Some Realistic Negotiated Settlement Provisions

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    It is ludicrous to demand a withdrawal of
        Yugoslav forces as a condition of a ceasefire

        By Lewis Mackenzie

        As a result of my United Nations service in Sarajevo in 1992 I
have the dubious distinction of brokering more ceasefire agreements
than any other Canadian. Dubious, because most of them failed!
        Nevertheless, based on the theory that you learn from your
mistakes, at around the 15th of 19 ceasefires I was beginning to get it
right.
..........  
Anyone discussing cease fire proposals on a more formal basis might
want to consider the following:
        A withdrawal of Yugoslav forces ^× military, police, and
paramilitary ^× before a ceasefire is, quite frankly, a ludicrous
demand by NATO. I can't believe the alliance is serious. No leader
would ever concentrate his forces in Kosovo for the drive north to
Serbia with NATO aircraft overhead still seeking targets. The
ceasefire must come first.
        The disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army will not happen.
Their own spokesman, based in the U.K., has stated that their aim is
to unite the Albanians of Macedonia and Albania proper with the
Kosovo Albanians, thereby creating a Greater Albania. He also
indicated they would never agree to disarm, considering what been
done to them by Yugoslav security forces. I believe him.
        The Rambouillet agreement is dead and anyone who thinks
otherwise has only been listening to NATO as opposed to the parties
to the conflict, the Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav leadership.
Their opinions should count for something.

       The presence of a follow-on international "peacekeeping'' force in
Kosovo to maintain security for returning refugees is a major problem
for Milosevic; however, it is not an impossible problem. The first step
is not to call it a "force". The word generates problems all by itself. I
used the terms "peacekeeping mission" and "peacekeeping corps" ^×
anything but "force".
        The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
monitors, pulled out just before the bombing started, did marvellous
work. Their numbers were approximately 50 per cent of what was
requested in the October 1998 Agreement. I would personally triple
their size. The Yugoslav officials I met with saw no problem with
that.
        I do not agree that nations participating in the air offensive
should
provide peacekeepers, for all of the obvious reasons. However, with
the UN's inability to put mission into Kosovo on short notice, NATO
troops wearing UN insignia  and authorized by a Security Council
resolution for a limited deployment of three months might be the
answer.
        During that time nations outside the conflict, such as Ukraine,
India, Brazil, Argentina, China, etc., could deploy their troops to the
area, ready to take over when the NATO troops withdrew.
        There were lots of pained expressions in Belgrade when I
proposed such an idea; however. it was not rejected out of hand.
        Needless to say, the Albanians will insist on some trustworthy
police/security force in Kosovo, as will the Serbs. This problem could
be managed by deploying a large UNCIVPOL (UN civilian police)



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                   ANDRE GUNDER FRANK
250 Kensington Ave - Apt 608     Tel: 1-514-933 2539    
Westmount/Montreal PQ/QC         Fax: 1-514-933 6445 
Canada H3Z 2G8              e-mail:agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca 

My Personal/Professional Home Page> http://www.whc.neu.edu/gunder.html
My NATO/Kosovo Page> http://csf.colorado.edu/archive/agfrank/nato_kosovo/       
My professional/personal conclusion is the same as Pogo's - 
            We have met the enemy, and it is US 
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