

Comparative Systems: An Overview

Bryan R. Roberts

University of Texas at Austin

United States of America

Introduction

This overview focuses on urbanization and the development of urban systems in less developed countries from the 1950s to the present. In 1950, some 18 percent of the population of less developed regions was urban, rising to 40 percent by 2000 (UNDP, 2002: Table A.2). These percentages conceal considerable variation between countries and regions. Forty-two percent of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean was urban in 1950, compared with 15 percent in Africa, 17 percent in South-Central Asia and 15 percent in South-Eastern Asia (ibid).¹ The differences in the extent of urbanization are associated with differences in the timing of urbanization and in the nature of urban systems. The highest rates of urbanization between 1950 and 2000 in Latin America occurred in the 1950s, when many of the urban systems of Latin American countries had high primacy – the concentration of a country’s urban population in its largest city. Countries in other regions experienced their fastest rates of urbanization later, in the 1960s and 1970s, and in comparison to Latin America primacy was a less marked feature of many of their urban systems in 1950.

These differences suggest some preliminary issues for our analysis. The first is whether urbanization obeys a natural evolution so that a country’s stage of urbanization can explain similarities and differences – whether, for instance, a country is beginning to urbanize, is at an intermediate point or has reached a mature level of urbanization. Are those less developed countries and regions that attained high levels of urbanization early now showing more balanced urban systems with the growth of intermediate cities resulting in a less marked pattern of primacy? Are those countries and regions that urbanized later repeating the unbalanced pattern of urban concentration that had characterized the early urbanizers?

The notion of stage of urbanization needs, however, to be used with caution. There are many factors that can account for differences in the urban systems of countries apart from their stage of urbanization. Thus, a country’s size, topography, population density or rates of economic growth will affect its urban system and differentiate it from the urban systems of other countries that are at similar stages of urbanization. A more fundamental problem with a stage

¹ There is also considerable variation within regions. South Africa shows 43 percent of its population living in urban areas in 1950, while Central and South America range from the 18 percent urban in Honduras to the 65.3 percent in Argentina and the 78 percent in Uruguay.

analysis is that it ignores the changing context of global political and economic relationships that affect countries and their urban systems. One of the primary objectives of this overview is to take account of this changing context and its implications for urban systems in developing countries.

The global context was the subject of theories in the 1970s and 1980s, such as those of Dependency and World System, which argued that the hierarchical relations between core and peripheral countries had systematic consequences for the nature of their social as well as their economic structures. The Dependency perspective was extended to cities and urban systems, showing that it was the economic activities and elites located in cities that played a crucial role in reproducing the hierarchical relations of inequality on a world scale (Portes and Walton, 1976, 1981; Walton, 1977; Roberts, 1978; Browning and Roberts, 1980; Armstrong and McGee, 1986). Cities and urbanization were explicitly linked to World System theory in Timberlake's (1985) edited volume, which documented the systematic unevenness in urban patterns that resulted from the relations between core, periphery and semi-periphery. From the 1980s onwards, analyses of urbanization have increasingly emphasized the global scope of urban systems, as captured in the concept of world or global cities, which organize the activities of lesser order cities throughout the world (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; King, 1990; Sassen, 1991; 1994).

I will consider the principal ways in which the global context affects urban systems in less developed countries by considering the political-economic system dominant in the world at the time of a country's urbanization. I begin with colonialism. Colonial relationships between core countries and their dependencies set the stage for differences in urbanization among less-developed countries. The second such system is that of Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI). Countries that were attaining high levels of urbanization in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s were doing it at a period when ISI policies had been widely adopted in less developed countries. ISI provided a protective fence around urban systems, reinforcing national hierarchies.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, less developed countries have urbanized under Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI). This political economic system is closely associated with neo-liberal economic policies. It is marked by the increasing reduction of tariffs, by exports in manufactured goods and services and by the elimination of many of the barriers to

foreign investment and to the free movement of capital. The international economic system is thus likely to affect the economies of towns and cities within a country more directly and pervasively than in the past, making national boundaries a less significant frame for the relationships among a country's urban places. Since many of the major cities of the less developed world have long been part of the global economy, we need to consider what is now different in their relation to the global economy. I will look at how free trade and the easing of restrictions on the flow of capital and information affects urbanization in less developed countries. I consider the role of global production systems in promoting interurban networks that bypass national urban hierarchies.

In each of these periods, we need to consider the extent and nature of a country's insertion into the global economy. Countries differ in the importance of international trade for their domestic economies. They also differ, especially in the later periods, in whether their insertion is through the export of primary products, through exporting manufactured goods or through the export of services.

I will take up other issues of contemporary urban systems more briefly since they cover subject matter that is likely to be covered in other papers. These issues are the negative and positive contributions of contemporary urban systems to an equitable and more democratic development in less developed countries. One set of issues are the social problems that are often seen to be inherent in the model of urban growth present in less developed countries: rising urban violence and new patterns of spatial and social segregation that sharpen inequality. Another set of issues are the capacities of urban people to defend and advance their interests in face of threats to their well being, whether economic or environmental. An important factor to be considered here is the influence of globalization on urban community organization through the actions of national and international advocacy groups, as well as through the promotion by international agencies and national governments of decentralization and of local participation. This decentralization often results in administrative fragmentation by failing to establish intermediate levels of government, such as metropolitan authorities.

I begin with a discussion of the concept of urban system. It is a widely used descriptive term in the literature on urbanization, but its conceptual significance for the analysis of development is often overlooked. I follow this discussion with an overview of patterns of

urbanization in less developed countries from 1950 to 2000, interpreting these patterns from the perspective of a country's and region's historical insertion into the global economy. I then take up the question of imbalances in urban systems, focusing on the issue of primacy, and how these imbalances are likely to be affected by economic globalization.

The Nature of Urban Systems

An urban system perspective analyzes urbanization in terms of the relationships between cities and between cities and their hinterlands (:643-648; Berry, 1961). These relationships channel flows of information, goods, services and people. The nature of the flows changes over time since “networks of information flows are increasingly substituting for product and people flows (Frisbie and Kasadra, 1988: 636). The ecological notions of key function and dominance have been an integral part of the concept of urban system (Hawley, 1968). Interurban flows in an urban system are hierarchically ordered flows between lower levels and higher levels with higher order centers ordering the development of subordinate centers through the control of political and economic resources. In the planning literature, urban systems are, or can be, key elements promoting a spatially even economic growth and development (Henderson, 2002a). Beginning with Christaller's Central Place Theory, there has been a continuing emphasis on the benefits that emerge from a well-articulated network of urban places that provide services for their hinterlands with individual urban places specializing in particular functions.² This perspective continues to influence the planning of national development, as in the case of the national spatial strategy of the Irish government (Department of the Environment and Local Government, 2000).

In the less developed world, the role of urban systems in development has been much more controversial. This controversy was apparent in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s in the contrast between those, such as Brian Berry (1973) who emphasized the modernizing role of cities and those who saw them as prime agents in deepening the dependency of less developed countries on the developed world. Armstrong and McGee (1985: p. 44), while admitting that urban systems could at times contribute to modern development, commented: “.... the far more important role of Third World urban systems is that of bases for centralized capital accumulation

² In their review of the literature, Frisbie and Kasadra (2003:647) state that “there is substantial agreement that a hierarchical system of cities is strongly, positively and reciprocally related to economic development.”

by transnational firms and local businesses.” Charges of ‘urban bias’ in the policies of governments and international agencies dominated much of the discussion of urbanization in the 1970s (Lipton, 1977). Analysts used terms such as ‘overurbanization’ or ‘pseudourbanization’ to emphasize the negative consequences of urbanization for development.

In regions of the world that in the 1950s and 1960s were already highly urban, such as Latin America, the focus was on the unevenness and imbalances of urbanization and of the evolving urban systems. This analysis was mainly concerned with the issue of primacy. Primacy was identified as a characteristic feature of the urban systems of less developed countries as they industrialized and began their periods of rapid urbanization. Primacy can be measured in several ways, but conceptually it refers to a structural characteristic of the urban system in which economic relationships among lower order cities and between these cities and their hinterlands are so weakly developed that economic transactions and population concentrate in one major city. In the absence of strong intermediate centers, rural-urban migration flows directly to the primate city, as do commercial exchanges.

The shift in scale of urban systems from the national to the global requires another rethinking of the applicability of the concept of urban systems to less developed countries. In its emphasis on flows, the literature on the global dimensions of urban systems does not radically differ from the earlier ecological perspectives on urban systems. What is more radical is the focus on the changing relation between interurban networks and their territorial base in a global space economy, as networks become uncoupled from a national territorial base (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 2000). World cities may not replace states as major actors in world governance, but the power of states, it is argued, increasingly depends on the creative synergy that takes place within major cities and their regions, and on the reach of the economic networks of these city regions (MacLeod, 2001). However, the erosion of the state’s control over its territory is potentially more serious for a balanced urban and regional development in less developed countries than in the developed world since the major world cities and their multinational corporations belong to the developed world.

The global interconnections of contemporary urbanization challenge the utility of thinking in terms of urban systems as hierarchically ordered relations among urban places of different sizes. Peter Taylor (2000) has cogently argued that the concept of urban networks

provides a more useful account of inter-urban relationships in the contemporary period than does that of urban system.³ Modern communications enable modern 'control' services (producer and headquarter services) to operate without being constrained by geographical boundaries.

Hierarchy is undermined because instantaneous communications and branch offices permit direct flows between even peripheral cities and major world centers, as in Taylor's data on the relations between Minneapolis and these centers.

The Pattern of Urbanization, 1950-2000

Two features of the urbanization of less developed countries stand out in the second half of the twentieth century. First, urbanization levels in 1950 differ sharply between regions and, to a lesser degree, within regions. Second, subsequent rates of urbanization vary between regions both in the degree and in the timing of the most rapid periods of urbanization (Table One). Latin America is the most urbanized region in 1950, followed, at some distance, by the Asian countries and Africa. Within the regions, there are contrasts, however. Thus Argentina is 65 percent urban in 1950 and Guatemala, 29.5 percent. In Asia, the Philippines are 27 percent urban in 1950, whereas Thailand is only 10 percent urban. In Africa, South Africa is 43 percent urban at that date and Uganda, 3.1 percent.

There is a relative consistency in the differences between regions with respect the rapidity and timing of urbanization. Latin America will have, overall, the lowest rates of urbanization of any region and, with the exception of Bolivia, the highest rates in Latin America occur in the period, 1950-1960. Africa will have the highest rates of urbanization overall, and these rates will peak in the 1960s and 1970s. Asia's rates of urbanization are, overall, intermediate between Latin America and Africa, peaking in the 1970s and 1980s. Note the considerable variation in rates of urbanization within regions, particularly in Africa and Asia. Thus India and Pakistan, with rates of urbanization below 1 percent a year contrast with China, Indonesia and Korea, which had rates in excess of 2.5 percent in at least two decades.

³ There is also a measurement problem. The concept of urban system, as urban geographers applied it in the 1960s, showed a hierarchy of urban places, with higher order places exercising some degree of control over places beneath them in terms of the supply of services and information. When applied to a world system of cities, the available data for identifying the hierarchy rarely include data that can serve as measures of hierarchical linkages between cities. See, also, Smith's (2003) comments on this issue.

Demographic processes explain some of these contrasts. The higher the initial level of urbanization, the lower is the potential supply of rural migrants that can maintain high rates of urbanization. Recent declines in fertility rates in rural as well as urban areas further diminish the potential rural-urban migration, helping explain the general decline in urbanization rates in the 1990s. The political economy perspective outlined earlier provides, however, a more encompassing explanation for these patterns through its focus on the history of these countries incorporation into the world economy. Throughout the less developed world, this incorporation created a dependent urbanization in that the pattern of urbanization was primarily shaped by external political and economic forces rather than by an internally generated process of economic development. Less developed countries began to urbanize, however, within different global economic contexts and under different modes of incorporation into the global economy. And changes in the global context affect all countries no matter their stage of urbanization. These variables provide a preliminary understanding of the key historical experiences affecting urbanization in less developed countries, particularly the varieties of agrarian transformation and the nature of industrialization.⁴

Five types of incorporation can be identified (Roberts, 1986: Table 1). These can overlap, particularly as a result of changes in the global economic context. The first type, namely the various countries of Latin America, includes those areas that historically were made over most completely to serve the import/export needs of the advanced industrial world and through the most radical restructuring of rural social relationships (see Walton's 1977 contrast of Latin America with East Africa). They show the highest levels of urbanization at the beginning of the period, industrialize relatively early in the twentieth century through import substituting industrialization and have initially high but declining rates of urbanization (see Table One). The second of these types is the early incorporation of countries, such as China and India, that had well-developed internal markets but whose economies were not fundamentally restructured in the colonial period by incorporation into the world system. In both these countries, internally generated economic changes were slow, and colonialism or, in the case of China, neo-colonialism brought no radically new sets of social and economic relationships (Raza et al., 1981; Skinner, 1977). The levels of urbanization are low and in the case of the Indian sub-continent,

⁴ I refer to the transformation of existing social relations through proletarianization and through breaking-down subsistence production. Incorporation produced many variations in this process as Wallerstein (1974) shows, at times reinforcing existing relationships, at others introducing archaic ones, as in the 're-feudalization' of Central Europe.

rates of urbanization have remained low, due to higher rates of natural increase among the rural population than among the urban population, the scarcity of permanent job opportunities in the cities and industrial de-concentration, particularly of household industry (Visaria, 1997; Mohan, 1997). The experiences associated with the third type, those fitting the countries of North Africa, such as Egypt, are similar since they, too, were incorporated early and without fundamental restructuring, and rates of urbanization are low in this type also. The contrast with China and India is that lacking large internal markets, countries of this type have been heavily dependent on external trade, resulting, in the case of North Africa, in moderately high levels of urbanization associated with an old urban culture (Abu-Lughod, 1980: 30-51).

The fourth type is one of relatively late incorporation in the world economy through colonialism, with uneven restructuring, resulting in 'islands' of export agriculture or mining amidst subsistence cultivation. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and South-east Asia fit this type, though to varying degrees. The level of urbanization is low initially, but the rate of urbanization is high (For more detailed accounts, see Gugler and Flanagan (1978) and Hart (1987) for Africa; Armstrong and McGee (1985:88-110) and Nemeth and Smith (1985) for Asia). The fifth type also shows high rates of urbanization. It is the most recent form of incorporation into the world system, which is associated with global production systems and export-oriented industrialization. These are the 'new' Asian countries, of which South Korea is an example in Table One, which became significant locations of foreign investment in the 1950s and 1960s. Korea's rapid transformation is closely linked to three phenomena: considerable economic and military aid, its proximity to Japan, as it seeks markets and outlets for investment and the adoption of an export-oriented industrialization (Nemeth and Smith, 1985: 197-204; Deyo, 1986). The rapid urbanization in other Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, is also based on their serving as platforms for export oriented industrialization. The recent upsurge in urbanization in China also indicates its changing role in the world economy as a supplier of cheap manufactured products.

Remember, however, that neither path-dependence on prior patterns of urbanization nor particular modes of incorporation into the world economy are sure predictors of patterns of urbanization in face of the disruptive forces of incorporation into the world economy. In the 1970s, it looked as if urbanization in East Africa would take a different path to that in Latin America, with greater possibilities of channeling resources into rural areas and thus less

urbanization or urban problems than in Latin America (Walton, 1977). Table One shows that Tanzania and Kenya, both of which sought to channel resources to the rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s, had the highest rates of urbanization in Africa from the 1970s onwards, and as Table 2 shows, a substantial concentration in large cities.

The Changing Nature of Urban Systems

In looking at imbalances in the urban systems of less developed countries through the optic of primacy, we need to remember that primacy is also a feature of the urban systems of many developed countries and was when these countries began to urbanize and industrialize. Thus, during their urbanization in the nineteenth century, various European countries had strongly primate urban systems. London and Paris, for example, maintained their size dominance of their respective urban systems throughout the nineteenth century. London's population was 62% of the city population of British cities in 1800, dropped to 54% by 1850 and was still at that percentage in 1900, despite the rise of the industrial cities in the North of the country; Paris was 57% of the French city population in 1800 and 64% in 1900.⁵

Indeed, various analysts have pointed to the advantages of high primacy for economic growth (See Hansen, 1990). In an underdeveloped country, the infrastructure needed for industrialization, such as transport and communications, education facilities, or urban utilities, are scarce and may only be found in one or two urban places. These factors played their part in the primacy of the urban systems of less developed countries, building upon certain patterns of colonial urbanization. In the colonial situation, provincial cities often served mainly as administrative and control centers to ensure the channeling for export of minerals, precious metals or the products of plantations and large estates; but wealth and elites tended to concentrate in the major city. When countries became independent and began to industrialize, it was these major cities that attracted both population and investment. They represented the largest and most available markets for industrialists producing for the domestic market. They also were likely to have the best infrastructure to support both industry and commerce in terms of communications and utilities. Remember, however, that other factors such as the size of the

⁵ . The city population in both countries is based on their large cities, with a population of 250,000 or more in 1900 - -- 11 in the British case and 6 in the French case (Mitchell, 1975, Table B4). Mitchell's historical statistics probably underestimate the size of provincial cities, such as Manchester, by only counting the city proper and not the conurbation. However, London's size domination of the urban system is unquestioned.

country and its geography are also important, resulting in low primacy in countries even when they had a colonial past and also practiced import-substituting industrialization, such as Colombia and India.

The current concern with primacy is now with the diseconomies of scale produced by concentration of resources in one or two cities. Vernon Henderson (2002b), for example, calculates that high primacy results in an inefficient national allocation of economic resources through the premiums paid for investing and doing business in the largest cities. These concerns have led to a policy emphasis on the need for a more spatially even pattern of urbanization, through intermediate cities that can serve as growth catalysts for their hinterlands without the costs in congestion and pollution associated with the largest cities.

What then has happened to primacy in the 50 years between 1950 and 2000? If we take as a rough indicator of high primacy, the concentration of 30 percent or more of a country's urban population in its largest city, then 10 of the 27 countries listed had high primacy in 1950 (Table Two). High primacy, by the definition that I am using, is thus not a general feature of urban systems in less developed countries. In 2000, 10 countries still showed high primacy, but with some changes in composition, with Africa making one net contribution to high primacy and Latin America showing one country, Bolivia, ceasing to have high primacy. Note that in various countries primacy peaks in the 1970s or 1980s before falling back by 2000. Overall, the evolution of primacy since the 1950s shows a rather different pattern of regional similarities and contrasts than did urbanization (Table Two). The Latin American countries have high primacy in the 1950s compared to other regions, which is often explained by their relatively large internal markets and by the adoption of import-substituting industrialization policies in the post Second World War period (Portes, 1989; Roberts, 1995: 38-41). However, some countries in Asia and Africa, such as Angola, Ethiopia and Thailand, show higher primacy than many Latin American countries at that date.

By 2000, there is considerable variation within regions in the degree of primacy and the main systematic difference is that the very large countries (India, China, Brazil) have low degrees of primacy. Regional trends in primacy are also not systematic. Each region has urban systems that have higher primacy by 2000 and ones that have lower primacy by that date. Again there is the suggestion that size of country is important, but it is not consistently related to

primacy, and other factors such as rates of economic growth and investment in provincial regions would need to be considered in a fuller analysis. Thus primacy is higher in Chile, Colombia and Guatemala in 2000 and lower in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In Asia, primacy is higher in Korea and Pakistan and lower in the other countries. In Africa, primacy is higher by 2000 in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia, and lower in Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania.

In general, however, by 2000, the largest city in a country is growing less fast than other urban places. Table Two shows the rates of urban growth of the largest cities in each country net of population growth, providing an estimate of the amount of growth that is accounted for by the net transfer of population from or to other places.⁶ Here the regional contrasts are more marked, particularly between Africa and the other two regions. The largest cities in the Latin American countries are growing very slowly by 2000, and some of the largest, such as Sao Paulo/Rio, Mexico City and Buenos Aires are showing negative rates of growth by this measure in the 1980s or 1990s. In Asia, this is also the case in Korea, China, India and Malaysia; but in Africa, only in South Africa and Egypt do their largest cities, Cairo and the Johannesburg complex, show negative rates of growth in one or both of the last two decades of the twentieth century.

When urban growth is occurring fastest outside the largest city, the gainers are not likely to be the smallest urban places, but intermediate size cities. This is the case in Latin America for which comparative data are available.⁷ In Chile, where Santiago's pre-eminence remains undisputed, it was intermediate cities in the South and North of the country that grew faster than did Santiago between 1952 and 1992 (Sabatini and Contreras, 2003). The cities nearest in size to Santiago's 4.7 million, Concepcion and Valparaiso with populations of 610,000 and 750,000 respectively in 1992, grew more slowly than Santiago in this period. In Mexico, the largest cities lose weight relative to cities of between 500,000 and 1 million, but when the measures are based on the sizes of urban places at the beginning of the period rather than the end, then it is cities

⁶ These estimates are very approximate. In those countries in which urban rates of fertility are substantially lower than the rural rates and rates of mortality similar, the net transfer of population into the cities may well be substantially higher than these figures indicate.

⁷ These data are taken from reports of the Andrew W. Mellon research project on Latin American Urbanization at the end of the Twentieth Century, based at the Center for Migration and Development of Princeton University and the Center for Migration and Urbanization of the University of Texas at Austin. The principal investigators are Alejandro Portes and Bryan Roberts.

between 100,000 and 500,000 that grow the fastest (Ariza, 2003). In Brazil, the largest cities, all of which have over 2 million inhabitants by 2000, are growing less rapidly on average than cities of between 250,000 and 2 million (Valladares and Prêteceille, 2003). In Argentina, the fastest growing urban places in the 1980s and 1990s were those with more than 50,000 population and smaller than the seven largest cities (Cerrutti, 2003). In India, also, the growth of the largest cities has been less fast than intermediate size cities and the largest cities growth rate showed little difference to that of smaller towns (Visaria, 1997).

In interpreting these trends in urban systems and evaluating them in terms of their implications for a balanced pattern of urban growth, caution is needed. One issue is methodological. The data is often not adequate to measure accurately the growth of different size types of cities, such as small, intermediate or large, and the contribution of migration to this growth.⁸ There is also a definitional issue respecting city size. Statistics are often reported by urban jurisdictions, ignoring the contiguous built-up areas or commuting patterns that make up a metropolitan area or large urban complex. Equally important are the conceptual ambiguities resulting from the fact that similar statistical trends often conceal different underlying causes. High primacy can result from economic dynamism, but also from economic stagnation. The accentuation of high primacy in Chile and in Angola reported in Table Two clearly responds to two very different economic processes. Luanda concentrates the population of Angola, not because of its industrial growth. It is a city almost entirely dominated by the informal economy and by the rents deriving from its offshore oil industry. Luanda is a city of refuge because of the disruptions of the Civil War and the absence of livelihood possibilities outside the capital where the money of the elites and international agencies concentrates. Chile is a highly centralized country, politically as well as economically. It also has one of Latin America's most dynamic export economies. That export economy is managed from Santiago, where all decisions are taken even respecting regional development priorities. Consequently, enterprise concentrates in the capital, generating many jobs in manufacturing, producer services, commerce and personal services.

⁸ Reclassification of rural places as urban places is one source of the increase in urbanization that may exaggerate the migration component of the growth of urban places. Also, in estimating the growth of cities of different sizes, comparison is often made between city size intervals at different census points in time, comparing, for instance, the total population of cities between 100,000 and 500,000 in 1980 with the total population of such cities in 1990. This results in a hierarchical bias against smaller urban places, since at the later census point the size interval will benefit not only from the growth of the cities that fell within it in the previous period, but also from the inclusion of new cities that reach the size interval and become included.

The relative lack of clear patterns of change in primacy in the statistics reported above also results, I suggest, from the operation of contradictory influences on the shape of urban systems. Those analyses of urbanization that posited that high primacy might be an inevitable and even desirable feature of the early stages of urbanization and economic growth also posited that primacy was likely to decline at later stages of economic growth. Economic growth would spread infrastructure, permitting the growth of other urban centers in a country, while increasing diseconomies of scale in the largest city would favor the growth of intermediate cities. Thus, from this perspective, the growth of intermediate cities is an expected feature of later stages of urbanization, based on their comparative advantages, including green field sites for industrial development, cheap and/or skilled labor, tourism and so on.

Though this ‘natural’ growth of intermediate cities is one factor influencing contemporary urban systems in less developed countries, it is probably a limited one. As Henderson (2002b) points out these hypotheses ignore the inertia produced in some countries by the political centralization that is often associated with high primacy. Where the primate city is a national capital and/or the location of the dominant business elites, this supports the primacy of the system in face of factors that would otherwise weaken it.

An equally important influences shaping urban systems is the current pattern of economic globalization. Whereas the traditional focus of urban systems analysis was on territorially and politically bounded urban systems, contemporary economic globalization raises the issue of urban systems that are organized without respect for national boundaries.⁹ Contemporary globalization is based on the free movement of goods, capital and, to a lesser extent, of people. An economic consequence is the functional interdependence and specialization of urban economies that results from increasingly unrestricted capital flows, near instantaneous means of communication and the organizing capacity of the cluster of business activities concentrated in the large cities (See Sassen, 1994; Fu-chen Lo and Yue-man Yeung, 1998: 9-11; Hall, 1998).¹⁰

⁹ The role of cities in territorial reorganization is an old one, as in Braudel’s account of the impact of the merchant cities of Europe in reshaping political boundaries. Large cities, of course, have always been involved in global networks (See King, 1990: 3-11).

¹⁰ These ‘global city’ perspectives suggest specific hypotheses about the occupational structure of cities, their spatial organization, the strategies of the business elites of the major cities, and the role of cities in contemporary social and economic development (Soja, 1986, 1987; Feagin, 1988; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2002: 3; Sassen 1991; Noyelle and Stanback, 1984).

This aspect of globalization is captured in the notion of global cities, which have distinctive patterns of occupational and spatial segregation, whose business elites organize economies on a regional and global level and are linked dynamically to each other and to subordinate urban centers throughout the world. National boundaries and nation states become less significant for the pattern of economic development, it is claimed, than the global flows of people and capital between world cities (Sassen, 1998, 2000).

The extensive literature on World Cities has, however, paid relatively little attention to how the cities of the poor of less developed countries are affected by the global system (Smith, 2003). The issue is an important one since it suggests the hypothesis that urban systems operating on a world scale may lead to a new type of urban peripheralization in less developed countries. If the relatively few economically dynamic city regions of less developed countries develop functional relations with each other and with major cities of the developed world, then provincial regions of less developed countries and their urban systems may become even further economically and culturally marginalized than they are at present. Would, for example, the development of a dynamic economic corridor between Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo as a result of Mercosur (the South American Free Trade area) result in the further impoverishment of the north and northeastern regions of Brazil and the Patagonian provinces of Argentina? Urban primacy often led to the extraction of resources from provincial towns and regions, but when urban systems were under national control, there was at least the possibility of state policies promoting a more equitable spatial development in less developed countries. The impact of trade agreements in restricting the ability of governments, both national and local, to implement policies designed to regulate and plan urban environments is a related aspect of globalization. It is one that I suspect will be taken up in other papers of this session.

The impact of globalization on urban systems comes primarily from the new global production systems that are a significant part of contemporary economic globalization (World Bank, 2003a). Certain trends facilitated these systems of production in which production can be organized from enterprises headquartered in the developed world, but implemented in production and trade chains that span the world.¹¹ Foreign investment has upgraded local technology for more effective participation in the global economy. Telephone and banking systems have been

¹¹ Ironically, I am writing this on a computer system bought over the Internet from Dell, an Austin based multinational, whose component parts were made in Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Mexico.

modernized. Internet and cable TV are introduced. Subsidiaries of banks and professional service firms interconnect most of the large cities of less developed countries with the major cities of the developed world (See GaWC data bank). These systems of production are not new and have been extensively discussed in the literature on development, through concepts such as the New International Division of Labor or Commodity Chains (Frobel et al. 1980; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994). What has been less discussed is their implication for urban systems. This is a topic that deserves much more attention than the scope of this overview permits.¹² One point needs making, however. These global systems of production will not have a homogeneous impact on national urban systems. They will vary in the extent to which they bypass national urban hierarchies and national administrative jurisdictions. I illustrate this variation by two polar types of impact that are both theoretically plausible and present in practice.

One type of impact is an extreme form of disarticulation of a country's urban system that occurs when a part of a manufacturing process is located in one place on the basis of inputs coming from other countries, with products going directly to other countries for further processing or commercialization. This occurs when Transnational Corporations set up operations aimed at international markets from the start. These investments are usually relatively isolated from the host economy and, essentially, sought to tap cheap labor (UNCTAD, 2002, p.160). Even the coordination of the production process is done almost entirely externally. In this case, the town where the manufacturing plant is located may have rapid rates of population and employment growth that substantially change its place in the urban hierarchy, but its growth generates few economic linkages with the rest of the country's urban system, not even in stimulating the growth of producer services in higher order cities. This is the case of Mexico's northern 'maquila' (in bond industry) cities that grew at annual rates of 3.5 percent in the 1980s, compared with Mexico City's 1 percent and the 2.3 percent of the two next largest metropolitan areas (Guadalajara and Monterrey).

The second type of impact occurs when the global system of production makes greater use of geographically concentrated and articulated production systems. In these cases, production is often oriented to the domestic as well as the export market and has direct and indirect effects

¹² A provisional list of factors that are needed for a more detailed analysis of the impact of global production systems on urban systems are: the type of global production process (eg. within industry or between industries), the strength of national and provincial governments in negotiating with multinational companies, the geographical and population size of a country, and the level of development of a country, both in human and material capital.

in stimulating local production and services (ibid. pp.160-61). In this type, the inputs to one part of the production process come from suppliers that are located relatively close to the main assembly plant. The product may be partly commercialized locally and the process is organized through regional headquarters of the parent multinational and through producer service firms located in nearby metropolitan areas. The impact of this type of global production system is likely to promote a polycentric urban form in many metropolitan regions in less developed countries (Gilbert, 1998). While the Sao Paulo metropolitan area has been growing relatively slowly in recent decades, the metropolis of Campinas and various intermediate cities in Sao Paulo's vicinity have had high rates of urban growth. These cities are closely interconnected by transportation networks and their economic activity is highly integrated, with headquarter and producer service functions concentrating in Sao Paulo and new industry locating in the peripheral locations.¹³ Garza (1999) describes a similar process for the Mexico City basin, in which fast growing cities like Toluca and Cuernavaca are an integral part of Mexico City's production and service system. Indeed, in Mexico, some of the new assembly industries have located in rural areas adjacent to the capital, where land is cheap and where there is a plentiful supply of female labor in the villages.

These developments are taking place in other parts of the world also where the emergence of regional urban complexes around a country's major city offsets the apparent decline in the primacy of the urban system.¹⁴ In Indonesia, the capital, Jakarta has become increasingly linked with the international economy and the other cities of the Pacific Asia urban system through direct investment and trade. Two of the three first Export Processing Zones were located in Jakarta, which is also the regional headquarters of foreign corporations in manufacturing, producer services and in oil and gas. Jakarta's growth spilled over into the surrounding densely populated rural region, leading to the creation of the Jabotabek metropolitan region, which in 1998 was estimated to have 21.7 million inhabitants (Soegijoko and Kusbiantoro, 2001). The towns of the Botabek part of the metropolitan region grew faster than

¹³ See Martine and Diniz (1997) for an account of the tendencies of de-concentration and re-concentration that are likely in Brazil and Sao Paulo specifically with changes in the technological basis of production.

¹⁴ The population figures for these regional complexes are usually substantially higher than for their metropolitan center. Jakarta has a population estimated at 11 million in 2000 in World Urbanization Prospects, but Jabotabek has an estimated population of 21.7 million. The figure of 3 million for the Kuala Lumpur region in 1990, given below, contrasts with the 1.4 million figure for 2000 that is the basis for the calculations on Malaysia in Table 2. By a regional definition of the largest city, both Indonesia's and Malaysia's primacy may not have dropped as much as is reported in Table 2.

did Jakarta. Botabek had a higher concentration of manufacturing in its economy and a lower concentration of services (particularly producer services) when compared to Jakarta's distribution. Botabek also attracted migrants from Jakarta as well as from other parts of Indonesia (ibid). An equally pronounced export-industry led growth has led to a clustering of economic activities in Kuala Lumpur and the Klang river basin (Thong, 1996). Regional headquarters of multinationals, foreign-linked merchant banks, advertising firms and other producer services located in Kuala Lumpur, while manufacturing concentrated in the corridor from Port Klang to Kuala Lumpur. Relative to other cities in Malaysia, the Kuala Lumpur region accentuated its population dominance from 1957 onwards, with the population of its core urban region reaching over 3 million by 1990 (ibid).

Part of the growth of intermediate cities in some countries is due to the emergence of what Lo and Yeung (1996) call 'borderless cities'. Thus, the rapid growth of certain intermediate cities in Malaysia and in Indonesia is due to their proximity to Singapore, as in the case of the Singapore-Jahore-Riau growth triangle. In essence, intermediate cities and small towns in Malaysia and in Indonesia are part of Singapore's metropolitan constellation (McLeod and McGee, 1996). Likewise, in China, the growth of cities and small towns, such as Guangzhou, Dongguan, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai in the Pearl River Delta, is due to their forming part of Hong Kong's regional economic system (Gar-on Yeh and Xu, 1996)

In the next section, I want to introduce a caveat about the impact of economic globalization on urban systems by looking at the uneven and heterogeneous impact of globalization on less developed countries.

The Uneven Impact of Economic Globalization

In this section, I will consider the factors that mediate the impact of economic globalization on less developed countries and their urban systems. That impact is not uniform, but depends on the type of insertion that each country and region has in the global economy. First, and most basically, the impact of globalization depends on the extent of involvement in world trade.

Trade Involvement

Though global trade has increased substantially in recent decades, in its extent and composition, trade varies considerably among less developed countries. In general, it is the less developed countries of Asia that have increased their contribution to the total of world imports most between 1985 and 2000, from 16.1 percent to 23.3 percent. Latin America's contribution remained stable at 6 percent and Africa's contribution declined from 4.3 percent to 2.2 percent (ECLAC, 2002a, Table 2.2). Developed countries supplied the majority of world imports in both these years. The composition of that trade varies considerably also, with the Asian countries most likely to export goods that ECLAC labels dynamic, such as manufactures of medium and high technological complexity (ibid, Table 2.4). Latin America exports a mix of manufactured and primary products, with a considerable difference in specialization between Latin American countries. Mexico and Costa Rica have, for instance, a high percentage of medium and high technology exports, whereas in the countries of South America, exports are still based on primary products or on manufactures based on primary products (ibid, Table 6.3). Africa mainly exports products of low market dynamism. These differences in the extent and composition of trade suggest that the functional reorganization that globalization brings to urban systems varies considerably by region. It is likely to be least in Africa and greatest in the less developed countries of Asia, since, I suggest, that it is the manufacturing and service sectors and the linkages that they generate, which are most likely to change the functional specialization of urban systems. We can develop this argument further by considering the related issue of external financing.

The Nature of External Financing

There are substantial regional and intra regional contrasts in the flows of capital into less developed countries. In the period from 1996-200, the majority (58 percent) of long term net resource flows into less developed countries are through foreign direct investment (FDI), with a further 20 percent coming through equity and bond investment and 13.8 percent through multilateral and bilateral loans and grants. The less developed countries of East Asia and the Pacific received 39.3 % of the total FDI, Latin America received 50.3%, South Asia received 2.6%, the Middle East and North Africa, 2.9% and Sub-Saharan Africa, 4.8% (World Bank, 2003a: Table 2). Investments did not flow evenly within regions – South Africa received the bulk

of sub-Saharan African private investments and in Latin America, these investments went principally to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. In Latin America, FDI increased as a proportion of net resource flows from 1980, when they constituted 20.4% of flows until 1998 when it made up some 70% of net resource flows (World Bank, 1999, Vol. 1, p. 194). In contrast, Africa receives most from bilateral and multilateral loans. By 1998, some 24% of the long-term debt of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa was in private hands and 76% in the hands of official creditors (ibid: 201). In contrast, in Latin America, 72% of its long-term debt was in the hands of private creditors by 1998, mainly in the form of bonds, whereas 38% was in the hands of official creditors, both multilateral and bilateral (World Bank, 1999, Vol. 1, p.195).

These data complement those on exports, suggesting that it is in Latin America and in Asia that national economies are most closely articulated to the priorities of the global market. The nature of this articulation is illustrated by data on changes in the pattern of FDI in the 1990s. Of the relatively small amounts of FDI that went to Africa between 1996 and 2000, 54.6 percent of them went to the primary sector, 20.6 percent to the secondary sector and 24.8 percent to the tertiary sector (UNCTAD, 2002, Table III.3).

In the other two regions, investments go primarily into manufacturing and the services. The switch from investment in primary production to investment in manufacturing is a familiar one, underlying the growth of exports in high and medium technology manufactures, but less familiar is the growing importance of investment in the services, particularly producer services (finance, professional services, real estate, communications). More than half of the FDI of less developed countries was in the services sector in 2000, doubling in the decade (Ibid, p.158.).

Services are less tradable on the international market than are manufactured goods and service investment is primarily to promote financial, commercial or real estate development, develop communications and organize trade and production within countries. However, services are becoming more tradable on the international market, and some less developed countries are now becoming the location for export-oriented services, just as they were in the past for export-oriented manufactures. Examples are research and development firms, regional headquarters and call/shared service centers. The share of less developed countries in R&D service exports rose from 25 percent to 42 percent between 2001 and 2002 and their share in call/shared services rose from 22 percent to 39 percent in the same period (ibid p.158). Export services can be highly significant for urban employment, particularly where there is a highly skilled labor force, as the

well-known case of Bangalore in India attests. Bangalore concentrates the Indian software and related services industries, which account nationally for 16 percent of India's exports (ibid: 158).

For our purposes, there are two salient characteristics of the changing composition of FDI, which I will illustrate with data from Latin America. First, in the 1990s, FDI went heavily into enterprises, most of whose impact on employment and on consumption was likely to be in or near to the major metropolitan centers. Over half of FDI in Latin America in the 1990s went into the service sector, such as financial services, real estate, telecommunications and commerce (malls and supermarkets). By the end of 1990s, 64% of FDI went to the services, 24% to manufacturing and 12% to the primary sector (ECLAC, 2002b: p. 29). In manufacturing, this investment contributed to the development of new industrial towns on the fringes of metropolitan areas, as in the case of Sao Paulo. Only exceptionally, do they seem to have led to a more radical spatial diversification of the urban system, as in the case of Mexico and Costa Rica where some of the new growth cities developed at some distance from the major metropolis.

The second characteristic of these investments is that they have had contradictory consequences for employment. Investments in the primary sector, often associated with the privatization of natural resources such as gas and petrol in Argentina, had a substantial, but often negative, employment impact on rural areas and small towns. Thus the restructuring imposed by REPSOL, the Spanish energy company, on the Argentine oil and gas industry, contributed to substantial unemployment in the provinces of Argentina and the relative decline in the industrial towns dependent on the energy extraction industry. Investment in commerce can also have negative consequences for employment, especially in the small-scale sector. Take the example of the foreign-owned supermarkets, such as the French Carrefour chain in Latin America. In Argentina, and in Buenos Aires in particular, the foreign supermarket chains produced a substantial change in the structure of retailing. By 2000, it was estimated that supermarkets handled 57% of food sales, whereas in the mid-80s, small stores had handled 70% of sales. In manufacturing, jobs have undoubtedly been created in the export sectors and often in intermediate cities located near borders or ports, where production costs are lower than in the large metropolitan areas. The restructuring of domestic enterprises through foreign investment, however, has also led to job losses as enterprises were rationalized to produce more efficiently for the domestic market.

Volatility and Dependence

The extent and nature of external indebtedness in the 1980s and 1990s is a final factor that we need to keep in mind in estimating the uneven impact of economic globalization on urban systems in less developed countries. By 2001, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa had the highest levels of debt as a proportion of their gross national income (68%) and most of this debt was multilateral or bilateral. In contrast, most long-term debt in the developing countries of Latin America and East Asia was in private hands and was a lower percentage of gross national income (42% and 31% respectively). FDI and portfolio investment can help offset the economically depressive effects of external indebtedness, but at the expense of greater foreign private control over national economies. In Latin America, for example, by 1998-2000, some 42 percent of the 500 largest Latin American firms by sales were under foreign ownership (ECLAC, 2002b: 50) and most of these were service or manufacturing enterprises. In both Argentina and Mexico, for example, foreign banks controlled the vast majority of bank assets by 2002 and foreign investment companies had a substantial ownership of pension funds and insurance companies.

In all less developed countries, external indebtedness combined with the fiscally restrictive policies of the multilateral agencies has meant a reduction in the capacity of states to promote and plan national development. This was clearly the case in urban areas, where there was a relative drop in public employment and in investments in infrastructure and public services. Moreover, the integration of financial markets has contributed to the volatility of local economies. The flows of money out of middle-income countries, for example, were important factors in the crises of the 1990s, such as those of Asia, Russia, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. All these crises, had impacts on the urban economies of less developed countries, but, we can hypothesize, the nature of these impacts will vary depending on the nature of the external dependence. An economic crisis, even a world one, will be just one in a long series for the inhabitants of those cities whose recent functional role has been mainly to serve as places of refuge from civil unrest and a declining rural economy. Economic crises, and their resultant higher levels of poverty, are likely to be more disruptive in countries and cities that had restructured their employment structures and ways of life to partake of the new global economy. For example, the Jabotabek region was particularly hard hit from 1997 onwards by the Asian

crisis, with double digit levels of unemployment and financially unable to meet the transport, housing and environmental challenges that the region's economic globalization had brought (Soegijoko and Kusbiantoro, 2001).

Globalization has, then, had one clear consequence for cities throughout the less developed world, that of making their economies more dependent on external sources of finance and more volatile. Volatility and dependence call into question the stability of the functional restructuring of urban systems with globalization. Thus, Alan Gilbert (1998) sees volatility and crisis as the main impacts of globalization on the major Latin American cities, rather than their acquiring new functions as 'global' or 'world cities'. In the next section, I consider the impact of this vulnerability on the one aspect that the urban systems of less developed countries have in common, the presence of megacities.

Megacities and Their Problems

Whereas the degree of urban primacy varies considerably between the urban systems of less developed countries, most countries have one or more megacities. India, which has one of the lowest levels of primacy among less developed countries, also has an increasing concentration of urban population in relatively large cities (Visaria, 1997). Several megacities, Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi, all had in excess of 12 million inhabitants in 2000. These cities are 'world' cities in population, but not in resources. Despite the slowing of their growth, the largest cities still concentrate huge populations with much higher levels of poverty and much poorer urban infrastructure than is the case of cities of comparable size in the developed world.

The problems of megacities reflect not only globalization and its discontents, but the demographic and socio-economic aspects of the contemporary, mature, stage of urbanization in the less developed world. My contrast is with earlier stages of urbanization when cities, particularly the largest cities, were growing very rapidly through large-scale mainly rural-urban migration. This was the stage when major cities throughout the less developed world were often being made by the efforts of their inhabitants who self-constructed housing, developed a rudimentary infrastructure and created their own jobs through the informal economy. This was the stage of urbanization in which problems were also solutions both to urban governments and to urban inhabitants, to paraphrase Mangin's (1967) characterization of squatter settlements.

Throughout the less developed world, governments tolerated informal housing and informal economies, and the migrants that made the city saw opportunities, albeit limited ones, for social mobility in both.

Less developed countries still differ greatly in their level of urbanization, and my characterization of the mature stage of urbanization applies better to some countries than to others. However, I argue that in most countries, the largest cities show many of the characteristics of the mature stage of urbanization. First are the demographic components of this mature stage. As we have noted, migration is now likely to be a less important net component in the growth of the largest cities than at earlier stages of urbanization (Table 2). Rural-urban migration, in particular, is a less important component of large city growth, but inter urban and intra urban migration are likely to increase as components of the restructuring of the urban system, increasing metropolitanization as well as the growth of intermediate cities.¹⁵ Declining fertility, particularly sharp in the cities, and increasing longevity results in smaller household size. Types of households become more differentiated as a result of the increasing proportion of households that are single person, couples without children and single parent. In this situation, even negative rates of urban growth can result in increasing numbers of households and thus in an increasing and more specialized demand for housing.

When combined with changes in the spatial structure and the economy of cities, the changing demographic structure of the large cities creates, I argue, a different set of problems than were present at the earlier stage of urbanization. In the mature stage of urbanization, cities and particularly the largest cities are more consolidated in terms of the occupation of urban space. There is less 'free' space for people to adapt to their changing requirements in the ways that John Turner (1967; 1968) described in his analyses of self-help housing. As the cities have grown larger, so, too, transport and journey-to-work problems have multiplied. Problems of waste disposal and of environmental hazards have become much more salient political and social issues than in the past, partly because of the sheer size and complexity of the cities and partly because their solution demands state action much more than was the case in the past when the prevalence of self-help solutions took direct pressure off the state. Current housing problems in

¹⁵ The relative decline in the rural-urban migration component in the population dynamics of large cities needs further research. It is possible, and Mexico City may be such a case, that a net migration loss in a large city results from substantial out-migration to other urban places, including international destinations, and the part 'replacement' of these out-migrants by migrants from small towns and villages.

the large cities of less developed countries are often those of the deterioration of low-income neighborhoods thirty or forty years on from when they were first built – what Peter Ward (2001) calls the third generation housing problem. These housing problems demand concerted social policies and are not susceptible to the self-help solutions of the 1960s and 1970s.

In the economy, also, large cities in the mature stage of urbanization are likely to present more perceived challenges and fewer perceived opportunities to their inhabitants than in earlier stages of urbanization. The informal economy is alive and well, and appears to have grown in the 1990s in most large cities of the less developed world. However, there are signs that the dynamics of the informal economy are changing towards being more of a survival economy that has fewer entrepreneurial opportunities (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 2002). At the same time, employment in larger, formal enterprises has become less secure, particularly with the relative decline in public employment. Complicating this picture is the increase in female labor force participation. More women are working outside the home than in the past, but much of this increase in participation is in informal economic activities.

One of the employment effects of economic globalization that is most likely to be felt in the largest cities, is a polarization of income and conditions of work between employment in technology-based firms in manufacturing and the services and employment in stagnating economic sectors of manufacturing, construction and the services. There are less ‘good’ jobs than in the past that can be obtained without very high educational qualifications. The opportunity structure of the labor market in the large cities of the less developed world has thus become increasingly credentialized and exclusive.

What this brief sketch suggests is that the challenging problems of the large cities in the mature stage of urbanization require concerted government action to resolve. The market clearly cannot resolve them, not even in the informal ways that it did in the earlier stages of urbanization. I will outline one particular issue that is symptomatic of these challenges, which is the issue of the spatially and socially divided city. Class and ethnic divisions have long spatially divided the large cities of the less developed world. This is not a new feature that results from globalization (Van Kempen and Marcuse, 2002). However, globalization has intensified and given a new pattern to these divisions in a number of ways. Economically, it sustains or increases income inequality, by simultaneously promoting the growth of high productivity sectors that

generate little employment and weakening, through import competition, more labor intensive sectors. It also bases that inequality on formal qualifications that exclude the majority of the urban population. This exclusion is social and spatial as manifest in the increasing gulf in achievement between private schools and colleges, often located in upper income neighborhoods, and public schools, particularly those located in low-income neighborhoods. Globalization has also weakened the fragile spatial and social interdependence between lower and upper income segments of the population. Exclusive residential and commercial enclaves potentially cut down the number of social and economic transactions between different social classes. Malls replace the street and other public places as the location for albeit a limited social interaction. The increase in security guards is a notable phenomenon in most large cities of the less developed world, often being the fastest growing sector of employment. These guards protect offices, malls, apartment complexes, and gated communities and even, as in Rio, residential streets. Their increasing numbers respond, as various commentators have pointed out, more to the perceived threat of violence on the part of middle and upper income sectors than to the actual incidence of violence. Teresa Caldera (2000) argues, for instance, that the fortified residential and business enclaves of the wealthy are legitimated by the fear of crime. They contribute, however, both to the fact of the divided city as well as to the sense of exclusion of lower-income populations.

Crime and violence is a common feature of the large cities of the less developed world and, in many cities, has shown a sharp increase in the 1990s. The various reports of the Princeton-Texas project document this increase in the major Latin American metropolises (See Valladares and Pr eteceille, 2003 for Brazil; Joseph, 2003 for Peru; Cerrutti, 2003 for Argentina; Ariza, 2003 for Mexico; Dammert, 2003 for Chile and Retamoso and Corbo, 2003, for Uruguay). Victim surveys in these countries report high levels of robbery and violence, and also show that the population has little confidence in the police forces so that they rarely report a crime. Chile and Santiago are partial exceptions of this trend, with lower levels of crimes of violence than in other countries of Latin America and a greater confidence in the police (Dammert, 2003). This theft and violence is mainly directly against low-income people and occurs in low-income areas since high-income areas or locales are well protected. Indeed violence has become an issue disrupting low-income communities. The types of self-help solidarity reported by Tony Leeds (1969, 1971) in Rio de Janeiro in the 1950s and 1960s contrast sharply with the drug-related conflicts and divisions that are present in Rio's contemporary favelas.

These trends in segregation and violence appear to be common to the large cities of the less developed world, giving rise to striking cultural similarities between cities in the preoccupations of their inhabitants and their manner of dealing with them. Thus Sao Paulo and Johannesburg share rising levels of urban violence, similar patterns of spatial segregation and an enormous increase in security services.¹⁶

Urban Community Responses to Globalization

In this section, I focus on another set of important research topics for understanding the impact of globalization on cities and urban systems in less developed countries. These are the new relations that have developed between citizens and the state.¹⁷

State-society relationships in less developed countries have been fundamentally affected by the reorganization of the state that accompanied the shift from the 1980s onwards from Import-Substituting economic regimes to ones that are more export oriented. This shift has also accentuated the involvement of external agencies – multilateral, bilateral and international NGOs in the internal affairs of less developed countries. The extent of change has varied in its scope in different countries. In most countries, however, the direction of change has been similar --- de-concentrating administration and, to a lesser extent, decentralizing administrative control. Under pressure from external financial agencies, central governments either reduce absolutely or relatively their administrative personnel. These reductions have been achieved by devolving responsibilities to lower-level authorities, such as provincial or municipal governments, by privatization and by sub-contracting government programs to NGOs or to ‘in-house’ temporary employees. This restructuring is an integral part of globalization. It is advocated by international agencies, such as the World Bank, the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Agency for International Development. Many of the specific reforms and initiatives are based on models drawn up by the international agencies and implemented without substantial change in different countries of the region.

¹⁶ This comparison has recently been made in terms of the concept of postmodern urbanism and new regimes of spatial power in an article submitted for Journal Review.

¹⁷ This section is Latin American in its perspective and may have less applicability to other regions.

The changing role of the state is paradoxically – since the state is meant to be a reduced state in the new economic order -- leading to a greater involvement of the state in people's lives. It has affected the ways in which government officials at all levels see their roles. These are no longer to be confined to the administration of a limited number of social services according to set rules, but increasingly include a pro-active oversight of services administered by others. In addition to a greater role for local government, there are public-private partnerships; an increase in the number of NGOs focused on technical assistance and service delivery and the recasting of community organizations to administer externally financed services. Accompanying decentralization is an explicit policy of targeting populations in need. The federal government's anti-poverty program, Oportunidades, in Mexico, which will reach over 4 million rural and urban households by 2003, directly targets the poor through health packages and educational scholarships. This targeting involves the poor in an extensive set of relations with both local and national officials, with local medical facilities and with the school bureaucracy.

These changes apply equally to rural as to urban populations, but they are an increasingly important feature of the life and organization of low-income urban neighborhoods in the large cities of less developed countries. First, compared with the past, there is a proliferation of actors involved in the implementation of social policy initiatives at the urban neighborhood level. Second, there is a deepening of the reach of social policy at the individual and neighborhood level. Third, there is greater ideological heterogeneity present in the implementation of social policy. The extent of the proliferation of actors involved in social policy varies between countries, depending on government commitment to private-public partnerships, to administrative decentralization and to working with NGOs and community organizations. But despite variations, a common set of tendencies explain the current increase in the range and number of social policy actors in the less developed world compared with the 1960s and 1970s. Foreign and national NGOs have increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. The democratization of the many less developed countries in this period is a factor explaining both that increase and the change in the character of NGO participation in social policy towards policy implementation rather than advocacy. To survive financially, NGOs increasingly take on the administration of programs in which role they are likely to have less interest than previously in promoting demand making (Bebbington and Farrington, 1993; Jelin, 1996; Nelson, 1996; Vivian, 1994).

Democratization has also increased dramatically the role of local government in social policy (Spink, 1999). Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s, municipal government was usually absent from the social policy field, without responsibility for health, education or welfare, by the 1990s, municipal governments had become major players in administering these areas of social policy. This complicates the coordination of activities in the large metropolitan areas, such as Santiago, which has over 40 municipalities. Fiscal austerity brings two further sets of actors in social policy – the private sector through public-private partnerships and local community organizations. In both cases, these are strategies for eking out scarce public funds to provide such services as job retraining or community-based caring for the young or the elderly.

The content of social policy has broadened in recent decades. More is offered, but also more is expected of the population. All these changes demand of social policy a degree of intervention into the lives of the population that was not present before. The elderly who have no kin to support them become a social policy imperative, more so in some countries than in others. The urgency of job retraining in face of the changing demands of the labor market is an apparent public concern. Issues of public security at the neighborhood level, whether in terms of domestic violence or of street gangs are fiercely debated to an extent that was not the case in the earlier period of urbanization.

International advocacy groups provide a somewhat different perspective on social policy (See Evans, 2000, Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Amongst groups advocating women's rights, the rights of children, indigenous rights, or human rights in general, the emphasis is on empowering local people to defend and advance their rights. This is what Appadurai (2000) calls globalization 'from below'. This refers to the growth of citizenship organization and consciousness as a result of the activities of international organizations, of national and international NGOs and of increased access to information by community groups. As Jelin (1996) points out, the effectiveness of participation and of rights advocacy lies as much in the process itself, as in concrete changes in laws or dramatic shifts in the distribution of resources.

The increase in public discourse about rights and about participation and the activities at the local level around these issues change the language of political debate. Governments and elites may still seek to impose policies from above, but they are constrained to do so through the words and symbols that recognize citizens as participative and rights bearing. Emblematic of

this in Latin America is the wide use of *Mesas de Concertación* (Roundtables for reaching agreement) in public policy. These meet at the local and national levels, stress participation by community representatives and serve as a forum for airing public policies. The spread of participative budgeting initiatives in Brazil's large cities and in other countries is further testimony that both the rhetoric and practice of state-citizen relationships is changing. This is not to say that these actions are necessarily successful in enabling people to gain more control over their environment and to improve their life chances. As the accounts in Peter Evans' (2002) Livable Cities show poor communities are usually less successful than middle-income ones in defending their environment. However, the cases reported in that volume from cities in less developed countries from different parts of the world also show that the poor, with the aid of outside agents such as national and international NGOs, can limit the environmentally destructive actions of self-interested business elites and global market forces. Popular participation and the complex relationships of urban inhabitants with the various levels of the state and the non-governmental sector are a further and unpredictable contribution of globalization to the urban social structure of less developed countries. The processes that they represent and their potential consequences for redressing urban inequalities both need study.

Conclusion

The impact of globalization on urban systems in less developed countries is ambiguous, contradictory and diverse. There is little evidence that globalization has promoted more balanced urban systems. Rather there is an urban patchwork made up of metropolitan complexes that concentrate a country's economic and population resources, specialized industrial cities more closely connected to the global economy than to their own national urban systems and borderless cities that co-opt the towns and cities of other countries. Adding to this patchwork are the large cities that are only to a minimum degree a functional part of the global economy, but which provide a livelihood for a displaced rural population, mainly through the informal economy. There are also cities whose growth are based on and contribute to the development of a provincial region, and this city type will often overlap with one of the first three types.

The diversity of urban systems makes generalization difficult across all city types. For the very large cities, the impact of economic globalization on labor markets and on the configuration of urban space accentuates economic insecurity and urban inequalities. Indirectly, it isolates low-

income populations, reducing the public spaces in which they interact with the better-off population as private facilities for health, education and recreation spring up around the city. At the same time, globalization has promoted a greater awareness on the part of governments, international organizations, and citizens of the need for innovation in social policy. It has also promoted the spread of information of their rights among low-income populations.

Whereas economic policy is bereft of new ideas, social policy has become the forum for discussing alternative ways forward. The fiscal austerity imposed by economic policy make these something of an illusion, but they are illusions that generate much debate and much activity at the local level. The local level is now, much more than in the past, a dynamic interface where state, international organizations, NGOs and the poor interrelate. It is thus likely to alter the nature of urban government. Authoritarian bureaucracy combined with clientelism might have been sufficient in the past to order the large cities of the less developed world. Now control is more likely to depend on subtler forms of control, combined with at least the appearance of citizen participation.

Table 1. Rates of Urbanization 1950-2000

	% Urban in 1950	Rate of Urbanization					% Urban in 2000
		1950-1960	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	
AFRICA	14.7	2.32	2.24	1.71	1.55	1.56	31.8
Angola	7.6	3.21	3.59	3.34	2.77	2.15	34.2
Dem Rep of Congo	19.1	1.55	3.06	-0.54	-0.27	0.80	30.3
Egypt	31.9	1.71	1.09	0.38	-0.06	-0.21	42.7
Ethiopia	4.6	3.36	2.90	1.98	1.94	1.99	15.5
Kenya	5.6	2.76	3.36	4.45	4.01	3.29	33.4
Nigeria	10.1	3.49	3.28	2.97	2.66	2.29	44.1
South Africa	43.1	0.79	0.25	0.07	0.14	1.52	56.9
Tanzania	3.8	2.18	3.50	7.91	3.86	3.96	32.3
Uganda	3.1	4.95	4.52	0.99	2.38	2.38	14.2
Zambia	8.9	6.66	5.61	2.77	-0.10	0.05	39.6
ASIA	17.4	1.77	1.18	1.39	1.85	1.47	32.3
China	12.5	2.47	0.84	1.19	3.35	2.67	35.8
India	17.3	0.40	0.96	1.55	1.02	0.80	27.7
Indonesia	12.4	1.63	1.58	2.61	3.27	2.86	41.0
Korea	21.4	2.61	3.85	3.34	2.61	1.03	81.9
Malaysia	20.4	2.67	2.29	2.29	1.70	1.42	57.4
Pakistan	17.5	2.32	1.19	1.20	0.85	0.80	33.1
Philippines	27.1	1.10	0.85	1.28	2.63	1.83	58.6
Thailand	10.5	1.74	0.62	2.45	0.95	0.57	19.8
LATIN AMERICA*	41.9	1.68	1.51	1.22	0.89	0.18	71.1
Argentina	65.3	1.19	0.63	0.56	0.43	0.19	88.2
Bolivia	33.9	0.82	0.78	1.34	2.01	1.15	62.3
Brazil	36.5	2.23	2.14	1.67	1.12	0.82	81.2
Chile	58.4	1.49	1.03	0.77	0.25	0.30	85.8
Colombia	42.1	1.54	1.41	1.01	0.93	0.87	75.0
Mexico	42.7	1.74	1.51	1.17	0.88	0.53	76.4
Peru	35.5	2.65	2.15	1.18	0.65	0.55	72.8
Guatemala	29.5	0.95	0.91	0.51	0.18	0.40	39.7
WESTERN ASIA	26.7	2.71	2.38	1.53	1.82	0.42	62.0
Turkey	21.3	3.32	2.56	1.31	3.35	0.72	65.8

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, UNPD.

*Includes the Caribbean.

Table 2. Primacy and Largest Cities 1950-2000

	% Largest City of Total Urban Population				Rate of Growth of Largest City minus Rate of natural increase of Population				
	1950	1970	1980	2000	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-00
AFRICA									
Angola	44.1	54.9	62.3	60.0	3.08	5.91	4.61	2.77	1.78
Dem Rep of Congo	7.4	22.2	28.4	32.8	7.28	8.26	1.95	1.31	0.63
Egypt	34.6	35.8	35.7	32.7	1.89	1.25	0.34	-0.58	-0.57
Ethiopia	46.2	29.3	31.9	27.1	0.72	0.97	2.83	1.21	1.09
Kenya	24.9	45.3	32.8	21.8	6.44	5.69	1.20	1.06	2.18
Nigeria	9.5	14.8	14.9	17.3	7.44	3.70	3.05	3.27	3.17
South Africa*	29.2	26.9	25.8	24.7	0.27	-0.03	-0.37	-0.04	1.29
Tanzania	26.1	42.5	29.7	18.7	4.73	5.83	4.32	1.41	1.78
Uganda	32.9	45.3	43.0	36.8	6.82	5.83	0.48	1.46	1.73
Zambia	12.0	21.9	22.8	40.0	9.67	8.59	3.18	2.85	2.71
ASIA									
China (2 Largest)	13.3	13.3	10.6	5.2	2.87	0.15	-0.76	0.33	-0.97
India (2 Largest)	12.0	11.9	11.2	10.4	0.51	0.78	0.87	0.65	0.51
Indonesia	14.7	19.1	17.9	12.7	4.25	1.55	1.99	0.52	2.14
Korea	23.5	40.9	38.2	25.8	6.33	5.67	2.67	1.24	-1.51
Malaysia	16.7	12.4	15.9	10.8	2.16	-0.17	4.76	-0.64	-0.11
Pakistan	14.8	20.3	22.1	21.5	3.80	2.86	2.09	0.46	0.87
Phillipines	28.5	29.3	33.1	22.5	0.85	1.40	2.48	0.52	0.07
Thailand	66.1	64.8	60.2	59.2	1.54	0.62	1.76	0.49	0.85
LATIN AMERICA									
Argentina	45.0	44.8	42.6	36.8	1.11	0.67	0.05	-0.27	-0.57
Bolivia	34.7	35.8	33.2	28.1	1.06	0.86	0.59	0.67	0.82
Brazil (2 Largest)	27.9	28.5	26.5	20.7	2.93	1.67	0.93	-0.54	0.02
Chile	37.4	39.3	41.1	41.9	2.02	0.99	1.23	0.43	0.29
Colombia	12.8	18.7	20.6	21.5	3.63	3.16	1.95	0.98	1.24
Guatemala	48.9	35.4	29.4	71.8	-0.71	-0.64	-1.36	5.56	3.96
Mexico	24.4	29.4	29.0	23.9	2.66	2.45	1.05	-0.46	-0.07
Peru	35.9	38.7	39.3	39.9	2.88	2.67	1.35	0.61	0.71
WESTERN ASIA									
Turkey	24.2	20.5	22.5	20.4	1.99	2.23	2.21	1.69	1.41

Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision. UNPD.

* Defined as the metro complex of Johannesburg, East Rand and Pretoria.

References

- Abu-Lughod, Janet, 1980. Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Appadurai, A. 2000. "Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination". Public Culture, 12(1): 119.
- Ariza, Marina, 2003. "La urbanización en México en el último cuarto del siglo XX: Avance de investigación". Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Center for Migration and Urbanization, University of Texas at Austin.
- Armstrong, William. & Terrence G. McGee 1985. Theatres of Accumulation. London & New York: Methuen.
- Beaverstock, J.V. R.G. Smith and P.J. Taylor, 2000. "World City Network: a new metageography." Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 90(1) 123-134.
- Bebbington, A. and Farrington, J. 1993. "Governments, NGOs and Agricultural Development: Perspectives on Changing Inter-Organisational Relationships," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (2): 199-219.
- Berry, Brian J.L 1961. "City Size Distributions and Economic Development." Economic Development and Cultural Change 9:573-588.
- Berry, Brian J.L. 1973. The Human Consequences Of Urbanization: Divergent Paths In The Urban Experience Of The Twentieth Century. London: Macmillan.
- Browning, Harley and Bryan Roberts. 1980. Urbanization, Sectoral transformation, and the utilization of labor in Latin America. Comparative Urban Research, 8: 86-104.
- Caldeira, Teresa, 2000. City of Walls: Crime, segregation, and citizenship in Sao Paulo. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cerrutti, Marcela. 2003. Latin American Urbanization in Late Twentieth Century: Progress Report on Argentina. Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Center for Migration and Urbanization, University of Texas at Austin.

- Dammert, Lucía, 2003. 'La (in) seguridad ciudadana en la Región Metropolitana de Santiago 1980-2000: Temas, tendencias y desafíos.' Progress Report on Chile Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Center for Migration and Urbanization, University of Texas at Austin.
- Deyo, F.C. 1986. "Industrialization and the structuring of asian labor movements: the 'gang of four'." In M. Hanagan and C. Stephenson (eds.), Confrontation, Class Consciousness and the Labor Process: 167-198. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2002a. Globalization and Development. Santiago de Chile: United Nations/ECLAC.
- ECLAC. 2002b. Foreign Investment in Latin American and the Caribbean, 2001. Santiago de Chile, ECLAC.
- Evans, Peter, 2000. "Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization." Contemporary Sociology, 29 (1): 230-241.
- Evans, P. (ed.) 2002. Livable Cities? Urban Struggles for Livelihood and Sustainability. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Feagin, J. R., 1988. Free Enterprise City. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Friedmann, John and G. Wolff. 1982. "World city formation: an agenda for research and action," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 6: 309-344.
- Frisbie, W. Parker and John D. Kasadra, 1988. "Spatial Processes" Pp. 629-666, in N. Smelser (ed.) Handbook of Sociology. Sage: Newbury Park, CA.
- Frisbie, W. Parker. 2001. Human Ecology: Insights on Demographic Behavior. Pp.6978-84, in Paul Baltes and Neil Smelser (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, v. 10 Elsevier Science.
- Frobel, F et al. (1980) The New International Division of Labour. CUP, Cambridge.
- Gar-on Yeh, Anthony and Xueqiang Xu, 1996. "Globalization and the urban system in China." In Lo, Fu-chen and Y. Yeung (eds.), Emerging world cities in Pacific Asia.
- Garza, Gustavo. 1999. Global economy, metropolitan dynamics and urban policies in Mexico. Cities, 16(3):149-170.
- Gereffi, Gary and Miguel Korzeniewicz (eds.), 1994. Commodity chains and global capitalism. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.

- Gilbert, Alan, 1998. "World Cities and the Urban Future: the View From Latin America" pp. 174-203 in Lo, Fu-Chen, and Yue-man Yeung (eds.).
- Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC). Website at <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/>.
- Gonzalez de la Rocha, Mercedes, 2002. 'From the resources of poverty to the poverty of resources.'
- Gugler, Joseph. 2002. "Introduction" In J. Gugler (ed) World Cities in Poor Countries. Forthcoming. Also as Research Bulletin 94, Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network.
- Gugler, Josef and William G. Flanagan, 1978. Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Peter, 1998. "Globalization and the World Cities", pp.12-37 in Fu-Chen, Lo and Yue-man Yeung (eds.).
- Hansen, N. 1990. "Impacts of small and intermediate size cities on population distribution." Regional Development Dialogue 11: 60-75.
- Hart, Keith, 1987. "Rural-urban migration in West Africa." In J. Eades (ed.), Migrants, Workers, and the Social Order: 65-81. London: Tavistock.
- Hawley, Amos. 1968. "Human Ecology." Pp. 323-332 in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D.L.Sills, New York: Crowell, Collier and Macmillan.
- Henderson, Vernon, 2002a. "Urbanization in Developing Countries." World Bank Research Observer, 17(1):89-112.
- Henderson, Vernon. 2002b. "Urban primacy, external costs, and quality of life." Resource and Energy Economics 24: 95-106.
- Jelin, E. (1996) 'Citizenship Revisted: Solidarity, Responsibility, and Rights', in E. Jelin and E. Hershberg (eds.), Constructing Democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 101-119.
- Jones, Gavin W. and Pravin Visaria (eds.), 1997. Urbanization in Large Developing Countries: China, Indonesia, Brazil, and India. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- King, A. 1990. Global Cities. London and New York: Routledge.

- Leeds, Anthony, 1969: The significant variables determining the character of squatter settlements. America Latina 12, 3, 44-86.
- Leeds, Anthony. 1971. 'The culture of poverty concept: conceptual, logical, and empirical problems, with perspectives from Brazil and Peru,' in E. Leacock, The Culture of Poverty: a Critique, New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 226-84.
- Lipton, Micahel. 1977. Why poor people stay poor: a study of urban bias in world development. London: Temple Smith.
- Lo, Fu-chen. and Y. Yeung (eds.), 1998. Globalization and the World of Large Cities. United Nations University Press: Tokyo · New York · Paris. Available from World Wide Web
- Lo, Fu-chen. and Y. Yeung (eds.), 1996. Emerging world cities in Pacific Asia. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- MacLeod, G. 2001. "New regionalism reconsidered: Globalization and the remaking of political economic space." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 25(4) 804-32.
- Macleod, Scott and T. G. McGee, 1996. "The Singapore-Jahore-Riau growth triangle." In Lo, Fu-chen and Y. Yeung (eds.), Emerging world cities in Pacific Asia.
- Mangin, William. 1967. "Latin American squatter settlements: a problem and a solution". Latin American Research Review 2: 65-98.
- Marcuse, P and R. van Kempen, 2000. 'Introduction' Pp 1-21 in Marcuse, P. and R. van Kempen (eds.) 2000. Globalizing cities : a new spatial order? Oxford and Malden, Mass: Blackwell.
- Martine, George and Clélio Campolina Diniz, 1997. "Economic and Demographic Concentration in Brazil: Recent Inversion of Historical Patterns." Pp.205-227 in G.W. Jones and P. Visaria, Urbanization in Large Developing Countries.
- Mitchell B. R. 1975. European historical statistics, 1750-1970. New York: Colombia University Press.
- Mohan, Rakesh. 1997. "Industrial Location Policies and their Implications for India." Pp 289-314 in G.W.Jones and P. Visaria, Urbanization in Large Developing Countries.

- Nelson, Paul. 1995. The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations: The Limits of Apolitical Development. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nemeth, Roger J. & David A. Smith, 1985. "The political economy of contrasting urban hierarchies in South Korea and the Philippines." In M. Timberlake (ed.), Urbanization in the World-Economy:183-206. Orlando: Academic Press.
- Noyelle, T. and T. M. Stanback, 1984. The Economic Transformation of American Cities. Totowa, N.J.:Towman and Allanheld.
- Portes, Alejandro and John Walton, 1976. Urban Latin America: The political condition from above and below. Austin and London: The University of Texas Press.
- Portes, Alejandro and John Walton, 1981. Labor, Class and the International System, New York: Academic Press.
- Portes, Alejandro, 1989. "Latin American urbanization during the years of the crisis," Latin American Research Review 24, 3: 7-49.
- Retamoso, A and Gabriel Corbo, 2003. 'Una Aproximación Al Fenómeno De La Delincuencia Y Criminalidad En Montevideo'. Websites, Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Center for Migration and Urbanization, University of Texas at Austin.
- Roberts, Bryan. 1978. Cities of Peasants. London: Edward Arnold.
- Roberts, Bryan. 1995. The Making of Citizens. London: Arnold.
- Raza, M. et al. 1981 "India: urbanization and national development," In M. Honjo (ed.), Urbanization and Regional Development: 71-96. Nagoya, Japan: Maruzen Asia.
- Sabatini, F and Yasna Contreras, 2003. "Chile: Evolución De La Concentración Demográfica Y Económica En El Sistema Urbano Nacional (1970-2002). Websites, Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Center for Migration and Urbanization, University of Texas at Austin.
- Sassen, S., 2000. "Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization". Public Culture, 12(1): 215-232.
- Sassen, S., 1998. Urban Impacts of Economic Globalization. Occasional Paper No. 5. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.
- Sassen, S., 1994. Cities in a World Economy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge/Sage.

- Sassen, Saskia, 1991. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Soegijoko, Budhy Tjahjati S and B.S. Kusbiantoro ., 2001. "Globalization and the sustainability of Jabotabek, Indonesia". In Lo, Fu-chen and Peter Marcotulio (eds.), Globalization and the Sustainability of Cities in the Asia Pacific Region. Tokyo: United Nations University.
- Skinner, George W.(ed.), 1977. The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Smith, David A. 2003. "Rediscovering Cities and Urbanization in the 21st Century World-System." In Wilma A. Dunaway (ed.) Emerging issues in the 21st century world-system, Vol. 2. Westport CT: Praeger.
- Soja, E. 1986 "Taking Los Angeles apart." Environment and Planning D: 255-72.
- Soja, E. 1987. "Economic restructuring and the internationalization of the Los Angeles region,' In M.P.Smith and J.R.Feagin (eds.), The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring and Community Politics, pp.178-198. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Spink, Peter, 1999. "Possibilities and Political Imperatives: Seventy Years of Administrative Reform in Latin America." In L. Bresser Pereira and P. Spink (eds.), Reforming the State: Managerial Public Administration in Latin America. Boulder, Co. and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Taylor, Peter. 2000. "World cities and territorial states under conditions of contemporary globalization" Political Geography, 19(1): 5-32.
- Thong, Lee Boon, 1996. "Emerging urban trends and the globalizing economy in Malaysia." In Lo, Fu-chen and Y. Yeung (eds.), Emerging world cities in Pacific Asia.
- Timberlake, Michael. 1985. Urbanization in the world-economy. Orlando : Academic Press.
- Turner, J.F.C. 1967. 'Barriers and channels for housing development in modernizing countries.' Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 33: 167-81.
- Turner, J.F.C. 1968. 'The squatter settlement: an architecture that works.' Architectural Design 38: 357-60.
- UNCTAD, 2002. The World Investment Report 2002. Geneva: United Nations.

- Valladares, Licia and Edmond Préteceille, 2003. “Análisis e Problemas Metodológicas no Estudo do sistema urbano, do mercado do trabalho e da violência urbano o caso do Brasil.” Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Center for Migration and Urbanization, University of Texas at Austin.
- Visaria, Pravin, 1997. “Urbanization in India: An Overview.” Pp 266-288, in G.W.Jones and P. Visaria, Urbanization in Large Developing Countries.
- Vivian, Jessica. 1994. “NGOs and Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe: No Magic Bullets,” in Development and Change, 25: 167-193.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1974 The Modern World-System I. New York: Academic Press
- Walton, John, 1977. “Accumulation and Comparative Urban Systems: Theory and some tentative contrasts of Latin America and Africa.” Comparative Urban Research, 5 (1) 5-18.
- World Bank, 1999. Global Debt Funding. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank, 2003a. Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 2003. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- World Bank, 2003b. Global Development Finance: Country and Summary Data. Washington, D.C. IBRD.