of interests in the economy. The limited nature of transnational capital and the checks imposed on rent-seeking activities forces social groups in the modern sector to maintain an active presence in the petty commodity sector. Patron-client relations thrive. The model allows for some kind of clientelist democracy, such as those operating in Botswana, Senegal and the Gambia. The patronage social order acts as a constraint on the relatively free social and political organizations to effectively challenge governmental authority. Such constraints limit the development of civil society.

In Botswana, for instance, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party makes use of traditional political systems such as the kgotla to legitimize its rule and blunt the effectiveness of opposition parties (Molokomme, 1989; Holm, 1988). High levels of sustained growth have allowed the régime to raise incomes, provide public welfare and support rural schemes that benefit peasant farmers – the backbone of its patronage network. Weak working class and professional groups make less critical demands on the political system.

The ruling Union Progressiste Sénégalaise transformed itself from an authoritarian into a "social democratic" party between 1978 and 1983. It attempted to infuse greater rationality in the administration of the state and economy by insisting on public accountability and cleansing the party and state apparatus of corruption. But in order to administer its highly contested democracy it has had to depend on the old patronage system that co-opts the marabouts, the main social and political force in the countryside, into the policy-making apparatus (Coulon, 1988). But, whereas Botswana has been able to sustain its clientelist democracy without much opposition, that of Senegal is undergoing serious stress. In recent times, opposition political parties and urban-based groups have challenged the dominance of the ruling party. It would seem Senegal's economic crisis is eroding the ruling party's ability to oil its patronage machine and govern without much coercion. Botswana on the other hand has one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Its growth rests, however, on potentially shaky mineral revenues, whose collapse may strain the patronage system that underpins its fledgling democracy.

Model C represents an economy in rapid transition to capitalism, where rent-seeking activities play crucial roles in supporting private capital. Most African economies were launched on this path of development at independence. Authoritarian rule accompanied such expansion. We analyze the details of this development and that of model D in the next section dealing with "stages in the struggles for democracy". Here it is significant to point out that various authoritarian ideologies – negritude, authenticity, African socialism – and political régimes such as military and one-party dictatorships were devised to push the frontiers of accumulation and maintain a firm grip on the political process.

Model D represents an economy in crisis. There is de-industrialization, excessive pilfering of public resources and dependence on the petty commodity sector for social reproduction. The fiscal crisis and adjustment measures introduced to cope with the recession lead to further repression as disaffected groups try to resist them. The social contract comes under considerable stress. Pressures for democratization intensify. This may even lead to the establishment of democratic governments as in many Latin American countries that are in transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. But stable and sustainable democracy cannot be guaranteed without substantial changes in the forms of accumulation and socio-economic development.

Model E represents an economy in deep crisis. De-industrialization is buttressed by the failure of the petty commodity sector to absorb the displaced groups in the modern sector. Rural-urban relations are marked by extreme dualism. Competition for state power intensifies. Authoritarianism is rife. Individualist solutions flourish, further weakening the collective struggles for democracy. State terror intensifies with the collapse of the social contract and the failure of patron-client relations to check the instability generated by the depression.

Model F represents the collapse of the modern economy and a return to petty commodity production. Economic activity is marked by subsistence production, low levels of exchange and barter. Fragmented kinship ties tend to regulate social relations. Collective family and kinship support systems take the place of public welfare. Civil society disappears as the public and private roles of individuals and enterprises become fused. This can lead to mixtures of authoritarian and informal, village level democracy. Recent scenarios of the withering away of the African state and general theories of state decay, in a way, fit this model of accumulation (Chazan, 1983; Sandbrook, 1985). This perspective does not ignore the progressive role that has been played by the petty commodity sector in most African societies in building modern states and supporting the activities of large-scale capital. It is also the case that in the current crisis, informal sector and peasant activities provide useful fall back positions for many individuals and households that have been displaced by modern enterprises and the state. Some sectors also show some promise in providing a basis for sustained economic development. Petty commodity production cannot, however, be viable in the absence of a properly functioning modern sector.

Most African countries are currently operating either model D or E. IMF and World Bank programmes seek to check the expansion of the state, which they believe is responsible for rent-seeking activities and the economic crisis, and move the economies to model B and eventually to A. But there is the danger that the adjustment programmes will lead to stagnation at D or a movement to E. The scenario of decaying states (F) should also not be ruled out. Popular forces may be interested in a strategy that pushes the economies to model B or A in order to strengthen their bargaining positions in the new democratic polity. Peasants and artisans may not be opposed to model B in order for them to continue to function as petty commodity producers; whereas workers and urban professionals may prefer model A, which is likely to give them better leverage in improving their living conditions and political rights. The construction of specific types of democratic systems is, at bottom, an empirical issue which depends on the projects social movements and ruling classes have set for themselves and the obstacles they are likely to face in implementing them.

The basis for democratization exists in all the models but democratic rule cannot be sustained in models C, D, E and F. Stable and sustainable democracy requires some level of economic development, a viable social contract, and the capacity of both dominant and subordinate groups to weaken the monopolistic forms of transnational capital, minimize the role of rent capitalism and transform patron-client relations in the petty commodity sector into relations of self-reliance and social independence.

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