THE
STRATFOR WEEKLY (5 June 2003)
WMD
by Dr. George Friedman
Summary
The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has created a political
crisis in the United States and Britain. Within the two governments, there are
recriminations and brutal political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in
February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to articulate its real, strategic
reasons for the war -- choosing instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead
to a deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here.
Analysis
"Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its name: The issue may
well result in the mass destruction of senior British and American officials who used
concerns about WMD in Iraq as the primary, public justification for going to war. The
simple fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and -- except
for some vans which may have been used for biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was
working to develop such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority for U.S. military forces,
which have occupied Iraq for more than a month, the failure to find weapons of mass
destruction not only has become an embarrassment, it also has the potential to mushroom
into a major political crisis in the United States and Britain. Not only is the political
opposition exploiting the paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are using
the issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess.
On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled Smoke and Mirrors: The United
States, Iraq and Deception, which made the following points:
1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was strategic and not about weapons of
mass destruction.
2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to justify the attack to its
coalition partners.
3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for the war would ultimately
create massive confusion as to the nature of the war the United States was fighting.
As we put it:
"To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic interests as the
justification for war has created a crisis in U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are
designed to protect strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S. grand
strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military strategy have collided. The
discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor will a
coup in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that will last for years,
maintaining one's conceptual footing is critical. If that footing cannot be maintained --
if the requirements of the war and the requirements of strategic clarity are incompatible
-- there are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq." The failure to
enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion of Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous
justification--has now come home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the
inability to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of the United States and is
tearing the government apart in an orgy of finger-pointing.
To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to start at the beginning -- with
al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily
competent global organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to top the
Sept. 11 strikes with something even more impressive. This led to a very reasonable fear
that al Qaeda possessed or was in the process of obtaining WMD.
U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- sensitive mode, began putting
together bits of intelligence that tended to show that what appeared to be logical
actually was happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was operating in a worst-case
scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing with WMD. Lower-grade intelligence was
regarded as significant. Two things resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of
mass destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al Qaeda's ability to
obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along with a range of less public events -- was the
"axis of evil" State of the Union speech, which identified three countries as
having WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of these countries.
If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy, then it is well known that
Iraq had WMD, since it used them in the past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that
Iraq continued to possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials believed there was a
parallel program in biological weapons, and also that Iraqi leaders had the ability and
the intent to restart their nuclear program, if they had not already done so. Running on
the worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into U.S. intelligence, Iraq was
identified as a country with WMD and likely to pass them on to al Qaeda.
Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There are other sources of WMD in
the world, even beyond the "axis of evil" countries. Simply invading Iraq would
not solve the fundamental problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has always
argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and strategic purpose:
Psychologically, it was designed to demonstrate to the Islamic world the enormous power
and ferocity of the United States; strategically, it was designed to position the United
States to coerce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran into changing their
policies toward suppressing al Qaeda operations in their countries. Both of these missions
were achieved.
WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It became, however, the
publicly stated moral, legal and political justification for the war. It was understood
that countries like France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with Washington in
a policy that would make the United States the arbiter of the Middle East. Washington had
to find a justification for the war that these allies would find irresistible.
That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. From the standpoint of
U.S. intelligence, this belief became a given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical
weapons, and no reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally destroyed
them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush administration that they were on safe
ground. Moreover, it was assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's
hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept the idea of a war in which
the stated goal -- and the real outcome -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons.
This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public justification for the war
did not compel France, Germany or Russia to endorse military action. They continued to
resist because they fully understood the outcome -- intended or not -- would be U.S.
domination of the Middle East, and they did not want to see that come about. Paris, Berlin
and Moscow turned the WMD issue on its head, arguing that if that was the real issue, then
inspections by the United Nations would be the way to solve the problem. Interestingly,
they never denied that Iraq had WMD; what they did deny was that proof of WMD had been
found. They also argued that over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection process would
either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or justify an invasion at that point. What is
important here is that French and Russian leaders shared with the United States the
conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought weapons of mass destruction
-- particularly if they were primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was
U.S. power in the Middle East.
In short, all sides were working from the same set of assumptions. There was not much
dispute that the Baathist regime probably had WMD. The issue between the United States and
its allies was strategic. After the war, the United States would become the dominant power
in the region, and it would use this power to force regional governments to strike at al
Qaeda. Germany, France and Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power, opposed the war.
Rather than clarifying the chasm in the alliance, the Bush administration permitted the
arguments over WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American public
believing the administration's public statements -- smoke and mirrors -- rather than its
private view.
The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all assumed that this problem
would disappear when the U.S. military got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public
justification would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved and no one would be
the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is difficult to believe even now -- is that
Hussein actually might not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or destroyed them
so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the kicker the Bush administration
never counted on.
The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers could range to the extremes:
He had no WMD or he still has WMD, being held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the
point here is that the WMD question was not the reason the United States went to war. The
war was waged in order to obtain a strategic base from which to coerce countries such as
Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia into using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within their
borders. From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be working.
However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United States walked into a trap.
The question of the location of WMD is important. The question of whether it was the CIA
or Defense Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's WMD is also
important. But these questions are ultimately trivial compared to the use of smoke and
mirrors to justify a war in which Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the
problem is that it created a situation in which the American public had one perception of
the reason for the war while the war's planners had another. In a democratic society
engaged in a war that will last for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have
created.
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